Venture capital private equity and the trade-off between family and economic goals in family firms by Rottke Becker, Olaf Matthaeus
 UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y 
EMPRESARIALES 
Departamento de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad III  
(Economía y Administración Financiera de la Empresa) 
 
 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY AND THE TRADE-
OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN 
FAMILY FIRMS 
 
EL CAPITAL RIESGO Y LA ELECCION ENTRE 
OBJETIVOS DE LA FAMILIA Y OBJETIVOS 
ECONOMICOS EN EMPRESAS FAMILIARES 
 
 
 MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR 
PRESENTADA POR 
Olaf Matthaeus Rottke Becker 
 
Bajo la dirección de los doctores 
  
José Martí Pellón 
Annalisa Croce 
 
 
Madrid, 2014 
 
 
© Olaf Matthaeus Rottke Becker, 2013 
 UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO FINANZAS DE EMPRESA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Venture Capital/Private Equity and the trade-off 
between family and economic goals in  
Family Firms  
 
El Capital Riesgo y la eleccion entre objetivos de la 
familia y objetivos economicos en  
empresas familiares 
 
PhD THESIS  
DOCTORAL DEGREE IN ‘FINANZAS DE EMPRESA’ 
 
Olaf Matthaeus Rottke Becker 
(Universidad Complutense de Madrid / Zeppelin University) 
 
Director: José Martí Pellón 
(Universidad Complutense de Madrid) 
 
Co-Director: Annalisa Croce 
(Politecnico di Milano) 
 
Madrid, June 2013 
 
  
  
  
Venture Capital/Private Equity and the 
trade-off between family and economic goals in  
Family Firms  
  
  
A mi familia,  
mis padres, Martin, Doerte,  
Alexandra, Lea y Ole, a quienes 
 debo todo lo que soy 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
6 
This PhD thesis is not solely my effort. It has benefited greatly from the 
help of a large number of people who have provided support and guidance 
directly or indirectly. My deepest gratitude is to you all. 
For their guidance and encouragement, I would especially like to thank 
Professor José Martí Pellón from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
(Spain) and to Professor Annalisa Croce from the Politecnico di Milano (Italy). 
Both shared with me a lot of their expertise and research insight. Their very 
helpful assistance improved the quality of this PhD thesis. I am indebted to 
both of them. Thanks especially to Professor Martí for accepting to be my 
supervisor, despite his many academic and professional commitments. 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Stephan A. Jansen, 
President of Zeppelin University and Holder of the Chair for Strategic 
Organization and Finance for his fundamental help, motivation, inspiration, 
support in this work and my scientific career. This help has been essential to 
me in my career so far. 
I have to express special thanks to Prof. Alvaro Tresierra (Universidad de 
Piura, Peru) for the very helpful discussions in Madrid and Peru, for helping me 
in structuring my work and his tremendous recommendations for challenging 
research questions as well as the secrets of STATA.  
Thanks to Prof. Maria Alejandra Ferrer (Universidad de Zulia, Venezuela) 
for her assistance in STATA, her scientific help and support in the 
organizational things, especially at the beginning and at the end.  
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
7 
Thanks to both of them for their help in the structuring of the dataset. In 
addition I would like to thank the whole team of research assistants of 
Professor José Martí Pellón for the support in the data collection process for 
this PhD thesis. 
My particular thanks go to Dominique Barthel from ASRCI for her very 
helpful assistance at the beginning and her contacts.  
Great thanks I have to give to Bernd Wieczorek (Chairman of Egon 
Zehnder Germany) for his introduction and opening his contacts for me, 
especially the research with Prof. Stephan Jansen. In this vein I would like to 
thank my partner Alard von Rohr and to give also thanks to Prof. Sabine Rau 
(WHU) for her helpful introduction to family firms’ research and challenges of 
the interaction with VC/PE investors. Also thanks to Prof. Gerhardt Wolff 
(University of Leipzig) as well as Prof. Arpad von Lazar (Instituto Empresa) for 
their help, especially within the context of the German database. 
For the structuring of my ideas and his very helpful guidance in the first 
steps I would especially like to thank Prof. Thomas Zellweger (Center for 
Family Business, St. Gallen University). Prof. Cristina Cruz (Instituto Empresa) 
for her guidance in Spanish universities, her help and ideas for my research 
until now. Also thanks to Prof. Josep Tapies (IESE) for his thoughts and 
invitation. Thanks to Prof. Daniel Lorenzo (Universidad de Cadiz) for very 
helpful discussions. Special thanks I have to express to my friend from 
economy studies in Hamburg Jörn Quitzau (Deutsche Bank Research) and 
André Kunkel (Ifo Institute) for their very helpful ideas at the beginning. 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
8 
My gratitude is also given to Prof. Olaf Gierhake from Swiss Partners as 
well as Sebastian Schubert for their help in this thesis. To Dennis Kaiser 
(Macquarie Group) special thanks for practical discussions, especially in Brasil. 
To Dr. Bischoff (Greenwich Capital) as wells as Alexander Eichner (Spark 
Group) I would like to express special thanks for discussions, their contacts 
and ideas. Furthermore, thanks to Jose Alvarez (Arcano Family Office) for 
helpful insights. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Erik Schlie (Instituto Empresa) 
for his ideas and advice for my scientific career. For her helpful comments in 
Barcelona I give thanks to Prof. Luisa Alemany (Esade Business School). 
Thanks a lot to Prof. Matthias Nordqvist, Prof. Francesco Chirico, Prof. Leif 
Melin, and the other research colleges from Jönköping Business School for 
their helpful criticism and discussion in Jönköping. 
For their support in building a German Database and perspective I 
express my gratitude to André Hülsböhmer and Michael Hedtstück (Finance-
Magazin), as well as Ursula Koners (Friedrichshafen Institute for Family 
Firms). Furthermore I would like to thank especially my assistants Diana 
Arendt and Denitsa Silver for their tremendous support, persistence and 
endurance with me. Additionally to Saskia Stahl and the whole team of A-Pro 
Just Classics! for their fundamental support and performance in my absence. 
Further thanks go to my colleagues and friends from Zeppelin University 
for very helpful discussions, comments and their hospitality, especially to Prof. 
Mark Mietzner, Prof. Reinhard Prügl, Prof. Marcel Tyrell, Prof. Christian Opitz, 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
9 
Lisa Henley, Rieke Schüss, Kathrin Haberle, Tim Göbel, Ulrich Hutschek, 
Wolfgang Spiess-Knafl, Andreas Bindert, Andrea Böttcher, Linn Rampl and 
Inga Wobker. Special thanks to Rieke in addition for her lovely support and 
specific help. Thanks to Karina Duchardt as presidents’ personal assistant for 
her fundamental help. For handling my travel organization and issues thanks 
to Svenja Heib from the central secretary as well as the whole checkin-team. 
For helping me especially in the first stage of this thesis I would like to 
give deep thanks to my friend Maria del Valle García Bersabé. Not only the 
first Spanish letters to universities, but furthermore for explaining to me the 
(former) distinctive system of a Spanish dissertation. Without her tremendous 
help I would not have started this adventure. 
For explaining all the wonderful challenges of the Spanish language great 
thanks to my friend Gaspar from Escuela Hispalense in Tarifa. His knowledge 
and infinite patience has made every Spanish lesson a wonderful event and 
motivated me to continue in Spain.  
For their patience, hospitality and support in Madrid and Zurich I wish to 
thank my friends Marco Seiz, Karin Zenhauser and Daisy Ray.  
Thanks to my friends in Madrid, especially to my girlfriend Cristina for her 
help and permanent understanding. In addition Borja, Bea, Jesus, Antonio, 
Cristina, Javier, Idoia, Stephany and my long-term flatmate Claudia and 
Daniel Rodriguez among others for motivating me, always listening to my “big 
small” worries and their attempt to help and understand my permanent lack of 
time. 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
10 
Thanks also to my German friends, Brit, Mirela, Ferdinand, Mülli, Isabelle, 
Eva and Ulrich, Sabine and Christian, Frederik, Phillip and Stefanie, Niko, Anke 
Nietsche and Beate among others for encourage me to continue on my way. 
Finally, the most important thanks I have to give to my family, including 
especially my parents, Martin and Dörte, Alexandra, Lea and Ole for 
accompanying me through this “long journey” and always listening to my 
doubts and worries. Without their love, patience and permanent, reliable 
support this work wouldn’t have been possible for me. There is no sufficient 
way to express my gratitude to them. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
12 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 11 
LIST OF TABLES 15 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 
RESUMEN 35 
CHAPTER 1  
FAMILY FIRMS, FAMILINESS AND RELUCTANCE  
TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL FINANCING 55 
1.1. Introduction 56 
1.2. Overview on family ownership and managerial control 59 
1.2.1 How to define family-Controlled BusinesseS (FCBs) 59 
1.2.2 How to measure familiness – the socioemotional wealth model 62 
1.2.3 Distinctive Nature of Family Firms 68 
1.2.3.1 Family Firms’ life cycles 68 
1.2.3.2 Growth and investment Behavior 69 
1.2.3.3 Financing 71 
1.2.3.4 Succession 73 
1.3 Overview on Venture Capital and Private Equity 74 
1.3.1 Fundamentals of Venture Capital and Private Equity 74 
1.3.2 The idiosyncrasy of the VC/PE investment process 76 
1.3.3 Distinctive impact of VC/PE 80 
1.3.3.1 Easing financial constraints in SMEs 80 
1.3.3.2 Increase productivity 81 
1.4. FCBs and VC/PE - Obstacles and opportunities 84 
1.4.1. SEW preservation and utility maximization 85 
1.4.2. Causality of VC/PE impact in FCBs 90 
1.5. References 94 
  
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
13 
CHAPTER 2  
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH,  
GENERATIONS AND VC/PE INVOLVEMENT  
IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED BUSINESSES 110 
2.1. Introduction 111 
2.2. Socioemotional wealth and venture capital in family businesses 113 
2.3. Data and methodology 119 
2.3.1. Description of the sample 119 
2.3.2. Models and methodology 122 
2.3.3. Descriptive statistics 126 
2.4. Results 128 
2.5. Further evidence on screening 134 
2.6. Conclusions 139 
2.7. References 141 
CHAPTER 3  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY   
IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED FIRMS AND THE IMPACT   
OF VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING 150 
3.1. Introduction 151 
3.2. The investment cash flow sensitivity 154 
3.2.1. Previous literature on the investment cash-flow sensitivity 154 
3.2.2. Investment cash flow sensitivity in FCBs 156 
3.3. The effect of VC/PE on the investment-cash flow sensitivity of FCBs 160 
3.4. Empirical strategy 162 
3.4.1. Sample description 162 
3.4.2. Models and estimation methodology 166 
3.4.3. Descriptive statistics 172 
 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
14 
3.5. Results 175 
3.6. Conclusions and discussion 184 
3.7. References 186 
CHAPTER 4  
THE IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL  
ON FAMILY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 196 
4.1. Introduction 197 
4.2. Family firms, Venture capital/Private Equity (VC/PE)  
and its impact on firm growth 200 
4.2.1 VC/PE impact on firm performance and growth 200 
4.2.2. Roles venture capital/Private Equity can play in family firms 205 
4.3. Data and methodology 212 
4.3.1. Data and sample selection 212 
4.3.2. Models and methodology 219 
4.3.3. Descriptive statistics 222 
4.4. Results 227 
4.5. Conclusion and discussion 233 
4.6. References 236 
CHAPTER 5      CONCLUSIONS 248 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
LIST OF TABLES 
16 
CHAPTER 2 
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH, GENERATIONS AND VC/PE  
INVOLVEMENT IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED BUSINESSES 110 
TABLE 2.1.  FULL SAMPLE OF VC/PE-BACKED FCBS  
AND NON-FCBS FIRMS 121 
TABLE 2.2.  BREAKDOWN OF VC/PE-BACKED FCBS BY SIZE  
CONSIDERING THE GENERATION IN WHICH THE VC/PE 
INVESTOR WAS INVOLVED 122 
TABLE 2.3.  PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT DESCRIPTIVE  
STATISTICS OF COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 126 
TABLE 2.4.  SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF  
VC/PE ON TFP GROWTH IN VC/PE-BACKED  
FCBS AND NON-FCBS. 129 
TABLE 2.5.  SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF VC/PE 
ON TFP GROWTH IN VC/PE-BACKED FCBS ACROSS 
GENERATIONS 133 
TABLE 2.6.  PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VC/PE-BACKED VS NON-VC/PE-
BACKED FCBS. 136 
TABLE 2.7.  SELECTION BY VC/PE IN FIRST  
AND FOLLOWING GENERATIONS FCBS 138 
 
CHAPTER 3  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED 
FIRMS AND THE  
IMPACT  OF VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING 150 
TABLE 3.1.  FULL SAMPLE OF VC/PE-BACKED  
AND CONTROL GROUP (CG) FCBS. 165 
TABLE 3.2.  VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 167 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
LIST OF TABLES 
17 
TABLE 3.3.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 173 
TABLE 3.4.  FCB'S INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  
IN THE PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD 179 
TABLE 3.5.  IMPACT OF VC/PE ON FCB'S  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  
AND INVESTMENT RATE 181 
CHAPTER 4  
THE IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL  
ON FAMILY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 196 
TABLE 4.1.  SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: NUMBER OF FIRMS 215 
TABLE 4.2.  SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: SIZE OF FIRMS 217 
TABLE 4.3.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF GROWTH 223 
TABLE 4.4.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EMPLOYEES  
AND ASSET GROWTH 225 
TABLE 4.5.  REGRESSION RESULTS: VC/PE INVESTOR  
HOLDING MINORITY STAKES, UP TO FIVE YEARS AFTER THE 
INITIAL INVESTMENT 228 
TABLE 4.6.  REGRESSION RESULTS: VC/PE  
INVESTOR HOLDING MAJORITY STAKES, UP TO FIVE YEARS 
AFTER THE INITIAL INVESTMENT 231 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
19 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Family-controlled businesses (FCBs, henceforth) are the most prevalent 
type of business in most countries worldwide and are responsible for a major 
part of gross domestic product, growth acceleration and sustainability in their 
economies (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobsen, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007). FCBs are widespread across business cycles, firm age and size. 
Although they are often popularly connected with ‘the small firm with some 
employees around the corner’, in most countries large FCBs play an important 
role. In Spain, El Corte Ingles, Banco Santander or ACS, among others, are 
well known examples. Similarly, in Germany we could cite Volkswagen, 
Schaeffler or Henkel. 
Research has lacked a common model to describe the factors that 
describe the ‘familiness’ of FCBs. It is also difficult to find a commonly 
accepted definition of FCBs. Different attempts to define FCBs can be found in 
Handler (1989), Habbershon and Williams (1999), Shanker and Astrachan 
(1996), Astrachan, Klein, and Smyrnios (2002), Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester, and Canella Jr. (2007), or Cruz, Gomez Mejia, and Becerra (2010), 
among others. Additionally, due to data constraints, researchers often 
formulate specific definitions of FCBs serving their research purposes. For this 
reason the results of studies focusing on FCBs are not always easy to 
compare. 
The role of emotions and other linked characteristics that are not 
measurable in a quantitative study have not been included in most definitions, 
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though in the last decade there was some progress on this issue. Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2007) marked fundamental progress in research. They integrated 
behavioral theory into family firm research and focused on possible reasons for 
family principals’ behavior. They create the socioemotional wealth model to 
describe ‘familiness’ (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & de Castro, 2011). This 
new model has rapidly reached acceptance since its publication in the 
literature. The authors use a sample of Spanish family firms of a simple but 
comparable type, namely olive oil mills. This allows them to concentrate on 
the central research questions without the distortion of firm diversity.  
In this framework, we should highlight that FCBs face important 
challenges such as growth and succession. In the initial phase after the 
foundation of a business, FCBs first use their internal resources to make it 
grow. They usually prefer to maintain control while neglecting external 
financing. This often limits the capacity to take advantage of their growth 
opportunities. Growth thus depends on the availability of external resources to 
finance investment activities, particularly in young and small firms. Financial 
shortage is often accompanied by a lack of experience in succession planning, 
which further limits growth potential and future survival of FCBs. FCBs have to 
decide between family members’ personal goals and firm’s economic and 
financial goals. Their wish to maintain control and stakes within the family 
across the generations makes FCBs reluctant to seek external financing and 
limits firms’ success. The wish to accomplish the transfer of stakes and 
management to subsequent generations additionally limits the access to a pool 
of professional managers and, hence, affects FCBs’ performance. 
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Venture capital and private equity (Hereinafter, VC/PE) is a pool of 
capital mainly provided by institutional investors and managed by 
professionals that is invested in businesses with high potential and high risk 
(Sahlman, 1990). VC/PE investors are used to reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetries as inside investors (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). 
VC/PE offer not only capital but also value-adding services. They are more 
willing to take risks and offer value-adding support that leads to 
improvements in efficiency (Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011). As 
financial intermediaries (Chan, 1983), they also help in mitigating financial 
constraints in growing firms (Bertoni, Ferrer, & Martí, 2013). Therefore, they 
seem to be an optimal partner for FCBs. Despite their importance, FCBs have 
been underrepresented in VC/PE portfolios until now (Martí, Menéndez, & 
Rottke, 2013) and there is a gap in research aimed at understanding the 
limited presence of FCBs in the portfolios of VC/PE institutions. 
This research aims to contribute to filling this gap and to shed light on 
the interaction between FCBs and VC/PE and how the latter can create value in 
FCBs. The analyses carried out in this study are based on a representative 
sample of unlisted Spanish FCBs in which a VC/PE firm invested in. Although 
mature firms are included, there is a special focus on firms at the expansion 
stage, as growth and succession play a major role and deserve the closest 
attention to ensure their sustainable survival. Data on the pre-investment 
period is used to analyze the motives for approaching VC/PE, whereas data on 
the post-investment period is used to highlight the impact of VC/PE on the 
investee firms. 
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Data about VC/PE investment was obtained from the Spanish Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Association (ASCRI) and 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com. The accounting and ownership information was 
taken from the AMADEUS Database and the official Trade Registers. 
Additionally, a sample of non-VC/PE financed FCBs was taken from the 
AMADEUS Database.  
Based on the existing framework for describing familiness, two analyses 
are made to test the first central research question, namely what leads FCBs 
to approaching VC/PE financing. We assume that low performance may lead to 
a shift of family preferences that eliminates the reluctance to access external 
funding when the survival of the firm is at risk.  
We first measure performance by analyzing total factor productivity. We 
argue that those FCBs exhibiting low productivity growth could be anticipating 
problems endangering the future survival of the firm. But, since low 
productivity could be indicating an imbalance between inputs and outputs, we 
also resort to investment cash flow sensitivity as a proxy for financial 
constraints, which reflects the need for external financing in the short term.  
Secondly, we analyze the performance of FCBs after the initial VC/PE 
investment. We find that FCBs significantly increase productivity in their 
investee firms. Similarly, those firms exhibit a decrease in the dependency of 
investments to internally generated cash flows. These findings are highly 
significant in first generation FCBs.  
Nevertheless, even though VC/PE involvement leads to faster growth, 
we find that a minority or majority share held by the VC/PE investor affects 
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the rate of growth of the investee firm. In this regard, we find that VC/PE-
backed non-FCBs grow faster than VC/PE FCBs when the investor holds a 
minority share, whereas no differences are found when the investor holds a 
majority share. The empirical demonstration of the role of productivity and 
financial constraints as proxies for FCBs’ decision-making processes is a 
significant contribution to family business literature. It contributes to the 
discussion about the relation between family and financial goals and outlines 
circumstances under which a shift in the prevalence of family goals over 
financial goals can be expected. A second contribution is the additional 
evidence on the positive effect of VC/PE involvement on investee firms. In 
addition, performance differences between minority and majority 
shareholdings of VC/PE investors in FCBs underline the need to address the 
problems deriving from the conflict between family and investors’ 
management cultures. 
This Ph.D. thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 outlines the 
framework of analysis of the research, whereas chapters 2 to 4 include three 
empirical research pieces. In chapters 2 and 3 we analyze potential reasons 
that explain when the reluctance of FCBs to access external sources of funds 
disappears. These chapters also provide evidence of the positive post-
investment evolution of investee firms, especially in first generation FBCs. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the different effect of VC/PE involvement depending on 
the minority or majority shareholding of the VC/PE firm. The final chapter 
outlines the main findings and contributions to the literature and includes the 
main limitations as well as ideas for future research on this topic. 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 
The first subsection of chapter 1 introduces the concept of FCBs, as well 
as the components of familiness, and frames conditions for their business 
challenges and decisions. The role VC/PE institutions can play in their investee 
firms is described in the second subsection. In addition to screening, the 
positive effect exerted on the investee firm is marked by funding but also by 
added value. The limiting factors contributing to the reluctance of FCBs to 
approach external financing are critically reviewed in the light of current 
research and the incentives for this study are outlined in the third section. 
Furthermore the causality of VC/PE impact is described in the context of the 
distinctive characters of FCBs and the motives and challenges for the 
cooperation from a VC/PE perspective are highlighted as well as obstacles to 
be overcome, like pricing.  
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CHAPTER 2 
In chapter 2 we analyze why VC/PE investors are accepted as 
shareholders in first generation FCBs from the perspective of owners’ 
socioemotional wealth (SEW). We argue that family owners overcome their 
natural reluctance to accept an external shareholder to protect their SEW, 
because the future of the company could be in danger. In addition, we aim to 
analyze the impact of VC/PE involvement in FCBs in first and second or 
subsequent generations. We anticipate that the value-adding effects of VC/PE 
involvement should be more effective in first generation FCBs because the 
management culture is not as established, ownership dispersion is lower and 
the entrepreneurial orientation is higher than in FCBs in second or following 
generations. 
We resort total factor productivity (hereinafter, TFP) growth to measure 
performance, estimated as suggested by Blundell and Bond (2000). In 
addition, we follow Chemmanur et al. (2011) and Croce, Martí, and Murtinu 
(2013) to analyze productivity growth before and after the initial VC/PE 
investment.  
We focus our analyses on a large sample of VC-backed FCBs and non-
FCBs that received VC/PE funding between 1995 and 2005. Our results show 
that VC/PE institutions choose first generation FCBs showing significantly lower 
TFP growth levels than those found in non-FCBs or in FCBs in second or 
following generations. After the entry of the VC/PE investor, as expected, TFP 
growth is positive and significant in first generation FCBs, both in the long 
term and in the short term. The use of TFP allows us to control for the other 
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possible explanation for better performance (i.e. the funding received) of the 
investee firm, because we have already proved that first generation FCBs were 
not better than the rest of the investee firms. Therefore, we can explain the 
improved performance by the value-adding effect of VC/PE involvement, which 
is effective in improving the entrepreneurial orientation of the FCB managers. 
In addition, we find evidence of a greater effect on performance in first versus 
second or subsequent generations, which could be based on lower agency 
conflicts and higher entrepreneurial orientation in first generation FCBs. We 
argue that these reasons determine more room for performance improvement 
in the first generation. 
This chapter was presented as a paper co-authored with Annalisa Croce 
(Politecnico Di Milano) and José Martí (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) at 
the 2012 European Financial Management Association (EFMA) Annual 
Conference (Barcelona, June 2012) and at the European Institute for 
Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) 8th Workshop on Family Firms 
Research (Jönköping, 2012), where it was included in the shortlist for the 
IFERA-Best Paper Award, and published in their proceedings. Furthermore it 
was accepted at the European Academy of Management (EURAM) Annual 
Conference (Amsterdam, 2012). 
CHAPTER 3 
The findings of the second chapter leave some questions open. VC/PE 
managers are specialized investors with superior screening abilities (Sahlman, 
1990) that would not invest in low performing firms. Nevertheless, since 
productivity measures an increase in outputs relative to an increase in inputs, 
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we argue that low TFP growth found in first generation FCBs could be caused 
by an imbalance between inputs and outputs. In this way, low TFP could be 
indicating that the increase in inputs has not yet resulted in an increase in 
outputs thus signalling a problem of financial constraints.  
We analyze investment sensitivity to internally generated resources as a 
reference of financial constraints in unlisted FCBs that could lead to this 
financial hardship. We argue that highly constrained FCBs will be more inclined 
to accept the entry of external shareholders such as VC/PE institutions. In 
addition, we aim to check to what extent VC/PE involvement affects the 
existing dependency of investments on internally generated cash flows. We 
based our analyses on the Euler equation (Bond & Meghir, 1994), which allows 
us to control for growth opportunities and the use of debt.  
The scope of analysis is a sample of unlisted Spanish VC-backed FCBs 
that received VC/PE investment between 1995 and 2006. We analyze the 
investment sensitivity to cash flows before and after the initial VC investment. 
We find evidence of significant sensitivity of investments to cash flows 
before the initial VC/PE investment in all FCBs that received a VC/PE 
investment later. This dependency is also significant in first generation control 
group FCBs, but not in descendant generation control group FCBs. In addition, 
financial constraints are significantly higher in first generation VC/PE-backed 
FCBs than in similar control group firms. Despite their natural reluctance to 
accept external shareholders, we argue that the former accept the entry of a 
VC firm to carry out investments that are necessary for survival: this is in line 
with Poutziouris (2000), who affirms that a percentage of FCBs are willing to 
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access external sources to grow faster. In descendant generation VC/PE-
backed firms the results are not conclusive because it is more likely that some 
of them may approach VC/PE firms to find an exit for some/all shareholders 
rather than to finance growth.  
Regarding the effect of VC/PE involvement on financial constraints we 
find that, despite the lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, the dependency 
is not fully eliminated in VC/PE-backed FCBs but those firms are no longer 
more financially constrained than other non VC-backed FCBs. This finding 
holds for the whole sample and for the subsample of first generation FCBs. We 
argue that the sensitivity is not eliminated because the presence of VC 
investors will positively affect a growth-seeking attitude in the firm and 
investments will increase more than family shareholders initially planned. 
This chapter was presented as a paper co-authored with Annalisa Croce 
(Politecnico Di Milano) and José Martí (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) at 
the 2013 European Financial Management Association (EFMA) Annual 
Conference (Reading, June 2013) and at the 2013 International Family 
Enterprise Research Academy (IFERA) Annual Conference (St. Gallen, June 
2013), and published in their proceedings. Furthermore it was accepted at the 
European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) 9th 
Workshop on Family Firms Research (Helsinki, May 2013). 
CHAPTER 4 
In the third empirical work we explore different growth patterns in 
family vs. non-family VC/PE-backed firms when investors hold either a 
majority or a minority position. We hypothesize slower growth in FCBs when 
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compared to non-family businesses if the VC/PE firm holds a minority stake 
and non-significant differences when the VC/PE firm becomes a controlling 
stakeholder in the investee firm. We expect that minority VC stakes in family 
businesses hinder strategic decisions because two very different management 
cultures overlap. In this vein, the risk-aversion attitude predicted by agency 
theory in FCBs may create barriers for growth-oriented strategies that VC/PE 
managers aim to develop. Nevertheless, we expect no differences from non-
family businesses when the VC/PE firm takes a controlling position, since the 
acquirer’s management tradition will replace the existing family’s management 
culture. In this way, conflicts between both management traditions are less 
likely to occur, albeit the investee firm may lose part, or all, of the value 
related to the family reputation. We test the hypotheses proposed on a unique 
sample of Spanish VC investments made between 1995 and 2004. 
In accordance with the hypotheses proposed, our results show 
significant differences in the growth patterns found in family and non-family 
investee firms, with the latter showing statistically higher growth rates in firms 
where VC/PE firms held minority stakes. No differences were found between 
family and non-family firms’ growth when the VC/PE investor acquired a 
controlling stake in the investee firm. To sum up, VC/PE is an alternative way 
to fund family firm growth and to solve succession and other conflicts among 
heirs, even though the impact is lower than that found in other non-family 
investee firms when the VC firm holds minority stakes.  
This chapter was presented as a paper co-authored with Susana 
Menéndez-Requejo (Universidad de Oviedo) and José Martí (Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid) at European Institute for Advanced Studies in 
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Management (EIASM) 6th Workshop on Family Firms Research (Barcelona, 
2010) and at the 2011 International Family Enterprise Research Academy 
IFERA Annual Conference (Sicily, 2011). This paper is accepted for publication 
in Journal of World Business (JCR with 2011 impact factor of 2.383). 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The first aim of this study is to highlight the motivation for family 
principals to set different preferences between socioemotional “family” and 
financial goals. Only in the case of poor performance do financial goals become 
more salient. Since the desire to preserve SEW is highest in first generation 
FCBs, in the first two empirical works of this thesis we find that only first 
generation FCBs with low performance are more likely to approach VC/PE 
investors and this low performance is explained by the existence of financial 
constraints.  
In addition, we also aim to analyze the effect of VC/PE involvement in 
investee FCBs. Our results show a positive effect of VC/PE investments in 
FCBs, especially in the first generation. Nevertheless, we also find that the 
impact of investors’ involvement in FCBs could change depending on the 
minority or majority shareholding of VC/PE firms. A minority stake might not 
allow them to carry through necessary changes and activities to lead the firm 
to new growth paths, whereas a majority stake enables them to do so with the 
necessary power to decide and select adequate growth strategies.  
This work contributes to the previous literature in several ways. Firstly, 
it develops a young stream of literature including behavioural and corporate 
finance issues in FCBs. The prevalence of socioemotional wealth preservation 
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over financial goals is highlighted in FCBs. But this prevalence changes when 
firm survival is at risk. We provide insights on the motives family principals 
have to approaching external investors. Secondly, we provide insights on the 
positive effect of VC/PE involvement of FCBs, especially in the first generation. 
Thirdly, we highlight difficulties VC/PE investors may face when investing in 
FCBs, especially when they hold minority stakes. 
Future research should investigate further the reasons why FCBs do or 
do not approach VC/PE institutions, with a generational perspective, 
completing the initial evidence found in our empirical works. More research is 
also required on the evidence found of low performing first generation FCBs 
accessing VC/PE financing, because VC/PE institutions show superior screening 
abilities and would not be expected to invest in poorly performing firms. We 
argue that low productivity growth could indicate that those FCBs accessing 
VC/PE are financially constrained but other reasons related to family 
characteristics should also be investigated. 
As main limitations, we should mention that the scope of this study is 
limited to only one country. Even though the approach reduces heterogeneity 
across sample firms and the impact of environmental issues, the sample size 
is not large enough to provide more evidence on the research questions 
analyzed. 
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1. 1.  Introducción 
Las empresas familiares (en adelante, EF) constituyen el tipo de 
empresa más extendido en la mayoría de los países e influyen en gran medida 
en el producto interior bruto, en el crecimiento y en la sostenibilidad de sus 
economías (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobsen, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2007). Este tipo de empresas está presente en todas las fases del ciclo 
económico, tienen una mayor o menor antigüedad y puede ser de cualquier 
tamaño. En la cultura popular a menudo se asocian al “pequeño comercio de 
barrio”. No obstante, en muchos países existen grandes empresas familiares 
con un papel esencial. En España, existen ejemplos bastante conocidos, como 
El Corte Inglés, Banco Santander o ACS, entre otras. De igual modo, en 
Alemania podríamos citar a Volkswagen, Schaeffler o Henkel. 
Durante mucho tiempo las investigaciones sobre EF han carecido de un 
modelo común para describir los factores que describen el "carácter familiar”. 
También es difícil encontrar una definición de EF aceptada a nivel general. Se 
han realizado distintos intentos por establecer una definición de EF, entre 
otros los de: Handler (1989), Habbershon y Williams (1999), Shanker y 
Astrachan (1996), Astrachan, Klein, y Smyrnios (2002), Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, Lester, y Canella Jr. (2007), o Cruz, Gomez Mejía y Becerra (2010). 
Además, la falta de datos provoca que los investigadores suelan formular 
definiciones específicas de EF que resulten apropiadas para los objetivos de 
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sus investigaciones. A causa de esto, no siempre es fácil comparar los 
resultados de los distintos estudios centrados en las EF. 
El papel que representan las emociones y otras características 
asociadas, no cuantificables en un estudio cuantitativo, no se ha tenido en 
cuenta en la mayoría de estas definiciones, aunque durante la última década 
se han realizado ciertos avances en esta materia.  
Gomez-Mejía et al. (2007) consiguieron un progreso fundamental en la 
investigación. Los autores integraron la teoría del comportamiento en la 
investigación sobre empresas familiares, centrándose en las posibles razones 
que determinaban el comportamiento de los administradores de empresas 
familiares. Crearon un nuevo modelo de riqueza socioemocional para describir 
el“carácter familiar” (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & de Castro, 2011), que ha 
gozado de una rápida aceptación desde su publicación. Para ello, utilizan como 
ejemplo de empresas familiares españolas un tipo simple, pero comparable: 
los molinos de aceite de oliva. Esto les permite concentrarse en las cuestiones 
clave de la investigación, prescindiendo del sesgo que provoca la diversidad de 
empresas. 
En este contexto, sería necesario resaltar que las EF se enfrentan a 
retos importantes, como el crecimiento o la sucesión. En la fase inicial que 
sucede al establecimiento de una empresa, las EF utilizan en primer lugar 
recursos internos para conseguir crecimiento. Normalmente, prefieren 
conservar el control y evitar la financiación externa, rasgo que suele limitar su 
capacidad para aprovechar sus oportunidades de crecimiento. Así, el 
crecimiento depende de la idoneidad de los recursos externos para financiar 
actividades de inversión, en particular en el caso de pequeñas y medianas 
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empresas y empresas jóvenes. La precariedad financiera a menudo va 
acompañada de la falta de experiencia en la planificación de la sucesión, factor 
que también reduce las posibilidades de crecimiento y de supervivencia de las 
EF. Estas tienen que decidir entre los objetivos personales de los miembros de 
la familia y los objetivos económicos y financieros de la empresa. La voluntad 
de mantener el control y la participación de las siguientes generaciones 
familiares en la empresa les hace desconfiar de la financiación externa y 
dificulta el éxito de la empresa. Este deseo de lograr el traspaso de la 
participación y de la gestión a las generaciones siguientes limita asimismo el 
acceso a un conjunto de gestores profesionales y, por tanto, afecta al 
rendimiento de la EF. 
El capital riesgo (en adelante, CR) son fondos de capital aportados por 
inversores institucionales y gestionados por profesionales que se invierten en 
empresas con gran potencial y alto riesgo (Sahlman, 1990). Los inversores de 
CR se utilizan para reducir los costes de transacción y las asimetrías de 
información como inversores internos. Parecen ser, por tanto, un socio óptimo 
para las empresas familiares (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). El CR no solo ofrece 
capital, sino también servicios con valor añadido. Estos inversores están más 
predispuestos a asumir riesgos y ofrecen un soporte de valor añadido que se 
traduce en mejoras de la eficiencia (Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011). 
Como intermediarios financieros (Chan, 1983), también contribuyen a atenuar 
las dificultades económicas de las empresas en crecimiento (Bertoni, Ferrer, & 
Martí, 2013) y, por tanto, resultan un socio óptimo para las EF. A pesar de su 
importancia, hasta ahora las EF han tenido escasa representación en las 
carteras de CR (Martí, Menéndez, & Rottke, 2013) y existe un vacío en las 
EL CR Y LA ELECCION ENTRE OBJETIVOS DE LA FAMILIA Y OBJETIVOS ECONOMICOS EN EF 
RESUMEN 
39 
investigaciones centradas en determinar el porqué las EF cuentan con una 
presencia tan limitada en las carteras de instituciones de CR.  
Este trabajo de investigación pretende contribuir a cubrir este hueco, así 
como a aclarar algunos aspectos de la interacción de las EF con el CR y el 
modo en que estos pueden crear valor en las EF. Los análisis realizados en 
este estudio se basan en una muestra representativa de EF españolas no 
cotizadas en las que invirtió alguna firma de CR. Aunque también se incluyen 
empresas maduras, se hace hincapié en las que se encuentran en fase de 
expansión, ya que en estos casos el crecimiento y la sucesión son factores 
esenciales y se les debe otorgar la máxima atención para garantizar que sigan 
siendo sostenibles. Los datos del periodo anterior a la inversión se utilizan 
para analizar los factores que llevaron a la empresa a interesarse por el CR, 
mientras que los datos posteriores a la misma muestran el impacto del CR en 
las empresas en las que se ha invertido. 
Los datos sobre inversiones de CR se obtuvieron de la Asociación 
Española de Entidades de Capital Riesgo (ASCRI) y 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com. La información sobre propiedad y contabilidad se 
extrajo de la base de datos AMADEUS y de los Registros Mercantiles públicos. 
Asimismo, también se extrajo de la base de datos AMADEUS una muestra de 
EF no financiadas con  CR. 
Partiendo de la estructura que describe el carácter familiar, se hacen 
dos análisis para responder a la primera cuestión central de la investigación, 
esto es, el motivo por el que las EF acuden a una entidad de CR. Se asume 
que unos rendimientos bajos pueden favorecer un cambio en el 
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comportamiento de la familia que elimine las reticencias a acceder a 
financiación externa cuando peligre la supervivencia de la empresa.  
En primer lugar, se mide el rendimiento a través de la productividad 
total de los factores (en adelante, PTF). Creemos que las EF que presentan un 
bajo crecimiento de la productividad podrían estar anticipando problemas que 
amenacen la propia existencia futura de la empresa. Sin embargo, puesto que 
una productividad baja puede indicar un desequilibrio entre aportaciones y 
resultados, también se recurre a la sensibilidad de la inversión al flujo de caja 
como indicador de restricción financiera, que pone de manifiesto las 
necesidades de financiación externa a corto plazo. 
En segundo lugar, se analiza el rendimiento de las EF tras la 
financiación inicial con CR. Se concluye que las EF aumentan 
significativamente la productividad en sus empresas participadas. De igual 
modo, esas empresas reflejan una disminución de la dependencia de 
inversiones para los flujos de caja que se generen internamente. Estas 
conclusiones resultan muy significativas en el caso de EF de primera 
generación. 
No obstante, aunque la presencia del CR genere un mayor crecimiento, 
se ha descubierto que el simple hecho de que el inversor de CR ostente una 
participación minoritaria o mayoritaria influye sobre la tasa de crecimiento de 
la empresa participada. En este sentido, se descubre que las empresas no 
familiares respaldadas por CR presentan un crecimiento más rápido que las EF 
de CR en aquellos casos en los que el inversor cuenta con una participación 
minoritaria, mientras que no se obtuvieron diferencias cuando el inversor 
ostenta una participación mayoritaria. La demonstración empírica de la 
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importancia de la productividad, así como la de las dificultades financieras 
como indicadores de los procesos decisorios de las EF, constituye una 
contribución fundamental para la literatura sobre EF. Esto supone una 
importante contribución a la discusión existente sobre la relación entre los 
objetivos familiares y financieros y podría así mismo subrayar las 
circunstancias bajo las que puede esperarse un cambio en la prevalencia de 
los objetivos familiares sobre los financieros. Una segunda contribución son las 
pruebas adicionales del efecto positivo de contar con CR sobre las empresas 
participadas. Además, las diferencias observadas en el rendimiento de las 
cuotas de inversión de CR minoritarias y mayoritarias en las EF ponen de 
manifiesto la necesidad de abordar los problemas derivados del conflicto entre 
las culturas de gestión familiares y de los inversores. 
Esta tesis doctoral sigue el esquema siguiente: el capítulo 1 presenta el 
marco de análisis de la investigación, mientras que los capítulos 2 a 4 incluyen 
tres estudios empíricos. En los capítulos 2 a 3 se analizan las hipótesis que 
explicarían cuándo desaparecen las reticencias a acceder a fuentes de 
financiación externa. Estos capítulos también ofrecen pruebas concretas de la 
positiva evolución que protagonizan las empresas participadas tras la 
inversión, especialmente en EF de primera generación. El capítulo 4 se centra 
en los distintos efectos que genera la presencia de CR en función de la cuota 
de participación minoritaria o mayoritaria de la empresa de CR. En el capítulo 
final se destacan las principales conclusiones y contribuciones a la literatura, 
incluyendo además las limitaciones principales, así como ideas para futuras 
investigaciones en este campo. 
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2. 2. Contenido de la investigación 
2.1 Capítulo 1 
El primer subapartado del capítulo 1 presenta el concepto de EF, así 
como los componentes que definen el carácter familiar, y enmarca los 
condicionantes de sus retos y decisiones empresariales. La función que las 
instituciones de CR pueden desempeñar en sus participadas se describe en el 
segundo subapartado. Además del efecto de un adecuado análisis para la 
selección de las empresas participadas, el efecto positivo ejercido sobre la 
éstas está marcado por la financiación, pero también por el valor añadido por 
los inversores de CR. Los factores que contribuyen a la reticencia de las EF a 
buscar financiación externa se revisan en el tercer apartado desde una 
perspectiva crítica, a tenor de las actuales investigaciones, y se exponen los 
incentivos de este estudio. Asimismo, en el contexto de los caracteres 
distintivos de las EF se describe la causalidad de las repercusiones del CR y se 
ponen de relieve las motivaciones y retos que se plantean a la cooperación 
desde una perspectiva del CR, así como los obstáculos que hay que superar, 
como por ejemplo la definicion del precio adecuado de la empresa.  
EL CR Y LA ELECCION ENTRE OBJETIVOS DE LA FAMILIA Y OBJETIVOS ECONOMICOS EN EF 
RESUMEN 
43 
2.2 Capítulo 2 
En el capítulo 2, analizamos por qué se acepta a los inversores de CR 
como accionistas en las EF de primera generación, desde la perspectiva de la 
riqueza socioemocional de los propietarios. Defendemos que los propietarios 
de negocios familiares superan su reticencia natural a aceptar a un socio 
externo para proteger su riqueza socioemocional, ya que consideran que el 
futuro de la compañía podría estar en peligro. Además, nuestro objetivo es 
analizar el impacto del CR en las EF de primera y segunda generación o 
posteriores. Se prevé que los efectos de valor añadido de la participación de 
CR deberían ser más eficaces en las EF de primera generación, ya que su 
cultura de administración no está tan arraigada, la dispersión de la propiedad 
es menor y la orientación empresarial es más fuerte que en las EF de segunda 
generación o subsiguientes. 
Recurrimos al crecimiento de la PTF para cuantificar el rendimiento, 
estimado según sugieren Blundell y Bond (2000). Además, seguimos a 
Chemmanur et al. (2011) y a Croce, Martí y Murtinu (2013) para analizar el 
crecimiento de la productividad antes y después de la inversión inicial de CR.  
Centramos nuestros análisis en una amplia muestra de EF respaldadas 
con CR y empresas no familiares que recibieron financiación de CR entre 1995 
y 2005. Nuestros resultados revelan que las instituciones de CR invierten en 
EF de primera generación que presentan unos niveles de crecimiento de la PTF 
significativamente inferiores a los de las empresas no familiares o a las de 
segunda o posteriores generaciones. Tras la entrada del inversor de CR, tal y 
como se preveía, el crecimiento de la PTF es positivo y significativo en las EF 
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de primera generación, tanto a largo como a corto plazo. El uso de la PTF nos 
permite controlar la otra explicación alternativa que justificaría un mejor 
rendimiento (es decir, la financiación recibida) de la empresa participada, 
puesto que ya hemos demostrado que las EF de primera generación no eran 
mejores que el resto de las empresas participadas. Por lo tanto, podemos 
explicar la mejora del rendimiento gracias al efecto del valor añadido de la 
participación de CR, que resulta eficaz para mejorar la orientación empresarial 
de los administradores de la EF. Además, hemos obtenido evidencia de que se 
registra un mayor efecto sobre el rendimiento en la primera generación, con 
respecto a la segunda o posteriores generaciones. Esto es debido 
probablemente a una menor cantidad de conflictos dirección-agencia y a una 
mayor orientación empresarial de las EF de primera generación. Sostenemos 
que estas razones determinan la existencia de un margen más amplio para la 
mejora del rendimiento en la primera generación. 
Este capítulo fue presentado, junto a Annalisa Croce (Politecnico Di 
Milano) y José Martí (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), en el Congreso 
Anual de 2012 de la European Financial Management Association (EFMA) 
(Barcelona, junio de 2012) y en el Instituto Europeo de Estudios Avanzados en 
Gestión (EIASM), 8º Taller de Investigación sobre EF (Jönköping, 2012), 
donde fue candidato al Premio al mejor artículo IFERA (Congreso Internacional 
de Empresa Familiar) y publicado en sus proceedings. Además, fue aceptado 
en la Conferencia Anual de la Academia Europea de Gestión (EURAM) 
(Ámsterdam, 2012).  
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2.3 Capítulo 3 
Los resultados del segundo capítulo dejan abiertos algunos 
interrogantes. Los administradores de CR son inversores especializados con 
excelentes capacidades de análisis (Sahlman, 1990) que no invertirían en 
empresas de bajo rendimiento. No obstante, dado que la productividad mide 
un aumento de los resultados en relación con un aumento de las aportaciones, 
defendemos que el bajo crecimiento de la PTF hallado en las EF de primera 
generación podría deberse a un desequilibrio entre las entradas y las salidas 
que se comparan al calcular la productividad resultados. De este modo, una 
baja PTF podría ser indicativa de que el aumento de las entradas todavía no se 
ha traducido en un aumento de los resultados, señalando un problema de 
dificultades financieras.  
Analizamos la sensibilidad de la inversión respecto a los recursos 
generados internamente como referencia de dificultades financieras en EF no 
cotizadas, como causa de las dificultades económicas. Argumentamos que las 
EF con grandes dificultades están más dispuestas a aceptar la entrada de 
accionistas externos, como instituciones de CR. Además, pretendemos 
comprobar hasta qué punto la entrada del CR afecta a la dependencia actual 
de las inversiones en los flujos de efectivo generados internamente. Basamos 
nuestros análisis en la ecuación de Euler (Bond & Meghir, 1994), que nos 
permite controlar las oportunidades de crecimiento y el uso de la deuda.  
El alcance del análisis es una muestra de EF españolas no cotizadas con 
financiación de capital riesgo que recibieron inversiones de CR entre 1995 y 
2006. Analizamos la sensibilidad de la inversión a los flujos de caja antes y 
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después de la inversión inicial de CR. Encontramos evidencia de una 
sensibilidad significativa de las inversiones respecto a los flujos de caja antes 
de la inversión inicial de CR en todas las EF que posteriormente recibieron CR. 
Esta dependencia también resulta significativa en las EF de primera generación 
incluidas en el grupo de control, pero no en las EF de siguientes generaciones 
del mismo grupo. Además, las dificultades financieras son significativamente 
mayores en las EF de primera generación con financiación de CR que en 
empresas similares del grupo control. A pesar de su reticencia natural a 
aceptar socios externos, sostenemos que éstas aceptan la entrada de una 
entidad de CR para llevar a cabo las inversiones necesarias para su 
supervivencia futura. Esta conclusión coincide con la opinión de Poutziouris 
(2000), quien afirma que un porcentaje de EF están predispuesto a acceder a 
fuentes externas para crecer con mayor rapidez. En las siguientes 
generaciones de empresas con financiación de CR los resultados no son 
concluyentes, ya que es más probable que en algunos casos recurran a 
entidades de CR a fin de encontrar una salida para algunos/todos los socios, 
más que para financiar su crecimiento. 
En cuanto al efecto de la participación de CR sobre las dificultades 
económicas, descubrimos que, a pesar de la menor sensibilidad de las 
inversiones al flujo de caja, la dependencia no queda totalmente eliminada en 
EF con respaldo de CR, pero dichas empresas no presentan ya más 
restricciones financieras que otras EF sin apoyo del CR. Esta conclusión es 
válida para toda la muestra, así como para las submuestras de EF de primera 
generación. Aducimos que la sensibilidad no queda eliminada porque la 
presencia de los inversores de CR tendrá un efecto positivo, con una actitud de 
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búsqueda de crecimiento en la empresa, y las inversiones aumentarán más de 
lo que los socios familiares habían previsto inicialmente. 
Este capítulo se presentó, junto a Annalisa Croce (Politecnico Di Milano) 
y José Martí (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), en el Congreso Anual de 
2013 de la EFMA (Reading, junio de 2012) y en el Congreso Anual de la 
Academia de Investigación Internacional de Empresa Familiar (IFERA) (St. 
Gallen, junio de 2013) y publicado en sus proceedings. Asimismo fue aceptado 
en el Instituto Europeo de Estudios Avanzados de Gestión (EIASM), en el 
marco del 9º Taller de Investigación en EF (Helsinki, 2013).  
2.4 Capítulo 4 
En el tercer trabajo empírico exploramos los diferentes patrones de 
crecimiento en las empresas con financiación de CR, tanto familiares como no 
familiares, cuando los inversores ostentan una posición mayoritaria o 
minoritaria. Planteamos la hipótesis de un crecimiento más lento en las EF, en 
comparación con los negocios no familiares, si la entidad de CR tiene una 
participación minoritaria; mientras que no se esperan diferencias significativas 
cuando la entidad de CR se convierte en socio mayoritario en la empresa 
participada. Prevemos que las participaciones de CR minoritarias en EF 
dificultarían las decisiones estratégicas, debido a la superposición de dos 
culturas directivas muy diferentes. En este sentido, la actitud de aversión al 
riesgo pronosticada por la teoría de la agencia en las EF puede suponer una 
barrera a la hora de adoptar las estrategias orientadas al crecimiento que los 
administradores de entidades de CR puedan tener como objetivo desarrollar. 
Sin embargo, no esperamos que existan diferencias con respecto a las 
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empresas no familiares cuando la entidad de CR ostenta una posición de 
control, ya que la tradición directiva de la entidad adquirente sustituirá a la 
cultura directiva de la familia en cuestión. De esa manera, es menos probable 
que surjan conflictos entre ambas culturas, aunque la empresa participada 
podría perder parte, o la totalidad, del valor derivado de la reputación familiar. 
Ponemos a prueba las hipótesis propuestas en una muestra única de 
inversiones de CR españolas realizadas entre 1995 y 2004.  
De acuerdo con las hipótesis propuestas, nuestros resultados revelan 
unas diferencias significativas en los patrones de crecimiento de las empresas 
participadas familiares y no familiares: estas últimas presentan unas tasas de 
crecimiento estadísticamente muy superiores en los negocios en los que las 
empresas de CR poseían una participación minoritaria. No se encontraron 
diferencias en el crecimiento de EF y no familiares cuando el inversor de CR 
adquirió una participación mayoritaria en la empresa participada. En resumen, 
el CR es una modalidad alternativa para financiar el crecimiento de las EF y 
resolver los conflictos de sucesión y de otra índole suscitados entre herederos, 
a pesar de que la repercusión es menor que en otras empresas no familiares 
participadas cuando la entidad de CR solo adquiere participaciones 
minoritarias. 
Este capítulo fue presentado, junto con Susana Menéndez-Requejo 
(Universidad de Oviedo) y José Martí (Universidad Complutense de Madrid), en 
el Instituto Europeo de Estudios Avanzados en Gestión (EIASM) en el marco 
del 6º Taller de Investigación en EF (Barcelona, 2010) y en el certamen de 
2011 de la Conferencia Anual de la Academia de Investigación Internacional 
de Empresa Familiar IFERA (Sicilia, 2011). Además, este artículo fue publicado 
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en 2013 en el Journal of World Business (JCR, con un factor de impacto de 
2,383 en 2011). 
3. 3. Conclusiones 
El primer objetivo de este trabajo consiste en destacar la motivación de 
los administradores de empresas familiares a la hora de establecer la prelación 
entre las preferencias “socioemocionales” de la familia y los objetivos 
financieros. Los objetivos financieros pasan a cobrar mayor relevancia sólo en 
caso de que se registre un escaso rendimiento que pueda poner en peligro la 
supervivencia futura de la empresa. Dado que el deseo de preservar la riqueza 
socioemocional es mayor en las EF de primera generación, en los dos primeros 
estudios empíricos de esta tesis descubrimos que sólo las EF de primera 
generación con bajos rendimientos son más propensas a asociarse a 
inversores de CR y este bajo rendimiento se explica por la existencia de 
dificultades de carácter financiero.  
Además, también nos marcamos el objetivo de analizar el efecto de la 
participación del CR en las EF participadas. Nuestros resultados ponen de 
manifiesto la existencia de un efecto positivo de las inversiones de CR en las 
EF, especialmente en la primera generación. No obstante, también 
descubrimos que el impacto de la participación de los inversores en este tipo 
de negocios podría variar en función de la participación mayoritaria o 
minoritaria que tuvieran las empresas de CR. Una participación minoritaria 
podría no permitirles llevar a cabo las modificaciones y actividades necesarias 
para conducir a la empresa hacia nuevas vías de crecimiento, mientras que 
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una participación mayoritaria les permitiría hacerlo con la competencia 
necesaria para decidir y seleccionar las estrategias de crecimiento adecuadas.  
Este trabajo contribuye a la literatura previa en varios sentidos. En 
primer lugar, desarrolla una corriente bibliográfica moderna que contempla las 
cuestiones relativas a las finanzas corporativas y el comportamiento societario 
en las EF, destacando la prevalencia de preservar la riqueza socioemocional 
por encima de los objetivos financieros. Sin embargo, esta prevalencia cambia 
cuando la supervivencia de la empresa está en riesgo. Ofrecemos una visión 
general sobre los principales motivos por los que los administradores de EF 
acuden a inversores externos. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos nuevas 
perspectivas sobre el efecto positivo de la participación del CR en las EF, 
especialmente en la primera generación. En tercer lugar, ponemos de relieve 
las dificultades con las que se podrían enfrentar los inversores de CR al invertir 
en EF, especialmente cuando poseen participaciones minoritarias. 
Las futuras investigaciones deberán profundizar en los motivos por los 
cuales las EF acuden o no a instituciones de CR, con una perspectiva 
generacional, para completar las pruebas iniciales descubiertas en nuestros 
estudios empíricos. También es necesario realizar más investigaciones sobre 
los resultados obtenidos de que las EF de primera generación y bajo 
rendimiento que acceden a financiación de CR, ya que las instituciones de CR 
poseen unas capacidades notables de análisis y no cabría esperar que 
invirtieran en empresas con escaso rendimiento. Defendemos que el 
crecimiento de la baja productividad podría indicar que aquellas empresas de 
bajo rendimiento que acceden a CR se ven sometidas a dificultades 
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financieras, aunque deberían también investigarse otros motivos relativos a 
las características familiares. 
Como principales limitaciones, debemos destacar que el alcance de este 
estudio se limita a un solo país. A pesar de que el enfoque reduce la 
heterogeneidad entre las empresas de la muestra y las repercusiones de los 
problemas medioambientales, carece del tamaño suficiente para poder 
proporcionar más datos sobre las cuestiones analizadas en el mismo. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
After its creation sooner or later every firm faces the challenge of 
growth to ensure its future survival. In addition, family-controlled 
businesses (FCBs, henceforth) deal with personal family issues which affect 
individual and business goals and decision-making processes. Small and 
medium-sized firms (hereafter, SMEs) need investments to ensure and 
improve their growth path and market position. The successful transfer of 
the business from the entrepreneurial stage to larger management 
structures is a key challenge for small firms. This transition recurrently 
takes place in FCBs, with the passing of the business from founders to the 
subsequent generation (Peiser & Wooten, 1983). But only a few firms are 
able to go through this transition process successfully and to survive 
beyond the first life-cycle. Especially in young firms failure is often caused 
by poor economic conditions, lack of capital and resources, or incompetent 
management (Dyer, 1988). 
Reasons for poor economic conditions may be inadequate cost 
structures and/or an insufficient volume of sales, which lead to a lack of 
profitability and insufficient internally generated cash flows. Below-average 
efficiency and a lack of professionalization often induce low margins and 
performance. Consequently, only limited capital and internally generated 
cash flow is available to finance necessary investments to ensure technical 
progress, efficiency and productivity. Founders may urge more and faster 
investments (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). On the other hand, the 
founder-spirit does not always fit with growing structures and larger 
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management teams (Schein, 1983) and there is a lack of professionalization 
and efficiency. 
Management of resources in FCBs is considered to be distinctive, 
specifically in their treatment of human capital, social capital, patient 
capital, survivability capital, and with a specific governance attitude. Thus, 
beyond the financing issue, appropriate resources may form part of a 
competitive advantage for FCBs (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). But this unique 
bundle of resources in FCBs (i.e. the ‘familiness’), created by the interaction 
of family and business, may also turn into a disadvantage (Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999). The wish to retain control among family members over 
generations might lead to an insufficient screening process of the top 
management team (TMT), favoring family members and neglecting business 
needs and necessary skills. Thus, often suboptimal employees and family 
successors are selected (Dunn, 1995). This fact, combined with a lack of 
experience in planning and carrying through the substitution of managers, 
especially the founder, may affect the succession and firm performance 
(Bennedsen, Nielsen, Meisner, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 1997). 
Additionally, the pool of human capital appears limited as FCBs might have 
difficulties in attracting potential managers, who may avoid FCBs due to 
exclusive family succession, limited growth potential and lack of 
professionalization (Donnelly, 1964; Horton, 1986). Hence, FCBs’ growth 
and financing may be limited due to these family specific (resource) issues.  
Venture capital and private equity (Hereinafter, VC/PE) is a pool of 
capital provided by investors and managed by professionals to be invested 
in businesses with high potential and high risk (Sahlman, 1990). They seem 
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to be an optimal partner as they are used to reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetries as inside investors (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). As 
a financial intermediary (Chan, 1983), they also help in mitigating financial 
constraints in growing firms (Bertoni, Ferrer, & Martí, 2013). They are more 
willing to take risks and offer value-adding support that leads to 
improvements in efficiency (Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011). 
Despite their importance, FCBs have been under-represented in VC/PE 
portfolios until now (Martí, Menéndez, & Rottke, 2013) and this work seeks 
to frame explanations and to build an understanding that will reduce 
obstacles to approaching external investors for the FCBs.  
In this chapter we aim to explain the distinctive characteristics of 
family ownership and managerial control, the why and when they approach 
external VC/PE financing and how this can enhance their growth and 
survival prospects. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the 
following section we outline a review of FCBs and their central challenges 
related to growth and succession. In the third section VC/PE activities are 
described as well as their tools to enhance firm value. The last section is 
dedicated to the motives for FCBs in approaching external financing. 
Additionally, reasons for VC/PE firms to invest in FCBs are highlighted to 
prepare the framework for the analysis made within this thesis. 
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1.2. OVERVIEW ON FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROL 
1.2.1 HOW TO DEFINE FAMILY-CONTROLLED BUSINESSES (FCBS) 
Research on FCBs has largely been descriptive rather than 
prescriptive in the past. Studies focused more on family relationships than 
on strategic decision making processes (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 
1996). Due to limited access to data most of the results were obtained for 
quoted firms with high ownership dispersion. As most FCBs are non-quoted, 
a huge number of questions about private firms are still neglected in the 
literature (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
The definition of FCBs has been subject to extensive discussion and 
some attempts have been made to improve the commonly used, less 
complex, definition based on ownership. In his work Handler (1989, p.258) 
stated that ’the definition of FCBs remains a “challenge” facing family 
business researchers’. The sole aim of the definition is to separate FCBs 
from their non-family counterparts. 
Most studies follow their specific research question with 
corresponding individual definitions rather than using a common definition 
(Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002). For the latter, particularly, the 
ownership focus appears less adequate since it considers the FCB as a 
monolithic organization and does not allow for the separation of distinctive 
characters such as culture, strength and differences of family influence. 
Shanker and Astrachan (1996) classified definitions by degrees of 
family influence. But in this early stage of family research no common 
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definition was used by researchers and the classification of FCBs was often 
made on a case-to-case basis (Astrachan et al., 2002). Since there is a 
general desire for a functionally useful definition,‘, the definition has to be 
made in such a way that it can be quantified and operationalized. Most of 
the definitions used in studies of this research stage reveal a high 
complexity. This not only prevents quantification but has also been seen as 
a reason to raise confusion, threatening the credibility of research in FCBs 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999). The definitions used, which show slight 
differences across studies, made it difficult to compare results from different 
studies. Furthermore, the integration of the theory remains complex, and 
methodological concerns prevent an increase in theoretical progress. 
Based on these critiques, Astrachan et al. (2002) developed the 
frequently cited F-PEC-model, respecting different dimensions of family 
influence to frame a basis to standardize the different definitions. They 
separate a power (P)-dimension, including ownership, governance and 
management subscale. The development of the FCB with a generational 
perspective is measured by the second Experience (E)-dimension, also 
differentiating experience in succession. The third Culture (C)-dimension 
identifies a family commitment subscale and the degree of the overlap of 
family and business values. The work of Jaskiewicz (2006) used the model 
in a performance study of English, Spanish and German family businesses, 
in which only quoted firms were considered. Although recent studies 
continue with the validation of the model (e.g. Holt, Rutherford, & Kuratko, 
2010), substantial criticism remains, especially about the complexity of the 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 1: FAMILY FIRMS, FAMILINESS AND RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL FINANCING 
 61
model and the lack of data available. In addition, few studies using this 
model have been published. 
Quantitative studies based on larger samples, particularly those 
aiming to highlight the context of financing and growth decision making, 
tend to use simpler definitions. Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes (2007) separated only three family 
generations for their paper’s sample of private Spanish firms and 
highlighted the first family generation as the one that has the founder 
(family member) with a dominant position in ownership and management, 
the second generation as that with descendant generations as managing 
owners. Third (and later) FCB generations are defined as those having 
descendant family generations as controlling owner and external 
management. 
Additionally, the definition of FCBs varies between private and 
publicly quoted FCBs. For the latter it is commonly proposed in literature 
that at least 5% of the shares are in the hands of the family (Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, Lester, & Canella Jr., 2007). Conversely, private FCBs are 
assumed to be such when more than 50% of the shares are owned by a 
family (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010) and this definition is taken as 
the basis in the studies in this work. The strength of endowment, 
discretionary power and personal attachment to the firm is higher in private 
firms than in publicly listed firms (Berrone et al., 2012). Thus ‘familiness’ in 
private firms is higher (i.e. they act more family-like) and investigation of 
their behavior is more challenging (Berrone et al., 2012; Miller, Breton-
Miller, & Lester, 2013).  
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1.2.2 HOW TO MEASURE FAMILINESS – THE SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH 
MODEL 
Current discussion about the description of FCBs’ distinctive 
character, the ‘familiness’, beyond size, stage and age, influencing their 
business decisions, is framed by the concept of socioemotional wealth 
(SEW, henceforth), which was introduced by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007). 
They investigate a large sample of Spanish olive oil mills and indicate the 
SEW as the central reference point for family principals’ business decisions. 
This concept helps in explaining differences across family generations and 
family endowment. Among other issues, it predicts high reluctance to 
accept external financing, which is assumed to decrease in future 
generations. This concept includes characteristics and behavioral issues of 
FCBs to further explain relevance of non-economic criteria to frame their 
business behavior beyond financial goals. It seeks to explain how the firm 
fulfils the family’s personal needs beyond economic aspects such as 
identity, influence, and perpetuation of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007). Research into FCBs has focused on different (non-economic) 
aspects of their attitudes. A strong emotional overtone, the role of family 
values in the organization and altruism to cater for family welfare are the 
most frequently mentioned criteria in this context (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, 
Berrone, de Castro, 2011). The relation of these non-economic attitudes to 
financial goals in FCBs, particularly aspects influencing family preferences, 
is neglected in previous research. The work of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) 
created the SEW concept to label and to explain this relation with a large 
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number of observations. Their investigation benefits from the simple, clear 
business structure of the olive oil mills and one which facilitated the 
progress of the SEW model. Based on the results of Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007), illustrated in figure 1. Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al. (2011) develop 
familiness as ‘the bind that ties’, which is based on five dimensions 
influencing the financial outcome of the FCB. 
 
FIGURE 1: FCBS RESEARCH FROM A SEW-PERSPECTIVE (GOMEZ-MEJIA, CRUZ ET AL., 2011, P. 
657) 
The authors differentiate the dimensions of management resources, 
strategic choices, organizational governance, stakeholder relationships and 
business ventures (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al., 2011) to subsume the 
influences on the financial performance of the FCB. The SEW concept lays 
out the landscape, frame and boundaries for future research, although few 
studies are developed and research regarding SEW dimensions remains in 
its infancy. Unlike other models for defining the family business mentioned 
above, the SEW model uses a very simple definition of FCBs and has 
undergone development based on the results of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007). 
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Although the model is new there is some evidence of the relevance of these 
SEW dimensions but with mixed results. 
Within the management resources dimension the special treatment of 
human capital often increases employees´ attachment to the firm. Due to a 
family’s intention to solve succession with family members, this often is 
accompanied by a negative impact on attracting and screening of potential 
managers (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). This also may have a negative impact on 
the degree of professionalization of the FCB due to a collision between 
familiness and professionalization (Howorth, Wright, & Westhead, 2007). 
Regarding the strategic choices dimension, Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al. 
(2011) consider the risk-taking corporate diversification and acquisition 
behavior, debt financing and accounting choices as relevant for decision-
making in FCBs. Especially controversial is risk-taking as FCBs may act in a 
risk-averse way (venture risks) and a risk-willing one (business risk) at the 
same time when this may serve their preservation of SEW (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007).  
The dimension of organizational governance integrates the role of the 
board, incentives to align interests and agency contracts. The stakeholder 
relationship dimension includes stakeholder management and corporate 
responsibility (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al., 2011). An implicit assumption 
within the SEW model is that family principals may prefer business decisions 
that benefit their SEW even when they might not be financially rewarding 
(Berrone et al., 2012). An example of this is a different treatment of 
environment and stakeholders to preserve their SEW. Berrone, Cruz, 
Gomez-Mejia, and Larraza-Kintana (2010) analyze firm’s environmental 
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behavior and indicate that FCBs pollute less than their non-family 
counterparts. Despite their little direct performance relation such as eased 
conditions from suppliers or lower pollution costs, FCBs often act like this. 
Some authors suggest that the special and sustainable treatment of their 
environment might give FCBs the potential to build a competitive advantage 
(Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998, Bansal, 
2005) and found a positive impact on firms’ results in the long run (Hart & 
Ahuja, 1996; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Russo & Fouts, 1997; King & 
Lenox, 2002). Also relations with stakeholders are shown to be different for 
family owners as they care more about the quality of these relationships, 
fulfilling their mainly non-pecuniary demands with proactive stakeholder 
engagement (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). This might 
positively influence stakeholders’ satisfaction and increases organizational 
effectiveness with positive influence on performance (Zellweger & Nason, 
2008). 
The business venture dimension focuses on the role of families in new 
ventures and corporate entrepreneurship (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al., 2011) 
and there is some evidence but with mixed findings. Cruz and Nordqvist 
(2012) indicate that the entrepreneurial orientation (henceforth, EO) of 
FCBs may change over generations. They assume that the EO tends to be 
lowest in second generation FCBs due to the ‘founder’s shadow’. They 
observed that new external shareholders, particularly institutional investors, 
exert a positive impact on the EO, while they found mixed results for the 
influence of (new) external management within the TMT. Zellweger and 
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Sieger (2012) post some doubts about the role of EO for long-lived FCBs 
and suggest specific dimensions for the measurement of EO.  
The relation between SEW and performance remains unclear. Miller et 
al. (2013) found mixed results in analyzing strategic conformity and SEW. 
They find a positive impact of strategic conformity on the return on assets, 
but no positive correlation with market valuation. They argue that this may 
highlight uncertainty about SEW relevance (i.e. whether SEW does have the 
potential to build a competitive advantage and enhance value or goes 
beyond financial considerations). Especially for small firms, Cruz et al. 
(2010) indicate that family endowment may create a comparative 
advantage of family employment with positive influence on performance. 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) highlight the meaning of stronger 
relationships within firms’ community and with external stakeholders for the 
survival and viability of FCBs over generations.  
In contrast, a dark side of familiness also exists and SEW can be a 
burden rather than a competitive advantage. Due to the strong family 
influence on a firm´s management, succession conflicts and dysfunctional 
relationships may occur (Berrone et al., 2012). Stakeholder orientation may 
be enlarged and negatively developed SEW dimensions may counter 
possible benefits (Kellermanns, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2012). In the same 
vein, family employment sometimes indicates negative aspects of SEW 
(Cruz et al., 2010). With regard to performance, family principals may tend 
to refuse risky business decisions (e.g. innovative investments), which are 
important for future growth and performance, to avoid losing control 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Thus, SEW may influence family owners to act 
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more conservatively and short-sightedly (Zahra, 2005). Furthermore, 
strong family control may give rise to activities that strengthen family 
power inside and outside the firm, which could lead to agency conflicts with 
external stakeholders (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
As a dark side of SEW, the strong separation of inside and outside the 
family by family members is often emphasized. In this way, SEW can be 
interpreted as self-serving behavior, including acceptance of fraud to 
maintain control and secure results (Kellermanns et al., 2012). In times of 
crisis and/or low performance this may convert a positive stakeholder 
treatment, supporting family’s SEW, into primarily self-serving behavior 
without focusing on the needs of external stakeholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002). 
In analyzing the interaction of FCBs with financial intermediaries the 
strategic dimension seems the most relevant factor with regard to the 
decision to approach external financing. On the one hand, this reduces 
family control and enlarges transparency for external banks or investors, 
thus decreasing SEW. Within a transaction, this loss of SEW, socioemotional 
aspects within the firm’s organization and transgenerational sustainability 
intentions may drive family owners to demand compensation for this. Thus, 
FCB owners may raise acceptable sales prices resulting in a higher 
(realized) firm value (Zellweger Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). 
On the other hand, due to the large quantity of evidence already 
published on the positive impact VC/PE firms have on their investee firms, 
the challenging question remains: what might be the motives for FCBs to 
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open their firms to external investors? In other words, what could be the 
benefits when family owners approach external financing?  
1.2.3 DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF FAMILY FIRMS 
1.2.3.1 FAMILY FIRMS’ LIFE CYCLES 
From the life-cycle perspective, every (small) firm sooner or later has 
to face the challenges of growth and expansion. FCBs face an additional 
constraint represented by difficulties in separating family relationships from 
business decisions (Peiser & Wooten, 1983; Handler & Kram, 1988; Upton, 
Teal, & Felan, 2001; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003; Sonfield & Lussier, 
2004; Cadieux, 2007). 
Firms’ development through their life-cycles may be described in 
three stages. A small firm’s history starts with the survival or founding 
stage, with a simple firm configuration and dominating position of the 
founder/s (Mintzberg, 1981). The business then reaches the success stage 
where the small firm breaks out of resources poverty and achieves a stable 
plateau of success. The take-off stage marks the ultimate phase, where a 
firm evolves to become a large, more complex organization where founders’ 
influence tends to decrease (Peiser & Wooten, 1983).  
Times of crisis for FCBs often occur at the success stage, where the 
(family) entrepreneur has to prepare for growth or the owners decide to 
disengage themselves. Therefore, the firm may decline in that stage (Peiser 
& Wooten, 1983). To avoid the latter FCBs are urged to force their business 
planning as well as strategic and succession planning to survive and to be 
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able to reach the succession stage (Upton et al., 2001). The founder has to 
improve and develop firm structures (e.g. strategic apex, operating core, 
middle line, technostructure and support staff), forces and resources 
(Mintzberg, 1981). To reach take-off stage it is also necessary to include 
employees in current and future performance goals (Upton et al., 2001).  
1.2.3.2 GROWTH AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 
Growth behavior of FCBs can be explained from a resource-based 
view or an agency view perspective (Molly, Laveren, & Jorissen, 2012). 
From the resource-based view perspective, FCBs generate a competitive 
advantage with expected higher performance and growth figures compared 
with non-FCBs due to the management of specific family resources (Sirmon 
& Hitt, 2003). From an agency perspective FCBs are described as an 
efficient type of organization with lower agency costs due to the coincidence 
of ownership and control (Daily & Dollinger, 1992). In contrast, other 
authors highlight the fact that agency costs can become significant for FCBs 
with negative influence on performance and growth (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). 
FCBs face many obstacles in their growth objectives and strategies as 
their first interest is to avoid a decline and loss of the family business. 
Furthermore, they want to promote firms’ continuity and family unity. 
Finally, they also like to maintain headcount and create wealth (Peiser & 
Wooten, 1983).  
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From a generational perspective firms in subsequent generations’ 
hands are often found to grow more slowly than first generation ones due to 
the tendency to maintain the business rather than losing it due to risky 
investment decisions. This is especially the case in the second generation 
and can be explained by the negative impact of ‘founders’ shadow’ and a 
reduced entrepreneurial orientation (Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012). 
There is a common understanding that family investment policies 
follow a risk aversion attitude to preserve long-term survival of the 
company. FCBs are expected to show long-term orientation and 
commitment to the firm. Thus, they are expected to devote substantial 
financial resources to long-term investment activities (Anderson, Duru, & 
Reeb, 2012). According to the SEW concept, however, Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007) outline that family principals avoid high-variance investments with 
uncertain outcomes to preserve SEW. Hence, they tend to invest less in 
long-term investments (Hsiang-Lan Chen & Wen-Tsung Hsu, 2009; Muñoz-
Bullón & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011) as risk increases with longer-term 
investment perspectives (Anderson et al., 2012). And, if this is so, they 
prefer capital expenditures such as physical assets to riskier R&D projects 
(e.g. Gomez-Mejia, Cruz et al., 2011), as the latter are seen as too risky 
with the potential to jeopardize results and family control (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). 
The merger with or acquisition of another firm (M&A) tends to be a 
long-term investment, often started in the stock market through a takeover 
bid. But in the same vein, as Caprio, Croci, and Del Giudice (2011) outline, 
those M&A activities are seen as risky projects by family owners. Thus, the 
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probability of takeover bids and acquisitions are less likely with family 
ownership, especially when the size of the family stake is not sufficient to 
retain control after the transaction. 
FCBs pursue long-term goals from a non-financial perspective if there 
is sufficient internal capital and no need for external capital. Cennamo et al. 
(2012) highlight that FCBs may show enlarged proactive stakeholder 
commitment to enhancing their SEW in a long-term perspective.  
Some authors argue that FCBs can be assumed to follow special 
investment calculations as they often finance investments with less debt 
and more internal ‘patient’ capital (see below), resulting in a lower cost of 
capital (Adams, Manners, Astrachan, & Mazzola, 2004). Expected and 
required return rates are lower and project schedules can be enlarged 
(Zellweger, 2007). But this calculation depends on the availability of 
sufficient internal capital to limit the risk of financial losses. 
1.2.3.3 FINANCING 
FCBs follow a specific hierarchy to finance investment opportunities, 
preferring internal to external funding, and debt to equity, if external 
financing is necessary. This is in accordance with the pecking order theory 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Long-term orientation and willingness to build and 
transfer the firm to later generations creates a special incentive for 
effectively managing financial capital (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; McConaughy 
& Phillips, 1999). Due to lower debt exposure and preference for internal 
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financing, their cost of capital tends to be lower (Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
McConaughy, 1999; Adams et al., 2004).  
In general, their business activities are claimed to be more 
conservative and consequently FCBs tend to be less indebted (Gallo, 1995; 
Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996). In line with that, family financing philosophy of 
investments requires ‘patient’ capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003, p. 343), which 
is typically provided by family members or others with the same time 
horizon and endowment as the family. In contrast to external capital, like 
bank debt, it is commonly granted for a long or unassigned period, without 
risk of liquidation, for long periods (Ward & Aronoff, 1991; Dobrzynski, 
1993). It could result from generated retained earnings or money lent by 
the owners. Thus, if (sufficient) patient capital is available, this can be seen 
as a huge valuable asset for FCBs (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) to avoid 
dependence on external financing. In this way FCBs can decide to follow a 
distinctive family investment strategies. As this philosophy results in low 
debt, their credibility increases as potential targets for external bank 
financing for some family specific capital needs (Cennamo et al., 2012). 
Some authors outline that FCBs act in distinctive, sometimes less capital 
intensive, sectors (Palacín-Sánchez, Ramírez-Herrera, & Di Pietro, 2012) 
and more cyclical industries (Zellweger, 2007). In addition, FCBs tend to act 
in specific sectors with an increasing degree of specialization, machinery 
and service sector, which are more labor intensive (Colombo & Grilli, 2010). 
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1.2.3.4 SUCCESSION 
The business forms the central part of the life of a founder and his 
family. In particular, founders often create a very distinctive spirit within 
their firm and their withdrawal, either planned or not (e.g. death), thus 
creates a huge challenge for the survival of the firm. Hence, the most 
critical event for planning growth is the organization of the succession 
(Peiser & Wooten, 1983). Professionalization with external management 
rather than a family successor is suggested to enable growth and efficient 
planning of the succession process (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). The 
organization of succession demands family resources in two ways. Firstly, 
succession planning regarding ownership may be an emotional, time- and 
capital-consuming process (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Koropp, Grichnik, & 
Gygax, 2012). Secondly, with respect to the management, the choice 
between a family CEO/director and a non-family external executive may 
deeply influence the future performance of the firm (Bennedsen et al., 
2007; Cai, Luo, & Wan, 2012). For the initialization of the succession 
planning, feasibility analysis is often dominating and the existence of a 
willing and trusted successor pushes the incumbents to leave the business 
instead of pursuing the desire to keep it within the family (Sharma et al., 
2003). A Management-Buy-In / Management-Buy-Out (MBO/MBI), i.e. a 
sale of stakes to existing or new managers, can be an option for a 
successful succession to sustain familiness and independent ownership 
(Howorth et al., 2007). In this context, financial investors can act as 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 1: FAMILY FIRMS, FAMILINESS AND RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL FINANCING 
 74
specialized intermediaries helping to plan, finance and organize this process 
(Scholes, Wright, Westhead, & Bruining, 2010). 
Financing remains a critical component for the outcome of succession 
planning (Koropp et al., 2012). Often debt can be used to ensure financial 
needs in the succession planning, but limitations in the owner-manager’s 
financial knowledge, prior succession experience and personal attitude 
regarding succession planning determine succession-financing decisions.  
1.3 OVERVIEW ON VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
VC/PE firms are specialized investors offering capital and assisting 
their investee firms with a set of value-adding activities (Croce, Martí, & 
Murtinu, 2013). Since this work aims to explain the interaction and impact 
of VC/PE investors on FCBs´ development it is necessary to highlight their 
approach and interaction with investee firms, the process of selection of 
investee firms and how they can be expected to add value to them. 
Additionally, we ask how they assess distinctive firm characteristics as 
exhibited by FCBs for their investment decision, and what might influence 
their ability to develop firm characteristics to create additional value.  
1.3.1 FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
Venture Capital (VC) is a pool of capital provided by investors and 
managed by professionals to be invested in businesses with high potential 
and high risk (Sahlman, 1990). It originated in the United States in the 
mid-1940s and started nearly four decades later in Europe with a wider 
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investment scope, including traditional young fast-growing companies as 
well as investments in more mature and less risky firms. Private Equity (PE) 
is a concept that describes the latter (Bertoni et al., 2013).  
Different groups of investments, depending on the age and the stage 
of development of the VC/PE-financed firm, have been established in the 
literature to classify VC/PE-financing: early stage, expansion stage and later 
stages. Further subgroups to classify life-cycle stages are assumed by some 
authors like Sahlman (1990) or, more recently, Puri and Zarutskie (2012). 
For the purpose of this study, however, the classification of the dataset 
used in the following chapters will include three categories only: early-
stage, expansion stage and later stages. Investments in early-stage firms 
include their development at the very beginning, i.e. founding steps, initial 
launch of products and marketing campaigns. Typical financing structures 
consist of separate financing rounds with risk-adjusted amounts, depending 
on the success in reaching milestones. Expansion investments mainly take 
place to enlarge and scale firms’ developed business model. Later stages 
are characterized by mature firm and management structures. Greater 
turnover and assets require larger amounts to be invested and different 
types of financial instruments are deployed (EVCA, 2013).  
Although research about PE has increased in the last decade, VC 
literature prevails, most notably motivated by the longer history in the 
United States. Only a few studies include different life-cycles or VC and PE 
investments in their research focus and concentrate on one of the stages. 
Only a few VC/PE firms concentrate investments in just one stage 
(Hellmann, 2000). Some VC/PE firms diversify risks by including mixed 
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early stage and expansion stage firms, or firms at the expansion and later 
stages with a more predictable return pattern.  
1.3.2 THE IDIOSYNCRASY OF THE VC/PE INVESTMENT PROCESS 
VC/PE offers equity financing without requesting the same collateral 
as banks do with debt financing. Thus they act as a financial intermediary 
able to face capital market imperfections, providing capital to firms who 
otherwise would not be able to access external financing (Lerner, 1995; 
Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). To cope with information asymmetry 
problems, VC/PE investors screen potential investments carefully, sign 
contracts with existing shareholders/managers and monitor investee firms 
closely (Sahlman, 1990). 
The screening process forms the most important part of the selection 
process to identify the most promising investee firms. VC/PE invests a 
significant amount of time and strength in the pre-investment process to 
obtain information about the investment target (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; 
Reid, 1996; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Thillai Rajan, 2010). On average, 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) estimate a three-week full-time period for the 
evaluation process and deal closing and nearly 100 days to complete the 
process of investment. The collection of information is the first part of the 
screening process to reduce information asymmetries, which result in 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems for the investor (Chan, 1983).  
Especially in the early stages, due to the lack of or insufficient 
(historic) data, investors base their investment decision on the 
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entrepreneur’s personality, the quality and uniqueness of the business 
concept and idea or the structure and attractiveness of the market 
(Tykvová, 2007). The problems stemming from information asymmetries 
are handled by VC/PE investors with suitable structuring of the deal and 
efficient incentive and compensation schemes (Sahlman, 1990). Based on 
the knowledge gained in the screening process, they structure adequate 
control rights (Lerner, 1995) and define funding milestones (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2003).  
VC/PE institutions are active investors that monitor and add value to 
their portfolio firms. Due to the information and detailed knowledge base 
about the firms, gained from the screening process, VC/PE investors are 
known as inside investors (Lerner, 1995). Thus, they are able to finance 
firms which normally would not receive external financing, so funding of 
VC/PEs plays a dominant role for those firms (Balboa, Martí, & Zieling, 
2011). But investments in these firms may imply an extensive risk and 
uncertainty of outcome for capital spenders beyond information 
asymmetries. VC/PE can handle this uncertainty with a specific design of 
contracts with entrepreneurs and important employees (contracting) and 
continuous control of the investee firms (monitoring). The dominant 
paradigm for the contracting is the adequate design to manage principal-
agent-relations, where VC/PE firm is the principal and the entrepreneur the 
agent. The structure of the contracts between the entrepreneurs and the 
VC/PE firm serves to establish the right incentives for the entrepreneur as 
agent to avoid moral hazard problems. Hence, contracting aims to influence 
entrepreneurs’ behavior to reduce agency costs (Tykvová, 2007). A second 
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important function contracts have is to set the incentives for the VC/PE as 
the agent, since their contribution is fundamental for the entrepreneur. 
Often financial contracts of VC/PEs include different rights such as voting 
and cash flow rights. They may also include the right of a VC/PE to obtain 
full control of the board and voting rights in the case of poor performance 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003). 
A periodical reporting is established to allow monitoring, also 
accompanied by audits and meetings to evaluate results. VC/PE managers 
are appointed as directors and often serve as consultants or at least trainers 
of the TMT. The frequency varies depending on firm characteristics. In the 
case of firms in the early-stages and high-tech-industries, where 
information asymmetries are highest, VC/PE develops more intensive 
monitoring activities. It may sometimes lead to abandoning a project. 
Chemmanur et al. (2011) find that VC/PE firms of high repute show 
stronger monitoring capacities. 
Further value-adding services provided by VC/PE firms are 
responsible for the positive impact on their investee firms. Beyond funding, 
contracting and monitoring, VC/PE is known for a variety of value-adding 
activities. They provide services that help investee firms to enhance their 
probability of success (Chemmanur et al., 2011). They help to hire 
competent management (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989) and provide better 
incentives to management and employees (Hellman & Puri, 2002). In 
addition, they provide access to their network of suppliers and potential 
customers, as well as other portfolio firms (Chemmanur et al., 2011). Their 
management support also contributes assistance in strategic and 
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operational planning (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Some show stronger 
relations with the managers of their investee firms (Sapienza et al., 1996). 
In that context Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann (2008) indicate that the 
experience of the VC managers may influence their intensity of active 
recruiting, help in fundraising and interaction of VC/PE with their investee 
firms. The intensity of VC/PE interaction may vary with the type of VC/PE 
investor, as independent VC/PE firms are found to be more active than 
‘captive’ (bank-, corporate-, or government-owned) firms. Firms enjoying 
higher investor activity are usually more successful (Bottazzi et al., 2008) 
and the experience of the VC managers may favor success in going public 
(Sørensen, 2007). There is some evidence that access to private financing 
like VC/PE furthermore helps firms to innovate and, thus, to increase 
productivity when they face competition in the product market (Spiegel & 
Tookes, 2013). 
The role VC/PE plays may differ for investments made in FCBs 
throughout their lifecycles, generations and firm characteristics (Scholes et 
al., 2010). Major potential in SMEs, often in the first generation and when 
they are financially constrained, arises from the mitigation of financial 
constraints and the improvement in efficiency. VC/PE firms select efficiency 
strategies that mainly take the form of activities to increase 
professionalization (Hellman & Puri, 2002) and to reduce costs (Bertoni et 
al., 2013). In contrast, growth/expansion strategies are chosen by VC/PE 
firms in larger and more mature firms. In some cases there is a new 
generation involved, whereas in others there is a dispersed ownership 
structure. The main potential in those firms can be derived from a review of 
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growth activities without the limitation of the previous family agenda 
(Scholes et al., 2010). 
1.3.3 DISTINCTIVE IMPACT OF VC/PE 
Therefore the effect of VC/PE involvement can be observed in 
different ways. Among them, we could highlight: 
• a reduction in financial constraints in SMEs; 
• an increase in productivity; 
• faster growth rates in SMEs. 
1.3.3.1 EASING FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN SMES 
SMEs have limited tangible fixed assets to be pledged as collateral to 
access external funding (Ang, 1991; Chittenden; Hall & Hutchinson, 1996). 
Thus, growth opportunities are conditioned by the internally generated cash 
flows (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2012).  
As inside investors, VC firms are used to reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetries (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). They are able to 
mitigate financial bottlenecks as financing partners (Chan, 1983) and help 
investee firms in taking advantage of their growth opportunities (Bertoni et 
al., 2013). As their limited tangible fixed assets cannot be used as 
collateral, they provide equity funding and enhance the credibility of 
investee firms (Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996). Therefore, VC/PE 
investors are ideal partners for financially constrained FCBs that lack 
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managerial and financial resources to take advantage of their growth 
opportunities.  
1.3.3.2 INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY 
In the 1990s in the United States, critics increasingly viewed 
operating profit as a measure of performance that could be subject to 
manipulation (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schønea, 2005). An alternative 
measure that received more attention is productivity (Palia & Lichtenberg, 
1999). Originally, productivity was considered as an economic variable, 
omitting managerial aspects in the estimation of production functions. In 
corporate finance literature principal-agent conflicts were predominant at 
that time. The first attempt to address the problem of neglecting the 
management aspects was undertaken by Mundlak (1961). He proposed a 
firm-specific, fixed-effects model, where each firm gets a separate 
intercept, but treating managerial quality and incentives as an unobservable 
constant for each firm. Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) first used managerial 
ownership of the firm’s shares as a determinant of firm output (conditional 
on capital and labor) in the estimation of a firm’s production function. This 
approach to the use of managerial compensation for the evaluation of firm 
performance has had a long history in the corporate finance literature. The 
work of Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) was the first to link the latter with 
productivity research and describes a concept of firm productivity.  
Microeconomic theory postulates a firm using a bundle of resources 
or inputs, commonly labor and capital. Assuming for simplicity reasons only 
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one product is to be produced, the general definition of productivity is 
defined as the ratio of (real) output to (real) input. 
As firms use more than one production factor, the partial productivity 
measure of this factor can be measured by using the input of this factor as 
the denominator. Labor productivity is adequately calculated as output per 
unit of labor input. In the same way capital productivity is calculated as 
output per unit of capital input. The measurement can be made for labor in 
total hours worked and for capital in real net stock of plant and equipment. 
Partial productivity measures serve to evaluate and compare firms from a 
ceteris-paribus-perspective, e.g. comparing labor productivity of different 
firms or periods within the same firm. But as it assumes the influence of the 
other non-labor factors to output will remain constant, it does not seem to 
be an adequate measure for the efficiency of a firm (Palia & Lichtenberg, 
1999). 
Baily and Schultze (1990) highlighted that a decline in (labor-
augmenting) productivity growth results in a decline in the rate of profit 
growth, which is equal to the marginal product of capital with a simple neo-
classical one-sector model for quoted firms. They observe that this takes 
place in the short run and (especially) in a steady-state long-run 
equilibrium. This leads Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) to argue that 
differences between firms in total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP) are 
likely to be positively correlated with differences in stock values and 
propose using productivity as a more fundamental proxy than market value 
for firm performance. They found managerial ownership changes to be 
positively correlated to efficiency and firm performance. 
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A little later Barth et al. (2005) developed this model for FCBs and 
found evidence of performance differences in FCBs with family management 
and those with external management. They found lower performance for 
the former and highlighted the importance of professional management to 
the efficiency of firms. Gains in productivity and efficiency could be caused 
by a more than proportional increase in outputs or a better and more 
efficient use of inputs.  
VC/PE firms are known as active investors used to controlling and 
replacing inefficient management, thus, increasing the efficiency of human 
capital. They seek to be leaders in technical progress and inside investors in 
the sectors in which they invest. With that knowledge they are able to urge 
necessary changes of production processes and renewals of machinery and 
stock (Tykvová, 2007). Monitoring and other value-adding services are 
provided by VC/PE in addition to funding to help increased efficiency in the 
use of production factors in investee firms (Chemmanur et al., 2011). As 
the age of firms increases often EO tends to decrease from the level of 
founders’ first steps. Since VC/PE managers with these value-adding 
capacities help to renew and increase the EO in (family) firms (Cruz & 
Nordqvist, 2012), an increase in productivity can be expected after the 
entry of the VC/PE firm (Croce, Marti, & Rottke, 2012). 
Croce et al. (2013) resort to TFP to reflect the effect of value added 
provided by VC/PE investors. They argue that higher growth was to be 
expected in the former due to the additional funding received. Nevertheless, 
since TFP measures the increase in output due to an increase in inputs, by 
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measuring TFP growth the differences cannot be attributed to funding but, 
rather, to other value-adding services provided by VC/PE investors. 
Therefore, the FCBs could also benefit from these value-adding 
services if they access VC/PE funding. 
1.4. FCBS AND VC/PE - OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Research into VC/PE involvement in FCBs is still in its infancy (Martí 
et al., 2013) but due to their importance in most European countries, 
especially in times of crisis, FCBs have received increased attention as 
investee firms in the VC/PE industry. Studies and research on FCBs have 
undergone a fundamental development. Whereas this area was scarcely 
considered in the last century, research has developed different methods to 
describe familiness and its distinctive characters within the last decades 
(Wright & Kellermanns, 2011).  
Despite this research progress, quantitative analysis of the relation 
between SEW and financial performance as well as interaction with external 
investors remains at the starting point (Berrone et al., 2012). Research 
indicates a reluctance of FCBs to approach external financing. On the one 
hand, the influence of FCBs’ distinctive characteristics before and after the 
VC/PE transaction needs further investigation. On the other hand, the 
treatment and valuation of FCBs and their specific characters by VC/PE 
investors has been neglected in research. In that context, the most 
challenging aspect of the transaction, the pricing, needs a special 
consideration. 
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1.4.1. SEW PRESERVATION AND UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
The model of SEW assumes the protection of FCBs’ SEW as the only 
reference point for family’s business decisions. Family principals may 
respond to claims that protect and enhance their SEW even if they are not 
financially rewarding (Berrone et al., 2012). This behavior does not 
necessarily lead to economic losses, as decisions based on socioemotional 
aspects, particularly those taken with long-term goals in mind, may serve 
as the source for competitive advantage (e.g. less pollution of FCBs) 
(Berrone et al., 2010). Some authors observe that SEW-oriented business 
decisions have a positive impact on performance. King and Lenox (2002) 
found greater concern for the environment had a positive influence on 
financial performance. Cruz et al. (2010) find evidence of a performance 
advantage in small and micro firms due to an imprinting effect of family 
employment, but acknowledge the negative aspects of family employment, 
e.g. low incentives to find new ways of doing things. Miller et al. (2013) 
indicate that strategic conformity was related to greater return on assets, 
but without positive impact on the market valuation of FCBs. Evidence for 
the relation of business decisions influenced by SEW concerns and 
performance is mixed as the SEW perspective allows also for negative 
aspects of familiness, such as succession conflicts, dysfunctional 
relationships and managerial entrenchment (Berrone et al., 2012).  
Recent research hence suggests that there might be more than just 
one reference point, beyond SEW, for family business decisions to be able 
to explain under which conditions economic objectives become preferable to 
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SEW-related goals. This research assumes FCBs maximize a utility function 
with two components, SEW and financial outcomes (Berrone et al., 2012). 
The preservation of SEW has to be made responsible for negative 
perceptions of external financing and family principals’ reluctance to 
approach external investors. The necessary transparency, fear of losing 
control, negative assumptions for the future of the firm (e.g. asset stripping 
may occur), and other SEW concerns may prevent the family from 
approaching an external financier or investor. Thus, an alternative reference 
point has to be assumed when FCBs approach external financing (Hennessy 
& Whited, 2007).  
Assuming a utility function with two components - SEW and financial 
outcomes - a shift results from changes in the utility consideration for SEW 
concerns and/or a higher utility of the financial outcome component 
(Berrone et al. 2012). 
Most current research assumes FCBs to be homogenous with regard 
to their SEW level and does not distinguish between different FCBs (Berrone 
et al., 2012). As family ownership is used as a proxy for the existence of 
SEW, differences are neglected in these studies (Gomez-Mejia, 2007; 
Berrone et al., 2010). Other authors do account for differences among 
FCBs, though without linking them to the new SEW model (Zahra, Hayton, 
& Salvato, 2004). But it seems obvious that strength of ownership, i.e. the 
shares and the percentage FCBs own, make a huge difference and two 
important aspects are introduced. These are, first, different SEW levels for 
private and quoted firms, and secondly, SEW differences among 
generations.  
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The difference between private and quoted firms results from 
different sizes of family shares. As access to data of private firms is very 
limited, most of the literature is developed based on publicly quoted firms 
assuming that at least 5% of the shares to be in the hands of the family 
(Miller et al., 2007). By contrast, private FCBs are assumed to be those 
where at least 50% of the stakes are owned by a family (Cruz et al., 2010). 
For the latter, the strength of endowment, discretionary power and personal 
attachment to the firm will be much higher, so SEW concerns will be more 
present than in publicly listed firms (Berrone et al., 2012). At the same time 
private firms are less visible and their interest in gaining attention, status 
and legitimacy is lower. The tradeoff between financial and socioemotional 
outcomes is also judged differently by these private firms. Thus, the level of 
reluctance and aversion to external and institutional interests in private 
firms can be assumed to be higher than in quoted firms (Miller et al., 2013). 
Generations of FCBs mark distinct levels of SEW strength and it can 
be assumed that a family’s relationship with their firm is strongest and 
attachment highest when the founding generation owns and manages the 
firm (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). With 
transition to subsequent generations attachment tends to weaken, as 
ownership dispersion is likely to grow as the number of inheritors increases 
(Schulze et al., 2003). Analyzing selling decisions for Spanish olive oil mills 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) suggests that besides economic issues, 
willingness to give up control and accept connected losses in SEW is greater 
when the firm is in subsequent generations’ hands (the second family 
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generation’s hands). This effect is even more pronounced if the firm is 
managed by external management (in the third or later family generations). 
There is evidence that financial considerations become more salient 
to (investment) decisions when economic development weakens and results 
decline (Berrone et al., 2012). Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Kintana (2010) find 
that diversification activities increase with decreasing performance figures. 
Gomez-Mejia, Hoskisson et al. (2011) describe R&D investments being 
extended with lower results. But understanding of the relationship between 
SEW and financial outcomes is limited and needs further investigation 
(Berrone et al., 2012). SEW evolution as an endogenous variable can be 
positively related to firms’ performance as founder-CEOs are considered to 
create value while descendants tend to destroy it (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
There is anecdotal evidence that SEW may enhance firm value when there 
is a high need for patient capital, or when tacit knowledge is important. But 
little is known about the relation between SEW and financial outcomes. The 
role that performance hazard and poor performance play in family 
principals’ financing decisions remains unclear (Berrone et al., 2012). As 
this study aims to investigate the incentive and motive for FCBs to 
cooperate with external investors and funding forms an important part of 
the VC/PE services offered, the meaning of performance hazard needs 
further investigation.  
With sufficient ‘patient’ (internal) capital family principals can follow 
their specific investment strategies with lower costs and return 
expectations. They can neglect external capital and follow longer time 
horizons, emphasizing non-economic goals (McConaughy, 1999). FCBs are 
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less enthusiastic about “trading” their SEW preservation for low business 
risk. On the contrary, higher performance hazard makes them more willing 
to diversify to reduce risk, as Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) outline. Thus, low 
performance might be the type of event regarded as an “informational clue” 
(Berrone et al., 2012, p. 261) which motivates family principals to think of 
shifting their reference point to financial considerations. This is because low 
performance may result in a twofold threat. On the one hand, there is the 
need to overcome financial hardship as family patrimony is often not 
diversified. Often the option of diversification is only discussed in FCBs when 
business risks increase and is influenced by performance variability and 
performance hazard (Gomez Mejia et al., 2010). On the other hand, there is 
the possibility of SEW vanishing. The firm may be sold, taken over by 
another firm, go bankrupt or similar, and this may influence a family to shift 
their preferences from SEW to financial considerations (Berrone et al., 
2012). As Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) outline, family principles, especially 
those of the founders, sometimes may lead to irrational behavior in times of 
crisis and increased performance hazard, to preserve SEW. This might then 
result in a greater reluctance to accept external help or capital. With 
declining performance and higher probability of completely losing SEW 
(perceived as more likely with worse results) the relative utility of 
preserving SEW is lowered. Thus, in adverse economic conditions, family 
principals would tend to switch the prevalence family over economic goals 
due to the lower utility of SEW and the higher importance (and utility) of 
financial aspects. In the same vein, family owners can be assumed to be 
more willing to open their firm to external sources of funds. Reasons for 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 1: FAMILY FIRMS, FAMILINESS AND RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL FINANCING 
 90
poor economic conditions, performance hazard and the failure of FCBs are 
often concentrated in a lack of capital, lack of resources and incompetent 
management (Dyer Jr., 1988). Therefore, these factors should be the 
framework for the utility of the corporation for a FCB with the value-adding 
capacities of VC/PE investors. It remains a challenging question: Is it 
possible to identify a situation in which economic objectives become 
preferable to SEW-related goals (Berrone et al., 2012)?  
1.4.2. CAUSALITY OF VC/PE IMPACT IN FCBS 
VC/PE investors may support FCBs to succeed in important challenges 
such as growth, financing and succession. They aim to increase the value of 
portfolio firms through screening, funding and adding value to their portfolio 
firms in addition to funding. For the success of the interaction of the two 
parties it seems necessary to investigate the role VC/PE firms can play. As 
mentioned above, in the context of FCBs a strong culture, reluctance to 
seek external financing and distinctive firm characteristics play a significant 
role. Value-adding capacities of VC/PE investors have to be reviewed in that 
light and specific determinants for the transaction have to be considered.  
Little is known about the influence of FCB governance and external 
investors like VC/PE on the strength of SEW preservation tendencies. With a 
Family CEO and board member Berrone et al. (2010) assume SEW to be 
more salient but found no evidence for this hypothesis. Gomez-Mejia, 
Hoskisson et al. (2011) find a weak effect for the presence of other owners, 
such as institutional investors, with different strategic frameworks and 
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interests, so that the SEW emphasis diminishes. It seems obvious that the 
strength of family governance does depend on the strength of ownership, 
i.e. the size of the stake of the family. In line with the arguments for the 
definition chosen for private FCBs, the loss of a majority of the family 
always means officially losing FCB status. In contrast, if the family retains a 
majority stake it may allow them to keep familiness in the firm. Thus, 
minority or majority might be an interesting variable within VC/PE 
interaction as SEW influence and importance within the FCB may vary 
profoundly depending on the remaining number of family shares. 
The positive impact that venture capital exerts may arise from 
selection, funding, monitoring and value-adding services provided by VC/PE. 
But when FCBs tend to be more willing to approach external investors 
(only) when economic conditions become more promising, investors’ 
potential motives for investing in this case have to be questioned as they 
invest huge resources in the selection process of their investee firms. This 
may thus appear a contradiction to screening capacities of VC/PE firms as 
they are assumed to only select winners. This might have a dual 
explanation, firstly by the key firm characteristics VC/PE are seeking in the 
screening process, and secondly with their different strategic focus. Puri and 
Zarutski (2012) observed this over two decades in their longitudinal study 
of VC-financed firms in the United States. They found that past results and 
performance do not represent the major focus of the screening of 
prospective investee firms but, rather, the future growth potential. VC/PE is 
willing to invest in firms with ideas and no or low immediate returns. As 
they are able to improve profitability with efficiency strategies (Jensen, 
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1993; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000; Scholes et al., 2010), it 
might be suggested in line with the results of Puri and Zarutski (2012) that 
ideas and potential to scale in FCBs might be preferred also to profitability. 
Growth potential of FCBs would be preferred to current results and 
performance. Family-specific criteria are screened as well as human 
resources (Dawson, 2011).  
Additionally, from an investor´s perspective the role may change and 
potential for value creation differ. Due to their specific capacities lesser 
performing and/or constrained firms may appear attractive. Bertoni et al. 
(2013) indicate that the role VC plays may change depending on firm size. 
Small and medium sized firms are more likely to be in a worse economic 
state than larger firms (e.g. due to information asymmetries). VC/PE then 
helps to overcome a lack of capital. Larger FCBs mostly act without 
depending on internal cash-flows and they tend to approach private equity 
firstly to take advantage of growth opportunities (Scholes et al., 2010; 
Bertoni et al., 2013). Particularly in FCBs a lack of entrepreneurial thinking 
combined with limitations of capital might reduce the possibility to execute 
growth options such as entry in new markets, rollout of brands and M&A-
activities to ensure future growth.  
Similar to industry transactions of distressed firms, called liquidity 
mergers (i.e. those without operational synergies), firms may also acquire 
other firms for their industry-specific assets, even though the latter may be 
financially distressed (Almeida, Campello & Hackbarth, 2011). VC/PE 
investors prefer FCBs with potential to reduce agency costs and already 
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professionalized, particularly due to non-family succession (Dawson, 2011). 
This is mostly the case in the second or later generations.  
Pricing forms a central part at the very beginning of the transaction. 
Due to family agendas and specific difficulties from highly concentrated 
ownership it may appear reasonable for VC/PE investors to pay a lower 
price for FCBs in acquisitions (Granata & Chirico, 2010, Scholes et al., 2010) 
or to request higher returns, e.g. dividends or interest rates paid (Dawson, 
2011). For family owners, in the financing process with a VC/PE, the price 
forms part of the investment decision (i.e. the price is compensating for the 
loss of SEW), which is calculated as part of the capital costs of VC/PE 
involvement. The SEW concept may further urge an owner to demand a 
higher price for selling the business to non-family owners to compensate for 
the perceived loss of SEW. With lower performance, fewer financing 
opportunities and increasing constraints price expectations may decline the 
more the constraints and threat to SEW increase. Zellweger and Dehlen 
(2012) estimate the value of SEW by measuring the difference between 
objective market value and the owners’ subjective assessment. In addition, 
the wish of family owners to know the company is in “good hands” seems to 
be central.  
But research in this area, partially the valuation of private firms, 
remains challenging as existing data are limited (for a survey see e.g. 
Sharma & Carney, 2012). Additionally, measuring of the influence of the 
non-economic endowment of the family still poses major challenges 
(Berrone et al., 2012). Thus, within the transaction, price discussion may be 
taken as one of the most important but conflicting issues. 
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Our work will not focus on pricing but, rather, on some objective 
measures of financial hardship in FCBs in different generations to check 
whether the natural reluctance to accept external investors such as VC/PE 
institutions is reduced in hard times. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Venture capital/Private Equity (hereinafter, VC/PE) institutions are 
considered as specialized investors able to reduce information asymmetries 
(Chan, 1983) and to renew the entrepreneurial orientation of the investee firm 
(Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012). They provide value-adding services to their investee 
firms in addition to funding (Croce, Martí & Murtinu, 2013). The impact of 
VC/PE involvement on the productivity growth of investee firms has already 
been addressed in the literature (e.g. Alemany & Marti, 2005; Chemmanur, 
Krishnan & Nandy, 2011; Croce et al., 2013, among others). With a few 
exceptions (Howorth, Wright & Westhead, 2007; Martí, Menéndez-Requejo & 
Rottke, 2013; Wright, Amess, Weir & Girma, 2009), however, the study of 
VC/PE investments in family firms has been neglected. Even though family-
controlled businesses (hereinafter, FCBs) are the prevailing form of enterprise 
in continental Europe (Faccio & Lang, 2002), they are underrepresented in the 
portfolios of VC/PE firms (Martí et al., 2013). This could be one of the reasons 
explaining the limited attention FCBs have received in the VC/PE literature.  
In addition, the extant literature has scarcely analyzed the effect of 
VC/PE involvement in FCBs across generations. There is ample discussion in 
the family business literature about the performance of FCBs across 
generations, but the results are mixed. Recent studies report the existence of 
non-economic factors influencing managerial decisions, introducing the 
concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW) of ownership for the family (Gomez-
Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Gomez-
Mejía, Cruz, Berrone & De Castro, 2011; Wright & Kellermanns, 2011). The 
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desire to protect SEW may harm the strategic positioning of the FCB over 
time, since their managers would be reluctant to carry out the investments 
required to enhance the company’s competitive edge. The desire to protect 
SEW may, in particular, reduce the incentive to accept a VC/PE investor as a 
shareholder in FCBs. Since the reluctance to accept external investors is 
higher in first generation FCBs (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), we aim to analyze 
why those companies approach VC/PE investors at that stage. In addition, we 
also aim to analyze to what extent the effect of VC/PE involvement is 
significantly different depending on the generation in which the investee firm 
receives VC/PE funding.  
The empirical analyses are carried out on a large representative sample 
of Spanish FCBs and non-FCBs that received VC/PE funding between 1995 and 
2005. We also take into consideration the generation in which FCBs received 
this treatment. 
This paper contributes to the family business literature in different 
ways. First, we provide further evidence about the desire to protect SEW in 
first generation FCBs. Second, our paper provides new evidence on whether 
and how VC/PE funding positively influences investee FCB's performance. 
Third, it provides additional evidence on the discussion about performance of 
FCBs across generations. Finally, following the suggestion of Sharma, 
Chrisman and Chua, (1997), we contribute to the introduction of a new 
dependent variable (i.e. the total factor productivity growth) in family-
business research to measure the outcomes of decisions and actions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section we 
discuss VC/PE involvement and its effect on growth and performance in FCBs 
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across generations and develop our research hypotheses. In the third section 
we describe the data and the methodology. In the fourth section we present 
the results of the empirical analyses. In the fifth section we provide additional 
evidence on our results. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the implication 
of the results and conclude. 
2.2. SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH AND VENTURE CAPITAL IN FAMILY BUSINESSES 
New and adapted theories have been published recently to increase our 
understanding of family attitudes, among which a new framework describing 
the SEW, or affective endowments, of family owners should be highlighted. 
Owners of FCBs are concerned not only with financial returns but also with the 
desire to protect their SEW in those firms as Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) 
observed in their study. On their results Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011) developed 
five broad categories to describe different dimensions influencing managerial 
decisions under the SEW umbrella: organizational choices concerning 
management processes, firm strategies, corporate governance, stakeholder 
relations and business venturing. They argue that SEW explains many of these 
choices. Contingency factors, such as family stage, firm size, firm hazard, and 
the presence of non-family shareholders, moderate the influence of SEW 
preservation on managerial decisions in FCBs (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). 
The SEW concept is developed on a generational perspective (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007) emphasizing that attitudes of family members differ across 
generations, thus affecting their capacity to influence the company’s strategic 
direction (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). According to the SEW perspective, the 
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degree of family identification, influence and personal investment in the firm 
changes as the company evolves across generations (Gomez-Mejia et. al, 
2007). McConaughy and Phillips (1999) find that founder-controlled firms grow 
faster and invest more in capital assets and research and development than 
descendant-controlled firms, but the latter are more profitable.  
In general, results of the analysis of the performance of FCBs across 
generations are not univocal. Some works find evidence of a negative 
influence of founder’s presence (Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan & Newman, 
1985; McConaughy, Walker, Henderson & Mishra, 1998; Slovin & Sushka, 
1993) since, for example, FCBs are seen as less efficient and professional, 
especially at the founding stage (Howorth et al., 2007). Conversely, other 
works highlight the positive influence of the founder’s entrepreneurial spirit on 
the existence, growth and performance of the company (Sraer & Thesmar, 
2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
Since in first generation FCBs only the founding generation is present, 
ownership structures tend to be less dispersed than in descendent generation 
FCBs (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007) and, as Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial 
(2001, p. 258) point out, ‘more concentrated ownership creates incentives for 
managers to exploit the upside potential of applying entrepreneurial actions’. 
Further, low ownership dispersion decreases the likelihood of incurring costs to 
serve family members (Haynes, Walker, Rowe, & Hong, 1999) that could lead 
to negative business performance. Moreover, a less disperse ownership 
structure in founder FCBs should lead to lower agency costs because the risk 
of facing family conflicts (e.g. succession problems or draining of resources) 
tends to be lower (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Moreover, regarding 
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employees, the number of family members involved in the business is likely to 
increase over time, and the selection method is not always based on their 
capabilities (Dyer, 2003), thus suggesting a decrease in management talent in 
following generation FCBs. Furthermore, the relationship between owners and 
employees tends to be stronger in first generation FCBs (Horton, 1986), and 
there is a higher understanding of the firms’ local environment (Randøy & 
Goel, 2003). Finally, other studies do not find significant differences in 
performance (Westhead, 2003). Results for founder’s influence are also mixed 
(e.g. Wright & Kellermanns, 2011). There is also a dark side of founders’ 
positive influence, as irrational behavior in combination with low results might 
convert in a strategic impasse, as Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) highlight. They 
indicate that founders’ might reject helping sell of shares by the corporative, 
despite a decrease of performance. Overall, these results indicate that there 
could be a peak in founder’s positive influence, which is consistent with the 
perspective of the SEW of ownership for the family (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; 
Wright & Kellermanns, 2011).  
VC/PE involvement may reduce the negative effects of the desire to 
protect SEW on family performance. VC/PE investors address some of the 
issues that are linked to SEW preservation, such as succession, 
professionalization of the company, growth and diversification. VC/PE 
institutions are specialized investors with outstanding screening abilities 
(Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000) who allocate money to companies with promising 
growth opportunities. In addition to funding, they also contribute to ‘build 
winners’ by providing effective monitoring (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Lerner, 
1995; Sahlman, 1990) as well as other value-adding services. The close 
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supervision of investee firms after the initial VC/PE investment contributes to 
reducing agency costs and enhances firm performance (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
1994; Lerner, 1995). But agency theory neglects to consider the effect of a 
key coaching function (Colombo & Grilli, 2010; Hellman & Puri, 2002), which is 
also relevant in the value creation process.  
Even though the share of FCBs in the portfolios of VC/PE investors is 
small (Martí et al., 2013), many FCBs receive VC/PE funding, and a significant 
percentage of them are invested when the first generation is still running the 
business. In accordance with Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), the desire to protect 
SEW would discourage FCBs from approaching VC/PE investors, especially in 
first generation FCBs. This apparent contradiction could be explained by the 
possible underperformance of the target company. From the perspective of 
capital structure theory, FCBs strongly adhere to the logic of the pecking order 
theory (Dunn & Hughes, 1995; Poutziouris, 2001; López-Gracia & Sánchez-
Andújar, 2007), which affirms that there is a hierarchical order of potential 
financing sources and internally generated resources are preferred to external 
ones (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Low performing companies would not generate enough resources 
internally to cover their financing needs and would try to access external 
sources of financing. Since information asymmetry problems limit the banks’ 
ability to analyze the risk of investment projects in unquoted companies, 
specialized equity investors such as VC/PE institutions would become a last 
resort (Bertoni, Ferrer & Martí, 2012).  
In addition, there is evidence indicating that families try to secure the 
long-term survival of the company, even at the risk of jeopardizing SEW. 
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Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) affirm that family-owned mills are more willing to 
join corporations (i.e. to sell shares and control to non-family shareholders) 
when the company is experiencing business trouble. In the same vein, Gómez-
Mejía, Makri & Larraza-Kintana (2010) find that family shareholders of large, 
publicly traded FCBs are more likely to diversify their holdings as business risk 
increases. According to Gomez-Mejía et al. (2011), which find that founder 
FCBs with decreasing results are more willing to accept the entry of external 
investors, such as VC/PE institutions, we state our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1.: Due to the desire to protect SEW, only low performing first 
generation FCBs accept VC/PE investors as external 
shareholders. 
 
As to the expected impact of VC/PE investors in FCBs, in general, family 
issues are hard to handle for outsiders (Haynes & Usdin, 1997; Kaye, 1991). 
Bammens, Voordeckers and van Gils (2008), Salvato and Melin (2008) and 
Sonfield and Lussier (2004), among others, provide evidence on differences in 
the contribution to value creation expected from family members across 
generations. In particular, the entrepreneurial orientation of the FCB is highest 
in the first generation (Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012). Managers in second or 
following generation FCBs could be more inclined to object to new venture 
initiatives and to avoid higher levels of business risk aiming to take advantage 
of growth opportunities. As a consequence, a significant improvement in 
performance is expected in first generation FCBs because VC/PE managers will 
enhance the company’s entrepreneurial orientation (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) 
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by contributing with valuable coaching capabilities. In fact, even though first 
generation FCBs are more inclined to retain control (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007), if an external investor is accepted on the board, the family managers 
would still have the entrepreneurial orientation that made possible the initial 
growth of the company. Therefore, it is easier for both parties to align their 
interests to start a new growth process with the assistance and funding of the 
VC/PE investor. Conversely, the decreasing entrepreneurial orientation of 
managers in FCBs in subsequent generations could delay the implementation 
of new investment initiatives.  
In sum, based on the problems outlined in descendant generations (e.g. 
higher ownership dispersion, higher number of family members involved, 
lower entrepreneurial orientation, etc.), we verify that the impact of VC/PE is 
higher in first generation FCBs than in second or following generation ones. 
Accordingly, we agree with Scholes, Wright, Westhead & Bruining (2010) that 
the scope for efficiency gains and growth favored by the entry of VC/PE 
investors is significant in first generation FCBs as it should be easy for VC/PE 
investors to implement changes in monitoring and performance incentives and 
to start new entrepreneurial ventures in less established first generation FCBs. 
In accordance with Croce et al. (2013), we expect that the ‘imprinting effect’ 
of VC/PE investors would have an impact both in the short and the long term. 1 
Therefore, our second hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
                                      
1 The resources received in the initial years ‘imprint’ the company’s future evolution. Milanov 
and Fernhaber (2009) affirm that the most sensitive years are the first three years since the 
firm is established. Since the entrance of a VC investor could be considered as a ‘re-birth’ of the 
firm (Croce et al., 2013), we will define as short term the first three years after the initial VC 
investment and long term as the fourth and subsequent years. 
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Hypothesis 2a.: The entry of a VC/PE investor in first generation FCBs leads 
to a significant improvement in performance, both in the 
short and the long term. 
 
Hypothesis 2b.: The effect of VC/PE involvement on performance should be 
higher in first generation FCBs than in second or following 
generation FCBs, both in the short and the long term. 
 
2.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
We focus our work on the Spanish market because there is a large 
number of FCBs, a few of them quoted, and there is also enough information 
on VC/PE investments available over a long period of time. The sources of 
VC/PE information are the Spanish Venture Capital Association (ASCRI) and 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com, which compile all individual VC/PE investments 
since 1991. We also collect accounting data on investee companies from the 
Official Trade Register and the AMADEUS Database. We focus our research on 
VC/PE investments performed between 1995 and 2005, with accounting data 
available until 2010. According to Martí, Salas and Alférez (2011), 1,815 
VC/PE investments were recorded in Spain in that period, including all stages 
but excluding financial and real estate sectors, as well as investments carried 
out abroad by Spanish VC/PE institutions. We were able to fully identify 1,508 
of them in the Official Trade Registers, but full accounting data were only 
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available on 1,335 companies. By stage of development of the investee 
company, there were 599 early stage firms, 573 companies at the expansion 
stage and 163 mature firms that were subject to a buyout or a replacement 
deal.2  
Since we estimate our models with the GMM (Blundell & Bond, 2000) 
methodology, we need at least five consecutive observations to define 
instruments properly, with the year of the initial investment being one of 
them. As a result, our sample size shrinks to 673 companies. 
The final step in the sampling process is to investigate the family or 
non-family nature of those firms. Based on information gathered from the 
AMADEUS database, the firms’ websites, the official corporate news releases 
(BORME) and press clippings, we define FCBs as those whose ultimate largest 
shareholder is a family, or individuals closely linked to a family group.3 On 
these grounds we identify 197 FCBs and 476 non-FCBs, with FCBs 
representing 29.3 percent of all sample firms.  
Table 2.1. reports the distribution of VC/PE-backed FCBs and non-FCBs 
firms by year of initial investment, by stage of development of the portfolio 
company at the time of the initial VC/PE investment and by activity sector. 
FCBs are mostly manufacturing companies at the expansion stage. 
 
                                      
2 We classify a firm as an early stage investment if it receives funding to complete the final 
development of the product or service to be distributed (seed), or already has a product or 
service and is raising money to launch the manufacturing and distribution of the product (start-
up). Expansion stage investments are defined as equity or quasi-equity investments in existing 
firms with at least one profitable line of business.  The investor acquires either a majority or a 
minority stake in those transactions and most of the money is used to buy existing shares. 
3 This definition is in accordance with the official family business definition given by GEEF 
(European Group of Owner Managed and Family Enterprises) and FBN (Family Business 
Network) in 2008 and also adopted by the IEF (Family Business Institute in Spain). 
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TABLE 2.1. 
FULL SAMPLE OF VC/PE-BACKED FCBS AND NON-FCBS FIRMS 
 
PANEL A. BREAKDOWN BY YEAR OF INITIAL VC/PE INVESTMENT. 
 
Year 
FCBs Non-FCBs All  
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
1995 6 3.05 27 5.67 33 4.90 
1996 9 4.57 25 5.25 34 5.05 
1997 12 6.09 38 7.98 50 7.43 
1998 26 13.20 34 7.14 60 8.92 
1999 22 11.17 32 6.72 54 8.02 
2000 26 13.20 68 14.29 94 13.97 
2001 23 11.68 34 7.14 57 8.47 
2002 15 7.61 34 7.14 49 7.28 
2003 32 16.24 75 15.76 107 15.90 
2004 10 5.08 62 13.03 72 10.70 
2005 16 8.12 47 9.87 63 9.36 
Total 197 100 476 100 673 100 
 
PANEL B. BREAKDOWN BY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
Stage 
FCBs Non-FCBs All  
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Early stage 30 15.23 158 33.19 188 27.93 
Expansion 136 69.04 248 52.10 384 57.06 
Later stage 31 15.74 70 14.71 101 15.01 
Total 197 100 476 100 673 100 
 
PANEL C. BREAKDOWN BY ACTIVITY SECTOR. 
 
Industry 
FCBs Non-FCBs All  
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Technology, Media & 
Telecom 
10 5.08 80 16.81 90 13.37 
Manufacturing 120 60.91 177 37.18 297 44.13 
Primary and Energy 1 0.51 17 3.57 18 2.67 
Services 66 33.50 202 42.44 268 39.82 
Total 197 100 476 100 673 100 
Source: Based on the information collected from ASCRI, www.webcapitalriesgo.com and 
the AMADEUS Database. 
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In Table 2.2. we report sales and employees of VC/PE-backed FCBs 
according to the generation in which the VC/PE investor was involved. 
TABLE 2.2. 
BREAKDOWN OF VC/PE-BACKED FCBS BY SIZE CONSIDERING THE 
GENERATION IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR WAS INVOLVED 
 
Size reference 
1ST generation 
FCBs 
Following 
generations 
FCBs 
All  
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Employees (Number)       
Under 10 20 17.86 14 16.47 34 17.26 
Between 10 and 50 39 34.82 29 34.12 68 34.52 
Between 50 and 250 40 35.71 29 34.12 69 35.03 
Over 250 13 11.61 13 15.29 26 13.20 
Total 112 100 85 100 197 100 
Sales (Euro Thousands) 
      
Under 2,000 31 27.68 20 23.53 51 25.89 
Between 2,000 and 
10,000 
41 36.61 25 29.41 66 33.50 
Between 10,000 and 
50,000 29 25.89 28 32.94 57 28.93 
Over 50,000 11 9.82 12 14.12 23 11.68 
Total 112 100 85 100 197 100 
Source: Based on the information collected from ASCRI, www.webcapitalriesgo.com and 
the AMADEUS Database. 
 
2.3.2. MODELS AND METHODOLOGY 
Rather than sales or earnings growth, we focus on total factor 
productivity (hereinafter, TFP) to measure performance. By focusing on TFP 
growth we are able to control for the additional funding received by the 
investee company since the increase in output would be balanced with the 
additional inputs that the company received (Croce et al., 2013). We aim to 
analyze the effect of VC/PE financing, in terms of both screening and value-
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added, in FCBs (first generation vs. second or following generations) and non-
FCBs. Our empirical models are based on model 4 from Croce et al. (2013), 
which is modified as follows: 
TFP_growth =	α	 +∑ γVC,

∗ d !"#$, + γ%&'VC,
%&' + ∑ γ
%&'
VC,
%&' ∗"#$,
dfamilygj+γlongVCi,tlong+j=1,fγlongfjVCi,tlong∗dfamilygj+βxi,t+µi+εit                 [1] 
where the dependent variable TFP_growth, is one-year TFP growth of firm i in 
year t.4 Regarding the independent variables, in order to distinguish between 
FCBs in first and second or following generations we include two dummies: 
d !2 	 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for FCB i in first generation and 0 
otherwise, whereas d !3 equals 1 for FCBs in second or following 
generations, and 0 otherwise. As for the VC variable, VC,

	is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 before receiving VC/PE funding, or 0 otherwise; VC,
%&' is 
a dummy that equals 1 in the first three years following the year of the initial 
VC/PE investment and 0 otherwise; VC,
'45 equals 1 for later years (i.e. from 
t+4 onwards) in investee companies, and 0 otherwise. x, is a set of control 
variables that includes the stage of development and the age of the investee 
firm.5 Moreover, we include three dummy variables representing whether the 
VC/PE investor investing in company i has a high, medium or low amount of 
funds under management. This represents a signal of reputation in Spanish 
VC/PE institutions (Balboa & Martí, 2007). We also include industry dummies 
                                      
4 We base our TFP estimations on the GMM-system (GMM-SYS) estimator developed by Blundell 
and Bond (2000). According to Van Biesebroeck (2007), we estimate TFP separately for each 
industry. Then, in the final step, the residuals of the production function are used to estimate 
firm’s TFP growth.  
5 We assume that companies that are starting up will show higher TFP growth levels than more 
mature firms. Similarly, younger firms will experience higher TFP growth than older companies. 
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and year dummies that allow us to control for cross-sectional differences 
among industries and over time, respectively. Finally, µ

 are firm-fixed effects 
inserted to control for unobserved heterogeneity at firm-level that may lead to 
a biased estimate of VC/PE coefficients. ε is an i.i.d. error term.  
To test our H1 we look at the coefficient γ
32
. A negative and 
significant value of this coefficient would confirm our H1 on the screening 
effect of VC/PE: first generation FCBs would present a lower TFP growth than 
non-FCBs in the years before the VC/PE investment. Conversely, for second or 
following generation FCBs, we expect that the coefficient γ
33
 would be non 
significant as the need to protect SEW assumes a lower relevance in defining 
firm's strategies (i.e. no differences are expected in TFP growth levels, before 
the entry of VC/PE, between the groups of non-FCBs and second or following 
generation FCBs). A positive and significant value of γ
%&'
 (γ
'45
) indicates that 
VC/PE has a short (long) term effect on productivity in non-FCBs. In order to 
test our H2a, we evaluate both these short and long term effects, net of the 
screening effect, on FCBs (first and second or following generations) by 
resorting to the Wald tests on the linear combination of parameters as 
described in Panel B of Table 2.4.6 Moreover, in order to test H2b, we compare 
the VC/PE effect (in both short and long term) between first generation FCBs 
and second or following generation FCBs. Again the Wald tests used are 
reported in the last rows of Table 2.4. 7 
                                      
6 In GMM estimations the coefficient of VC,
 is always excluded in estimates and, thus, in linear 
combination tests. 
7 As robustness check, in order to exclude any screening effect between FCBs and non-FCBs, we 
only focus on FCBs. We thus estimate the effect of VC financing on FCB's productivity through 
the following model: 
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Finally, as a robustness check, we exclude any screening effect completely 
and, in order to assess the value added provided by VC/PE investors (both in 
the short and the long term), we estimate separately this simple model for 
first generation and second or following generation FCBs: 
TFP5'6&
=	α	 + βx, + θ%&' VC,
%&'
+ θ'45 VC,
'45
+µ

+ ε                         [2] 
We estimate equations [1] and [2] with different procedures. We start 
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in which we treat firm-specific 
effects as equal among all firms. We continue with random effects (RE) 
estimated with robust standard errors. In OLS and RE estimations we control 
for selection by inserting additional terms (i.e. VC,
) to isolate TFP growth 
differences between VC/PE-backed FCBs (first and second or following 
generations) and non-FCBs before the initial VC/PE round. In addition, to 
further address endogeneity problems that could distort the analysis of the 
value-adding effect of VC/PE involvement, we also resort to the two-step 
difference generalized method of moments (GMM-DIFF) estimator (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) with finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005). In the specification estimated with the GMM-DIFF 
estimator we exclude the additional term included in OLS and RE estimations 
                                                                                                                   
TFP5'6&
= 	α	 + βx, ++δ32VC,

∗ d !2 + δ%&'3:;<=>VC,
%&'
+ δ%&'32VC,
%&' ∗ d !2 +
δ'45 
VC,
'45
+δ'4532VC,
'45
∗ d !2+μ + ε        
According to H1 we expect δ32 to be negative and significant, indicating a lower productivity in 
the pre-investment period for first generation FCBs. As for equation [1], to study both the short 
and long term effects of VC, net of the screening effect, on FCBs and compare them, we need to 
perform the Wald tests on the linear combinations of parameters. Results, which are in line with 
those presented in Section 4, are not reported in the text for the sake of brevity. They are 
available from the authors upon request. 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 2: SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH, GENERATIONS AND VC/PE INVOLVEMENT IN FCBS 
 126
and consider the VC variables as endogenous (i.e. instruments start  
from t-2).8  
2.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This study deals with a total sample of 673 investee firms, 197 of which 
are FCBs (112 in first generation and 85 in second or following generations). 
In the first columns of Table 2.3., we report some descriptive statistics about 
size (in terms of total assets, fixed assets and sales), employment (in terms of 
payroll expenses and headcount) and age for FCBs and non-FCBs.  
TABLE 2.3. 
PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COMPANY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
 
                                      
8 However, to avoid that the use of a large number of instruments results in significant finite 
sample bias, and that measurement errors cause potential distortions in our estimates, the 
instrument set is restricted with moment conditions in the interval between t-2 and t-4 (see 
Bond, 2002). 
 
 
FCBs vs non-FCBs 1ST GENERATION (1G) vs. FOLLOWING GENERATIONS (FG) FCBs 
    PRE-INVESTMENT POST-INVESTMENT PRE-INVESTMENT POST-INVESTMENT 
  
  
FCBs Non-FCBs 
FCBs vs. non-
FCBs 
FCBs Non-FCBs 
FCBs vs. non-
FCBs 
1G FG 1G vs. FG 1G FG 1G vs. FG 
Total  
assets† 
Mean 16986.79 25546.69 -8559.9 *** 41046.37 39719.16 1327.21  14054.23 21152.18 -7097.95 *** 32483.8 52482.98 -19999.18 *** 
Median 5193 5790   10966 8602   4623 6053   8704 14903   
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
Fixed  
assets† 
Mean 7102.01 13145.92 -6043.91 *** 22300.33 23628.7 -1328.37  5858.06 8868.91 -3010.85 ** 14681.18 32476.88 -17795.7 *** 
Median 1879 1888   
4562 3381 
  
1736 1968.5 
  
3850 6277 
  
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
Sales† 
Mean 17452.39 28921.94 -11469.55 *** 30939.1 35052.63 -4113.53  13547.35 22999.09 -9451.74 *** 24958.22 38927.47 -13969.25 *** 
Median 6011 5156   8747 6263   4706 7396   6630.5 11486   
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
Payroll  
expenses† 
Mean 2832.62 4875.88 -2043.26 *** 5367.51 6465.76 -1098.25 * 2310.66 3574.01 -1263.35 *** 4688.97 6273.8 -1584.83 ** 
Median 1008 1208   1958 1560   919 1185   1779.5 2296   
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
Head- 
count 
Mean 100.43 178.55 -78.12 *** 186.52 268.88 -82.37 ** 90.02 115.21 -25.2 * 168.26 210.9 -42.64 * 
Median 42 43   66 51   41 44   66 65   
Obs 973 1652   
1343 3105 
  
571 402 
  
768 575 
  
Age 
Mean 16.7 12.38 4.32 *** 21.26 15.08 6.18 *** 13.02 21.92 -8.9 *** 17.65 26.07 -8.41 *** 
Median 15 8   19 11   12 20   17 24   
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
TFP  
growth 
Mean -0.04 0.028 -0.068 * 0.008 0.041 -0.033  -0.076 0.011 -0.087 ** 0.028 -0.019 0.047  
Median -0.008 -0.003   
-0.003 0.001 
  
-0.016 0 
  
-0.009 0 
  
Obs 973 1652   1343 3105   571 402   768 575   
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. † Data are expressed in thousand € and deflated by CPI (reference year: 2005). 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 2: SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH, GENERATIONS AND VC/PE INVOLVEMENT IN FCBS 
 127
We show summary statistics, such as mean, median and number of 
observations for each category in both pre and post-investment periods. 
Moreover, for every variable, we perform t-tests on the difference-in-mean 
between the group of FCBs and the group of non-FCBs. We find that there are 
significant differences between the two groups before the initial VC/PE round. 
In particular, FCBs are smaller in terms of both output and input variables of 
the production function (sales, capital and labor costs). Conversely, after the 
first round of VC/PE financing, on average, FCBs are able to increase their 
revenues and capital (in terms of total assets, fixed assets and sales) whereas 
labor costs are still lower than those paid by non-FCBs. This evidence seems 
to suggest a positive effect of VC/PE on the growth of the investee companies. 
In the last columns of Table 2.3. we compare FCBs in first generation vs. FCBs 
in second or subsequent generations. As expected, first generation FCBs seem 
to be significantly smaller and younger than second or subsequent generation 
ones in both pre and post-investment periods. In the last rows of Table 2.3. 
we specifically focus on TFP growth. Results indicate that, before the 
involvement of VC/PE investors, FCBs seem to show a lower TFP growth than 
non-FCBs ones. In addition, among FCBs, first generation firms show a lower 
productivity growth than FCBs in descendant generations. However, in both 
cases, differences become non-significant after the entry of the VC/PE 
investors.  
Overall, these unconditional summary statistics suggest that VC/PE 
investors seem to invest in FCBs with lower performance, especially in the first 
generation, and they contribute to increasing firm’s productivity growth, again, 
especially in founder generation FCBs.  
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2.4. RESULTS 
The regression results of equation [1] on the full sample of VC/PE-
backed firms, including both FCBs and non-FCBs, are shown in Panel A of 
Table 2.4. The three columns report ordinary OLS, RE and GMM-DIFF 
estimations. Regarding screening, our results show that, in accordance with 
what is shown in the descriptive statistics (Section 3.3), FCBs that received 
VC/PE funding during the first generation showed TFP growth levels 
significantly lower than those found in non-FCBs investees prior to the VC/PE 
investment event. Nevertheless, this was not the case of FCBs in second or 
following generations, which did not exhibit significant differences with non-
FCBs in TFP growth prior to the initial VC/PE investment. This finding confirms 
our first hypothesis.9 
  
                                      
9 We address the screening hypothesis in Subsection 2.5 by providing further evidence to our 
results. 
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TABLE 2.4. 
SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF VC/PE ON TFP GROWTH IN 
VC/PE-BACKED FCBS AND NON-FCBS. 
 
PANEL A. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
coeff OLS RE GMM 
VC,

∗ d !2 γ32 
-0.0999 *** -0.0999 *** 
  
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
   
VC,

∗ d !3 γ33 
0.0004 
 
0.0004 
   
(0.035) 
 
(0.035) 
   
VC,
%&' γ%&' 
0.0802 ** 0.0802 ** 0.0682 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.058) 
 
VC,
%&' ∗ d !2	 γ%&'32 
-0.0082 
 
-0.0082 
 
0.4102 *** 
(0.054) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.071) 
 
VC,
%&' ∗ d !3 γ%&'33 
-0.0640 
 
-0.0640 
 
-0.2662 ** 
(0.043) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.117) 
 
VC,
'45 γ'45 
0.0310 
 
0.0310 
 
0.0619 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.07) 
 
VC,
'45
∗ d !2 
γ
'4532
 0.0223 
 
0.0223 
 
0.4474 ** 
(0.025) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.191) 
 
VC,
'45
∗ d !3 
γ
'4533
 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.3019 ** 
(0.033) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.129) 
 
Agei,t 
 -0.0016 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0051 
 
 (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Stagei 
 -0.0447 *** -0.0447 *** 
  
 (0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
   
Small size VCsi 
 -0.0018 
 
-0.0018 
 
-0.0857 
 
 (0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.078) 
 
Medium size VCsi 
 0.0003 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.0686 
 
 (0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.056) 
 
Intercept α	 
0.2199 
 
-0.0001 
   
(0.164) 
 
(0.057) 
   
N.obs.  7073 
 
7073 
 
6384 
 
N.firms  673 
 
673 
 
673 
 
Hansen test  
    
95.7245  
[92]  
AR1  
    
-6.9491 *** 
AR2  
    
1.4160 
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TABLE 2.4. (CONT.) 
PANEL B. SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF VC/PE ON FCBS 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH  
VC/PE impact 
on 1ST 
generation 
FCBs 
Short-
term 
γ
%&'
+ γ
%&'32
− γ
32
 0,1720 ** 0,1720 ** 0,4784 *** 
(0.071) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.0399) 
 
Long-
term 
γ
'45
+ γ
'4532
− γ
32
 0,1533 *** 0,1533 *** 0,5094 *** 
(0.039) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.1605) 
 
VC/PE impact 
on following 
generation 
FCBs 
Short-
term 
γ
%&'
+ γ
%&'33
− γ
33
 0,0158  0,0158  -0,198 * 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.108) 
 
Long-
term 
γ
'45
+ γ
'4533
− γ
33
 0,0306  0,0306  -0,24 * 
(0.049) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.143) 
 
Difference 
VC/PE impact 
(1ST generation 
vs. following 
generations 
FCBs) 
Short-
term 
γ
%&'32
− γ
32
− γ
%&'33
− γ
33
 
0,1562 * 0,1562 * 0,6764 *** 
(0.086) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.122) 
 
Long-
term 
γ
'4532
− γ
32
− γ
'4533
− γ
33
 
0,1227 ** 0,1227 ** 0,7494 *** 
(0.058) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.290) 
 
 
Estimates of Equation [1]. The dependent variable is total factor productivity growth. The 
independent variables are: (1) VC,
is a dummy variable that equals 1 prior to the year of the 
initial investment, or 0 otherwise; (2) d !2is a dummy variable that equals 1 in family firm i 
in first generation, or 0 otherwise; (3) d !3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for family firm i 
in second or following generations, or 0 otherwise; (4) VC,
%&' is a dummy that equals 1 in the 
first three years following the year of the initial VC investment, or 0 otherwise; (5) VC,
'45 equals 
1 for later years (i.e. from t+4 onwards), and 0 otherwise; (6) Agei,t is the age of company i in 
year t; (7) Stagei  is the stage of development (i.e. early, expansion or late stage) of company i 
at the time of the initial VC/PE round; (8) is dummy that equals 1 if the investee company 
received funding from a VC/PE investor with less than €50 million under management, or 0 
otherwise; (9) is dummy that equals 1 if the investee company received funding from a VC/PE 
investor with funds under management amounting between €50 and €150 million, or 0 
otherwise. OLS, RE and GMM columns refer to the estimations based on the full sample, 
including both family and non-family VC/PE-backed firms. Estimates are derived from OLS and 
RE regressions with robust clustered standard errors and difference GMM estimations. Standard 
errors in round brackets. Degrees of freedom in square brackets. ***, ** and * indicate, 
respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
 
The variable BCD,E
FGHIE  reports that TFP growth is positive and significant, 
on average, in VC/PE-backed companies (both family and non-family-
controlled businesses) in the first three years after the initial investment, but 
only when the models are estimated using OLS or RE techniques. 
Nevertheless, our main interest is to check how VC/PE investors are able to 
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add value in FCBs over time and across generations. The effective predictions 
are based on the Wald tests shown in Panel B of Table 2.4. We find that, in the 
first three years after the initial VC/PE round, there is a significant TFP growth 
in FCBs which receive VC/PE funding in the first generation. This result 
confirms our hypothesis 2a. Moreover, this result is consistent with the 
positive effect found in the GMM column, which does not require controlling for 
the endogeneity of the VC/PE investment.  
Conversely, there is not a significant effect on TFP growth of VC/PE 
involvement in the first three years after the investment in FCBs in second or 
following generations. GMM estimation of the model even shows a negative 
coefficient for the variable BCD,E
FGHIE. Regarding the long term effect (i.e. from the 
fourth year after the initial investment onwards), results show a non-
significant impact of VC/PE on non-FCBs. In the case of FCBs, as shown in 
Panel B of Table 2.4., we find that a significant TPF increase engendered by 
VC/PEs is found when FCBs are in the first generation. This result also holds 
when the estimation is carried out using the GMM methodology. Conversely, a 
non-significant effect in the long term TFP growth levels is found in FCBs that 
were subject to a VC/PE investment when they were in second or following 
generations. Furthermore, a marginally significant negative coefficient is found 
when the model is estimated with the GMM methodology. In addition, in the 
last two rows of Panel B of Table 2.4. we test our hypothesis 2b on whether 
there are significant differences in TFP growth rates between FCBs in first and 
second or following generations, both in the short and long term. It should be 
remarked that, regardless of the estimation technique employed, short term 
and long term TFP growth rates are significantly different between both 
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groups, confirming our hypothesis 2b, with the results showing the highest 
significance level in the case of coefficients estimated using the GMM-DIFF 
methodology. 
As a check, we estimate Equation [2] separately for the two subsamples 
of FCBs backed by VC/PE institutions, namely those that received VC/PE 
funding in the first generation and those being funded in second or following 
generations. In this model there is no need to control for selection (i.e. 
analysis of TFP growth before the initial VC/PE investment) because 
regressions are carried out separately for both groups. The results are 
reported in Table 2.5. For FCBs in the first generation, we find a positive and 
significant growth in TFP, both in the short and in the long term, regardless of 
the estimation method employed. Conversely, we do not find significant TFP 
growth in firms in second or following generations, either in the short or the 
long term, in FCBs in second or following generations in columns OLS and RE. 
We do find significant values in the GMM column that would show positive long 
term performance in FCBs in second or following generations. Nevertheless, 
this difference is not significant when it is compared with long term growth of 
first generation FCBs. In addition, we have to report that GMM estimations 
could not be reliable in this group due to the lack of significance of AR1. 
Consequently, again, our hypothesis 2b is confirmed. 
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TABLE 2.5. 
SHORT AND LONG TERM EFFECTS OF VC/PE ON TFP GROWTH IN 
VC/PE-BACKED FCBS ACROSS GENERATIONS 
 
1st generation FCBs Following generations FCBs 
OLS RE GMM OLS RE GMM 
JKL,M
NOPQM 
0,1932 ** 0,1932 ** 0,1052 *** 0,0115 
 
0,0115 
 
0,0882 *** 
(0.084) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.033) 
 
JKL,M
RPST
 
0,1858 *** 0,1858 *** 0,0942 ** -0,0061 
 
-0,0061 
 
0,0951 *** 
(0.053) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.034) 
 
Agei,t 
-0,0013 
 
-0,0013 
   
-0,0001 
 
-0,0001 
   
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
   
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
   
Stagei 
0,0172 
 
0,0172 
   
0,0096 
 
0,0096 
   
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
   
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
   
Small size 
VCsi 
-0,0445 
 
-0,0445 
 
-0,103 
 
-0,0121 
 
-0,0121 
 
0,0645 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.065) 
 
Medium size 
VCsi 
-0,0135 
 
-0,0135 
 
-0,0301 
 
-0,0389 
 
-0,0389 
 
0,02 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Intercept 
-0,1263 
 
-0,3164 *** 
  
0,5693 *** -0,0039 
   
(0.093) 
 
(0.083) 
   
(0.061) 
 
(0.137) 
   
N.obs. 1339 
 
1339 
 
1226 
 
977 
 
977 
 
888 
 
N.firms 112 
 
112 
 
112 
 
85 
 
85 
 
85 
 
Hansen test 
    
39.002  
[51]      
45.7915  
[52]  
AR1 
    
-2,5887 *** 
    
-1,5784 
 
AR2 
    
1,1652 
     
1,096 
 
Estimates of Equation [2]. The dependent variable is total factor productivity growth. The 
independent variables are: (1) VC,
%&' is a dummy that equals 1 in the first three years following 
the year of the initial VC investment in FCB, or 0 otherwise; (2) VC,
'45 equals 1 for later years in 
FCB, and 0 otherwise; (3) Agei,t is the age of company i in year t; (4) Stagei  is the stage of 
development (i.e. early, expansion or late stage) of company i at the time of the initial VC 
round; (5) is dummy that equals 1 if the investee company received funding from a VC investor 
with less than €50 million under management, or 0 otherwise; (6) is dummy that equals 1 if the 
investee company received funding from a VC investor with funds under management 
amounting between €50 and €150 million, or 0 otherwise. OLS, RE and GMM columns refer to 
the estimations based on the subsample of VC-backed FCBs. Estimates are derived from OLS 
and RE regressions with robust clustered standard errors and system GMM estimations. 
Standard errors in round brackets. Degrees of freedom in square brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
 
To sum up, VC/PE investors seem to select first generation FCBs 
exhibiting lower TFP growth than other VC/PE-backed FCBs and non-FCBs and 
are able to increase TFP growth significantly both in the short and the long 
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term. This is in accordance with our hypotheses because the entrepreneurial 
orientation of the family managers is higher in these firms than in second and 
further generations FCBs. As a result, VC/PE investors are able to implement 
their value-adding activities with fewer conflicts than those found in FCBs in 
descendant generations. 
2.5. FURTHER EVIDENCE ON SCREENING  
In the previous section we showed that, before receiving VC/PE funding, 
FCBs in first generation exhibit significantly lower TFP growth than other 
investee firms, both non-FCBs and FCBs in second or following generations. 
We interpreted this result as a confirmation of hypothesis 1, since first 
generation FCBs would only approach VC/PE investors if their troubles in 
sustaining firm's growth outweigh the desire to protect their SEW.  
In order to better exploit the screening hypothesis, in this section, we 
perform a further analysis by introducing a matched sample of non-VC/PE-
backed FCBs. We aim to verify, by resorting to a selection equation, that the 
receipt of VC/PE financing is negatively correlated with productivity growth in 
first generation FCBs, whereas this relationship is not significant in second or 
following generation FCBs.  
We built a matched sample of non-VC/PE-backed FCBs that is 
comparable to the sample of VC/PE-backed FCBs according to a set of a priori 
defined characteristics (for a similar procedure in the VC/PE literature, see e.g. 
Chemmanur et al., 2011; Croce et al., 2013). Control group companies are 
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identified using a propensity score method. 10 The aim is to find, for each FCB 
that received VC/PE financing in year t, the non-VC/PE-backed FCB that, in the 
same year, had the most similar probability (i.e. propensity score) of receiving 
VC/PE.11 We run the matching procedure separately for first generation FCBs 
and second or following generation ones. After matching the sample is 
composed of 174 VC/PE-backed FCBs (110 of which are in first generation) 
and 140 non-VC/PE-backed FCBs (73 of which are in first generation). 
In Table 2.6., we report some descriptive statistics about size (in terms of 
total assets and sales), employment (in terms of payroll expenses and 
headcount), age and TFP growth for VC/PE-backed and matched non-VC/PE-
backed FCBs.  
  
                                      
10 We performed a nearest neighbor matching. The sampling of the control group is performed 
with replacement so that each control group firm can be selected as a match for more than one 
VC-backed firm (possibly in different years).  
11 Propensity scores are obtained by estimating, for each year, a probit model in which the 
dependent variable is the occurrence of a VC investment and independent variables include: 
age, size (measured by the end-of-period book value of firm's total assets), sales, intangible 
assets to total assets, region and industry controls. 
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TABLE 2.6. 
PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VC/PE-
BACKED VS NON-VC/PE-BACKED FCBS. 
 
 
 
We show summary statistics, such as mean, median and number of 
observations for each category in both pre and post-investment periods. 
Moreover, for every variable, we perform t-tests on the difference-in-mean 
between the group of VC/PE-backed FCBs and the matched control group. We 
do not find significant differences between VC/PE-backed FCBs and the 
matched control group before the initial VC/PE round. Conversely, after the 
first VC/PE round, VC/PE-backed firms are, on average, larger than non-
VC/PE-backed firms in terms of total assets, sales, payroll expenses and 
headcount. As for TFP growth, no significant differences are found in both the 
pre and post-investment periods. These unconditional summary statistics 
  PRE-INVESTMENT POST-INVESTMENT 
  Non-VC-
backed 
VC-backed 
VC vs. non-VC-
backed 
Non-VC-
backed 
VC-backed 
VC vs. non-VC-
backed 
Total  
assets† 
Mean 10616.030 11901.150 1285.120  13537.010 28076.090 14539.080 *** 
Median 2446.000 4845.000   3205.000 10358.000   
Obs 1136 977   552 998   
Sales† 
Mean 12343.320 11615.420 -727.900  5011.130 13025.190 8014.060 *** 
Median 2988.500 5128.000   1034.000 4132.000   
Obs 1136 977   552 998   
Payroll  
expenses† 
Mean 1917.071 2081.381 164.310  13839.820 21834.270 7994.450 *** 
Median 494.500 892.000   3749.000 8215.500   
Obs 1136 977   552 998   
Head- 
count 
Mean 65.409 73.291 7.882  86.533 136.552 50.019 *** 
Median 23.000 38.000   28.000 62.000   
Obs 1134 977   552 998   
Age 
Mean 15.528 15.719 0.190  20.109 19.915 -0.194  
Median 13.500 13.000   18.500 18.000   
Obs 1136 977   552 998   
TFP  
growth 
Mean -0.0002 -0.012 -0.012  -0.005 0.005 0.010  
Median -0.0004 -0.006   -0.005 0.004   
Obs 1136 977   552 998   
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. †Data are expressed in 
housand € and deflated by CPI (reference year: 2005). 
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seem to suggest that VC/PE investors, on average, do not perform any 
screening activity on FCBs and do not significantly contribute to foster FCBs’ 
productivity growth. 
First, one may argue that, even among non-VC/PE-backed firms, the 
TFP growth in first generation FCBs is lower than that in following generation 
FCBs, thus meaning that the result cannot be related to VC/PE selection. 
However, we verify that, among non-VC/PE-backed firms, first generation 
FCBs do not show significant differences in their TFP growth, on average, than 
other FCBs (p-value of t-test equals to 0.817). This evidence allows us to 
conclude that only first generation FCBs with lower TFP growth look for VC/PE 
funding. 
Second, we proceed to a multivariate analysis on screening by VC/PE by 
using a dynamic probit model in which the dependent variable is a binary 
dummy, identifying whether a firm receives VC/PE backing or not. This 
dependent variable is always equal to zero for all non-VC/PE-backed FCBs. For 
VC/PE-backed FCBs, it is zero in all years prior to receiving VC/PE financing, 
and it equals one in the year in which the firm receives VC/PE financing. It is 
set to missing in the following years.12 As independent variables we include 
TFP growth, age, size (measured by the logarithm of total assets) and the 
stage of development of the company. Moreover, we also include the ratio 
between intangible assets and total assets as a measure of growth orientation 
(e.g. Caves, 1980; Itami, 1987; Myers, 1977). In order to test our  
                                      
12 Thus, VC-backed firms effectively drop out of the sample for all years subsequent to the year 
of receiving financing. This procedure is customary in empirical analysis on selection (see 
Chemmanur et al., 2011, for a similar procedure) 
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hypothesis 1, we estimate two different dynamic probit models by 
distinguishing among first generation and second or following generation 
FCBs. Results are shown in Table 2.7. 
TABLE 2.7. 
SELECTION BY VC/PE IN FIRST AND FOLLOWING GENERATIONS FCBS 
 
 1
ST generation FCBs Following generations FCBs 
Agei,t -0.1476 *** 0.0049  
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Stagei 0.7407  
-0.3477 
 
 
(0.681) 
 
(1.099) 
 
Sizei,t 1.6903 *** 1.4261 *** 
 
(0.395) 
 
(0.446) 
 
Intangible on  
Totalassetsi,t 
4.3178 ** 5.0642  
 
(1.825) 
 
(3.831) 
 
TFP_growthi,t -0.8429 * 0.3895  
 
(0.502) 
 
(0.977) 
 
d_industry included  included  
d_year included  included  
d_region included  included  
N 1492  1172  
N_g 183  131  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for VC-backed FCBs in the year of the 
initial investment, and 0 for non-VC-backed firms; Agei,t is the age of company i in year t; 
Stagei  is the stage of development (i.e. early, expansion or late stage) of company i at the time 
of the initial VC round; Size is the logarithm of total assets of company i in year t;  TFP growthi,t 
is the growth of total factor productivity of firm i in year t. The first column refers to the 
estimations based on the subsample of VC-backed FCBs in first generation. The second column 
refers to following generation FCBs. Estimates are derived from dynamic probit regressions. 
Standard errors in round brackets. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 
<1%, <5% and <10%. 
 
Results confirm that VC/PE investors are able to invest, among first 
generation FCBs, only in those with lower productivity growth, whereas this 
result does not hold for following generation FCBs. We interpret this evidence 
as a further proof of hypothesis 1. As for control variables, we find that VC/PE-
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backed FCBs are larger than non-VC/PE-backed ones, in both first and 
subsequent generation FCBs. Focusing on first generation FCBs only, the 
VC/PE-backed ones are younger and have higher growth orientation. These 
selection criteria do not hold for following generation FCBs.  
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
FCBs are the prevailing form of enterprise in the world. Nevertheless, 
since family shareholders are more reluctant to allow the presence of external 
shareholders, FCBs are underrepresented in the portfolios of VC/PE 
institutions. As a result, the study of VC/PE involvement in FCBs has been 
neglected in the literature. With this paper we intend to contribute to filling 
this gap. First, based on the perspective of owners’ SEW, we aim to analyze 
why VC/PE investors are accepted as shareholders in first generation FCBs. We 
argue that family owners overcome their natural reluctance to accept an 
external shareholder, to protect their SEW, because the future of the company 
could be in danger. Second, we aim to analyze the impact of VC/PE 
involvement in FCBs in first and second or following generations. We anticipate 
that the value-adding effects of VC/PE involvement should be more effective in 
first generation FCBs, since the management culture is not as established, 
ownership dispersion is lower and the entrepreneurial orientation is higher 
than in FCBs in second or following generations. 
We focus our analyses on a large sample of VC/PE-backed FCBs and 
non-FCBs that received VC/PE funding between 1995 and 2005. Our results 
show that VC/PE institutions choose first generation FCBs showing significantly 
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lower TFP growth levels than those found in non-FCBs or in FCBs in second or 
following generations. After the entry of the VC/PE investor, as expected, TFP 
growth is positive and significant in first generation FCBs, both in the long 
term and in the short term. The use of TFP allows us to control for the other 
possible explanation for a better performance (i.e. the funding received) of the 
investee firm, because we already proved that first generation FCBs were not 
better than the rest of the investee firms. Therefore, we can explain the higher 
performance by the value-adding effect of VC/PE involvement, which is 
effective in improving the entrepreneurial orientation of the FCB managers. In 
addition, we find evidence on the higher effect on performance in first versus 
second or subsequent generations, which could be based on the lower agency 
conflicts and higher entrepreneurial orientation of the former. We argue that 
these reasons determine more room for performance improvement in the first 
generation. 
Our work contributes to the existing literature on FCBs in several ways. 
First, it increases our understanding of VC/PE involvement in FCBs, which has 
been neglected in the literature. Second, we provide new evidence aligned 
with the ideas of the SEW preservation perspective. More precisely, we provide 
further evidence on the greatest desire to protect SEW in first generation 
FCBs, which is reflected by the fact that only those showing significantly lower 
TFP growth levels accept VC/PE funding. This paper also provides evidence on 
the positive effect of VC/PE involvement in FCBs, especially when the firm is 
still in the first generation. Finally, the higher TFP growth levels found in first 
generation FCBs also provides additional evidence on the higher 
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entrepreneurial orientation of those firms, when compared to that of FCBs in 
extended generations. 
The main limitation of our paper, when we test hypothesis 1, is that we 
do not control for first generation FCBs that seek, but fail to obtain VC/PE 
funding. In fact, the step in which firms decide whether to position themselves 
‘on the market for VC/PE’ or not (Eckhardt, Shane & Delmar, 2006) may cause 
a self-selection bias. Unfortunately, we do not have information on whether 
firms asked for VC/PE without obtaining it. 
For further research, it would be interesting to split the sample to 
analyze whether and how our results are influenced by the stake held by the 
VC/PE investors (i.e. separating among majority or minority shareholders).13 
In addition, our sample refers to Spanish firms. It would be of interest to test 
whether these hypotheses are also valid in other European countries. Finally, 
qualitative information about the human capital in FCBs could complete our 
view based on quantitative data. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Information asymmetry makes it difficult for external investors to assess 
the quality of investment projects or the reliability of the managers in a firm. 
The higher the information asymmetry the higher the risk associated to the 
firm and, thus, the higher the cost of external sources of funds. Information 
asymmetry is lower in listed firms because they are obliged to provide detailed 
audited accounting information regularly and to report immediately any 
relevant information to the market. This is not the case in privately held 
companies, which are more affected by the higher level of risk perceived by 
stakeholders that conditions the choice of financing between internally 
generated cash flows and outside sources of funds (Carpenter & Petersen, 
2002).  
The problems derived from information asymmetries that influence the 
choice between internal and external capital exist in both family and non-
family firms. However, we choose in this work to focus on family controlled 
businesses (hereinafter, FCBs): Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002) provide evidence on the importance of FCBs among listed firms. 
Their relative importance is significantly higher among unlisted firms. In the 
most developed countries, Gersick, Davis, Hampton & Lansberg (1997) 
estimate that FCBs account for over two thirds of all companies and about half 
of a country’s GDP.  
The issue of financial constraints is particularly relevant in FCBs as they 
strongly adhere to the pecking order theory to finance their investments. First, 
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FCBs prefer internal financing with patient capital and lower cost of capital 
(McConaughy, 1999; Zellweger, 2007). Second,  even though FCBs, 
particularly founder-controlled firms, could benefit from external financing due 
to their lower agency costs, the limited use by FCBs of external finance could 
be explained, as highlighted in the literature (e.g. Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, 
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & 
Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía, Hoskisson, Makri, Sirmon, & Campbell,  2011) 
by the desire to preserve the socioemotional wealth (hereinafter, SEW). SEW 
could be defined as a behavior of family principles that ‘weigh perceived 
threats to their endowment according to a subjective valuation of what is 
important to their welfare, what is already accrued, and what can be counted 
on’ (Gómez-Mejía, Cruz et al., 2011, p. 665). Zellweger, Kellermanns, 
Chrisman, and Chua (2012) point out that FCBs make strategic choices that do 
not derive from an economic reference point or a risk-averse financial logic: as 
a consequence, FCBs may discard strategic investments with positive net 
present value if external sources of funds are required to finance them. 
Nevertheless, Berrone, Cruz and Gómez-Mejía (2012) also affirm that 
although SEW preservation is the “higher order” reference point, when poor 
performance could lead to severe financial hardship to the family’s standard of 
living, the family is forced to reconsider SEW as the primary reference point. 
This could lead to the acceptance of external stakeholders, such as Venture 
Capital/Private Equity (hereinafter, VC/PE) investors.  
In this context, the aim of the paper is two-fold. First, we pretend to 
analyze the investment sensitivity to internally generated cash flows as a 
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driver of VC/PE involvement in FCBs: in particular, we argue that VC/PE will 
invest in FCBs when they are severely affected by information asymmetries 
and, as a consequence, their investments are highly driven by the availability 
of internal capital. Second, we pretend to ascertain to what extent VC/PE 
involvement contributes to reduce the dependency between investments and 
internal cash flow generation. We distinguish between firms in which the 
founding firm is running the business (first generation FCBs) and firms in 
descendant generations (following generations FCBs) assuming that there are 
subject to a different degree of information asymmetries. 
We focus our analyses on a representative sample of medium sized 
Spanish privately held FCBs by comparing the investment cash-flow sensitivity 
of VC/PE-backed FCBs (that received the initial VC/PE investment between 
1995 and 2006) with that of a group of non VC/PE-backed FCBs. Our 
comparison is based on both the pre-investment period (i.e. before the 
receiving of VC/PE) and post-investment period (i.e. by tracking the evolution 
after the entry of VC/PE).  
Our paper contributes to the family business literature in several ways. 
First, we contribute to provide evidence on the dilemma between preserving 
SEW or the achievement of financial goals, highlighted by Berrone et al. 
(2012) as one topic in the agenda for future research in family firm literature. 
Second, we use a new dependent variable (i.e. the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity) in family-business research to measure the outcomes of decisions 
and actions, as suggested by Sharma, Chrisman and Chua (1997). Moreover, 
we provide evidence of VC/PE involvement in FCBs, which has been scarcely 
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addressed in the family business literature. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section 
develops the relationship between investments and internally generated cash 
flows as a driver of the acceptance of external investors. In the third section 
we explain why the entrance of a VC/PE firm should lead to a reduction in the 
dependency between investments and internal cash flows. In the fourth 
section we describe the data and the methodology. The results are presented 
and discussed in the fifth section. In the final section we conclude and 
highlight the contributions and agenda for future research. 
3.2. THE INVESTMENT CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
3.2.1. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON THE INVESTMENT CASH-FLOW SENSITIVITY 
In perfect capital markets investment decisions are independent from 
financing decisions (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) and, hence, the availability of 
internally generated funds would not affect the investment pattern of firms 
(Jorgenson, 1963; Hall & Jorgenson, 1967).  In real markets, however, there 
are frictions such as transaction costs, agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 
Fama & Jensen, 1983a) and asymmetric information (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
that make it difficult for firms to access external sources of funds. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) highlight that firms follow a hierarchy in the access to different 
sources of funds (i.e. pecking order), preferring internal to external funding, 
and debt to equity, when external financing is necessary. 
In this work we refer to the approach proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
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Pettersen (1988). They argue that the marginal opportunity cost of internal 
capital is constant, whereas the debt supply curve is upward-sloping. In 
addition, the greater capital market imperfections the steeper the slope will 
become. In this context, it would be expected that investments in financially 
constrained firms would be more sensitive to internal cash flows. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) assume that firms with low dividend payouts are more financially 
constrained and find evidence on their higher investment-cash flow sensitivity.   
It is important to observe that the approach of Fazzari et al. (1988) has 
been largely criticized. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) demonstrate that 
the profit-maximizing investment choices of firms do not imply a monotonic 
relationship between financial constraints and the sensitivity of investments to 
cash flows. They empirically test it on a subsample of the same sample used 
by Fazzari et al. (1988).  Hubbard (1998) highlights that positive investment-
cash flow sensitivity may simply derive from the lack of proper control for 
unobserved investment opportunities. In addition, the opportunistic behavior 
by managers who misuse the firm’s free cash flows could cause 
overinvestment (Jensen, 1986) and lead to a positive relationship between 
investments and cash flows in the absence of financial constraints. Therefore, 
even though overinvestment and underinvestment problems have a different 
theoretical basis, they generate similar empirical effects. Vogt (1994) provides 
evidence that overinvestment is more common in larger firms whereas 
underinvestment dominates in smaller firms. Privately-held FCBs, particularly 
small and young firms, are most affected by information asymmetry. They are 
not used to periodic reporting and, hence, are less visible to external 
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stakeholders than listed firms. Nevertheless, as ownership and control are not 
generally separated, agency problems related to ownership tend to be 
negligible.  
We control for the criticisms on Fazzari et al. (1988)'s theory in our work. 
First, we estimate an Euler equation, according to the model of Bond and 
Meghir (1994), in order to control for firms’ investment opportunities. 
Moreover, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow argument does not hold for privately 
held FCBs in our sample: as ownership and control are generally not 
separated, agency problems tend to be negligible and free cash flow abuses on 
the part of owner-managers are not expected. Hence, in what follows we will 
interpret positive investment-cash flow sensitivity as a sign of binding financial 
constraints that condition the firm’s investment activity of FCBs. 
3.2.2. INVESTMENT CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS 
FCBs strongly adhere to the pecking order theory (e.g., see Coleman & 
Carsky, 1999, Poutziouris, 2001, López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007) to 
finance their investments.  
On the one hand, FCBs prefer internal financing with patient capital and 
lower cost of capital (McConaughy, 1999; Zellweger, 2007). The willingness to 
pass the business to subsequent generations creates a special incentive to 
manage financial capital efficiently (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999). 
Consequently, this demands a ‘generational investment strategy that creates 
desirable patient capital’ (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003, p. 343). Patient capital differs 
from the typical financial capital in the length of the time frame of 
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investments. Capital is committed over long periods of time without the threat 
of liquidation (Dobrzynski, 1993; Ward & Aronoff, 1991). Capital is typically 
committed by family members or others revealing the same endowment to the 
firm as the family itself.  
On the other hand, family involvement is usually associated with lower 
agency problems due to the connection between ownership and management 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 
2004), especially when the founding generation is running the business. 
However, even though FCBs, particularly founder-controlled firms, could 
benefit from external financing due to their lower agency costs (Randøy & 
Goel, 2003; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003), evidence shows that, in general, 
those firms tend to be less indebted (Gallo, 1995; Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; 
López-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007) than non-FCBs. Moreover, on the 
equity side, FCBs are underrepresented in the portfolios of VC/PE investors 
(Martí, Menéndez-Requejo, S., & Rottke, 2013). 
The limited use of external finance could be explained, as highlighted in 
the literature (e.g. Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía, Hoskisson et al., 2011) by the preservation of the SEW as key 
noneconomic reference point for FCB's decision making. In fact, Zellweger et 
al. (2012) point out that FCBs make strategic choices that do not derive from 
an economic reference point or a risk-averse financial logic: FCBs may discard 
strategic investments with positive net present value if external sources of 
funds are required to finance them. In the same vein, Gómez-Mejía et al. 
(2007) affirm that FCBs prefer to give up to their growth opportunities if the 
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required funding endangers a loss in their SEW. Similarly, Poutziouris (2000) 
finds that the majority of UK FCBs have a propensity to retain family control 
across generations. 
We argue that the inability or reluctance of FCBs to access external 
sources of funds is reflected by the dependency of investment on internally 
generated cash flows. Hence, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3.1: FCBs show a positive and significant dependency of 
investments on internally generated cash flows. 
But some FCBs may fail to generate a sustainable volume of internal 
funds, due to an insufficient free operating cash flow, to be able to 
continuously invest and overcome periods of poor performance (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). Only very large FCBs (e.g., Ford or Wal-Mart) with access to traditional 
capital markets are no longer dependent on the family’s commitment in hard 
times. In this regard, Berrone et al. (2012, p. 261)  affirm that ‘although SEW 
preservation is the “higher order” reference point for the family principal, poor 
performance acts as an informational clue that alters the family owners’ loss 
framing’. Berrone et al. (2012) point out that in extreme situations, (i.e. when 
anticipated poor performance could lead to severe financial hardship to the 
family’s standard of living), the family is forced to reconsider SEW as the 
primary reference point, and this could lead to the acceptance of external 
sources of funds. In the same vein, Poutziouris (2000) finds that around 
21.4% of UK FCBs are interested in increasing the size of the business and are 
willing to raise external capital to finance their expansion and diversification.  
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In this work, we focus on a particular type of external finance: Venture 
Capital/Private Equity (VC/PE). VC/PE represents a pool of capital provided by 
informed investors and managed by professionals to be invested in businesses 
with high growth potential and high risk (Sahlman, 1990), but also in 
established companies with stable and predictable cash flows (Amess & 
Wright, 2012). VC/PE institutions are considered as specialized investors able 
to face information asymmetries better than investment bankers and 
uninformed investors (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994).  
Following our reasoning, despite their natural reluctance to access 
external financing sources, some FCBs may approach VC/PE institutions due to 
their inability to finance their investments, including those required for the 
survival of the company, with internally generated cash flows.  
Our second hypothesis follows from this discussion:  
Hypothesis 3.2: FCBs that are funded by VC/PE institutions show higher 
dependency of investments on internally generated cash 
flows than other similar FCBs prior to the VC/PE 
investment. 
Moreover, the degree of family identification, influence and personal 
investment in the firm changes as the company evolves across generations 
(Gersick et al., 1997; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino, 2003). We argue that is 
especially in first generation FCBs that the reluctance to accept external 
investors is particularly high (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). If we add that 
founder-controlled firms grow faster and invest more in capital assets and 
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research and development than descendant-controlled firms (McConaughy & 
Phillips, 1999), then the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity expected in 
FCBs funded by VC/PE investors would be even in first generation FCBs.  
Accordingly, our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3.3: First generation FCBs that are funded by VC/PE institutions 
show higher dependency of investments on internally 
generated cash flows than other similar first generation 
FCBs prior to the VC/PE investment. 
Regarding FCBs in second or subsequent generations, there are reasons 
in favor (e.g. higher agency costs due to ownership dispersion) or against 
(easier access to external funds from traditional sources) higher investment-
cash flow sensitivity in FCBs approaching VC/PE. Therefore, in our results we 
will provide some exploratory evidence. 
3.3. THE EFFECT OF VC/PE ON THE INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF 
FCBS 
When evaluating the impact of the entry of a VC/PE investor, the first 
effect to be considered is the additional funds provided by VC/PE firms, which 
enlarge the firm’s equity base and helps finance the acquisition of assets to 
take advantage of growth opportunities.  
However, the final effect is not only related to the direct injection of funds. 
VC/PE investors can alleviate the problems derived from information 
asymmetries. They sign detailed contracts with managers and monitor their 
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progress closely (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994). In addition, they provide 
managerial resources (Sørensen, 2007), such as assistance in designing the 
strategic plan or in management recruitment, and provide access to their 
network of contacts (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza et 
al., 1996). Moreover, the value added by VC/PE investors is positively 
perceived by other stakeholders. Megginson and Weiss (1991) report a 
‘certification effect’ on investors whereas Sahlman (1990) and Tykvová (2006) 
remark an easier access to investment bankers. Therefore, in addition to the 
equity funding supplied, VC/PE presence also allows investee firms to raise 
additional funds from banks and other external investors. Hence, VC/PE 
involvement is expected to cause a significant reduction in the dependency of 
investments on internally generated cash flows. We argue that this effect 
should hold also when VC/PE invest in FCBs. Accordingly, our fourth 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3.4: VC/PE investors reduce the dependency of investments on 
internally generated cash flows in FCBs. 
In the VC/PE literature, Engel and Stiebale (2009), Bertoni, Colombo 
and Croce (2010) and Bertoni, Ferrer and Marti (2013) provide evidence on 
the significant reduction in the investment sensitivity to cash flows after the 
initial VC/PE investment in investee firms experiencing a rapid growth process 
(i.e. high technology startups and firms at the expansion stage). Since FBCs in 
the first generation grow faster (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999), we argue that 
VC/PE involvement could be insufficient to remove investment cash flow 
sensitivity completely in those firms. This reasoning drives us to  
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the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3.5: VC/PE investors reduce, but do not completely remove, the 
dependency of investments on internally generated cash 
flows in first generation FCBs. 
But Manigart, Baeyens and Verschueren (2003) do not find a significant 
reduction in a more generalist sample including firms at different stages of 
development whereas Bertoni et al. (2013) find that there is an increase in the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms that were subject to a VC/PE-
sponsored buyout deal. Since descendant generation family-controlled 
businesses tend to be larger and more profitable than first generation ones 
(McConaughy & Phillips, 1999) and were basically equity financed, VC/PE 
investors will tend to increase their debt exposure. This strategy will be surely 
applied the case of majority acquisitions (i.e. leveraged buyouts). As a result, 
the final outcome in second or following generations is uncertain, because the 
investment cash flow sensitivity could either decrease in growing firms or 
increase in mature firms subject to a buyout. Therefore, we provide 
exploratory evidence on the impact of VC/PE involvement in those FCBs in 
second or subsequent generations. 
3.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
3.4.1. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Our empirical analyses are based on the Spanish market because there 
are many FCBs, nearly all of them privately-held. In addition, there is a 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS AND THE IMPACT OF VC FUNDING’S 
 163
detailed catalogue of VC/PE deals available: www.webcapitalriesgo.com 
collects all individual investments carried out since 1991 on behalf of the 
Spanish Venture Capital Association (ASCRI) to prepare the annual reports. 
Since all Spanish companies are obliged to report their accounts to the Official 
Trade Register since 1991, there is also accounting information available on 
most privately-held firms. Therefore, the scope of this study focuses on VC/PE 
investments carried out between 1995 and 2006 to be able to have pre and 
post-investment observations on all investee firms. The source of accounting 
information is the AMADEUS Database. 
According to Martí, Salas and Alférez (2011), 1,815 VC/PE investments 
were recorded in Spain between 1995 and 2005, including all stages but 
excluding financial and real estate sectors, as well as investments carried out 
abroad by Spanish VC/PE institutions. ASCRI/webcapitalriesgo records include 
375 additional investments committed in 2006 with the same characteristics 
(i.e. domestic non-financial or real estate), totaling a population of 2,190 
companies. We were able to identify 1,833 of them in the Official Trade 
Registers, but full accounting data was only available in AMADEUS on 1,660 
companies.  
Based on the information collected from the AMADEUS database, the 
firms’ websites, the official corporate news releases (BORME) and press 
clippings, we define FCBs as those whose ultimate largest shareholder was a 
family, or individuals closely linked to a family group, at the time of the initial 
VC/PE investment. This definition is in accordance with the official family 
business definition given by GEEF (European Group of Owner Managed and 
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Family Enterprises) and FBN (Family Business Network) in 2008 and also 
adopted by the IEF (Family Business Institute in Spain). Based on this 
definition we found evidence that 346 investees were FCBs. 
In order to define a control group of non VC/PE-backed FCBs, we 
collected the list of members for regional associations of Spanish FCBs and 
downloaded their accounting data from the AMADEUS database. Then we 
performed a propensity score matching process to select a group of similar 
firms with the same characteristics and probability of obtaining VC/PE funding. 
We obtain a total control group of 380 FCBs. 
Since we base our analyses on the Euler equation, estimated with GMM 
(Blundell & Bond, 2000), we need at least three consecutive observations to 
define instruments properly. In addition, as we want to analyze the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of VC/PE-backed FCBs in both the pre and 
post-investment periods, we only include VC/PE-backed firms for which we 
have accounting data across the investment year. As a result, our sample size 
shrinks to 469 FCBs, 151 of which are VC/PE-backed and 318 are control 
group (CG) FCBs.  
In addition, we also consider the generation in which the FCB obtained 
VC/PE. Out of 151 VC/PE-backed firms, we identified 76 firms that received 
VC/PE when the founder generation was running the business and 75 that 
were funded when descendant generations were managing the company. 
Regarding CG firms, we use as classification reference the year of the initial 
investment of the respective matched VC/PE-backed pairs, classifying 165 in 
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first generation and 153 in descendant generations. Table 3.1. reports the 
distribution of VC/PE-backed and CG sample FCBs by generation, activity 
sector and foundation year.  
TABLE 3.1. 
FULL SAMPLE OF VC/PE-BACKED AND CONTROL GROUP (CG) FCBS. 
 
 
VC/PE-BACKED FCBS CG FCBS TOTAL 
 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
INDUSTRY 
Pharma  and R&D 0 0.00% 5 1.57% 5 1.07% 
Manufacturing 96 63.58% 201 63.21% 297 63.33% 
Primary & Utilities 2 1.32% 10 3.14% 12 2.56% 
Commerce 22 14.57% 49 15.41% 71 15.14% 
Transport 3 1.99% 13 4.09% 16 3.41% 
Hotel & Leisure 7 4.64% 8 2.52% 15 3.20% 
ICT 9 5.96% 6 1.89% 15 3.20% 
Other services 12 7.95% 26 8.18% 38 8.10% 
Total 151 100.00% 318 100.00% 469 100.00% 
FOUNDATION YEAR 
before 1960 6 3.97% 59 18.55% 65 13.86% 
1960-1964 10 6.62% 43 13.52% 53 11.30% 
1965-1960 11 7.28% 18 5.66% 29 6.18% 
1970-1974 20 13.25% 27 8.49% 47 10.02% 
1975-1979 15 9.93% 34 10.69% 49 10.45% 
1980-1984 26 17.22% 34 10.69% 60 12.79% 
1985-1989 29 19.21% 37 11.64% 66 14.07% 
1990-1994 20 13.25% 40 12.58% 60 12.79% 
1995-2000 13 8.61% 22 6.92% 35 7.46% 
2001-2005 1 0.66% 4 1.26% 5 1.07% 
Total 151 100.00% 318 100.00% 469 100.00% 
GENERATION 
First generation 76 50.33% 165 51.89% 241 51.39% 
Following generations 75 49.67% 153 48.11% 228 48.61% 
Total 151 100.00% 318 100.00% 469 100.00% 
Source: Based on the information collected from ASCRI, www.webcapitalriesgo.com and the 
AMADEUS Database. 
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3.4.2. MODELS AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
There are different econometric models that pretend to analyze the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (e.g. see Hubbard, 1998; Bond & Van 
Reenen, 2007). As mentioned in Section 2.1, current cash flows measures the 
availability of internal capital but may also be related to firms’ investment 
opportunities. In the latter case, one cannot interpret the correlation between 
investments and cash flows as signal of financial constraints. Thus, the model 
should include some variable to control for firms’ unobserved investment 
opportunities. For this purpose, we estimate an Euler equation, according to 
the model of Bond and Meghir (1994), and we insert the dummy variable 
iVCd _ , which indicates a family firm i that received VC/PE during its life. 
Conversely, iCGd _ , identifies a CG family firm i. Therefore, the econometric 
specification (Model 1a) we use is as follows: 
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where Ii,t is the level of investments in tangible and intangible assets of 
firm i in period t,14 Ki,t is the end-of-period- t book value of firm i’s total 
assets, CFi,t is firm i’s cash flow in period t after taxes but before dividends,15 
                                      
14 We measure investments by the increase in the book value of tangible and intangible assets 
net of depreciation. 
15 Other authors have used ex-dividend cash flows (e.g. Manigart et al., 2003). We opted for 
cash flows before dividends because our sample is composed of unlisted firms. Managers of 
listed firms are more constrained than those of privately held firms to avoid a reduction in the 
amount of dividends paid to shareholders, as this reduction may be perceived as a negative 
signal by investors. Conversely, in privately held firms, dividends have no signaling role and all 
cash flows can be reinvested if some profitable investment opportunity arises. 
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Si,t is firm i’s sales during period t and Di,t is firm i’s end-of-period- t total debt. 
All the models also include year, regional and sectoral dummies. ε is an i.i.d. 
error term. Table 3.2. provides a detailed description of the variables 
considered in this work. 
TABLE 3.2. 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Ii,t 
Increase from t-1 to t in the book value of tangible and 
intangible assets net of depreciation of firm i   
CFi,t 
Cash flow of firm i at the end of period t after taxes but 
before dividends 
Si,t Sales of firm i at the end period t 
Di,t 
Sum of short- and long-term debt  of  firm i at the end 
of period t  
Ki,t 
Book value of tangible and intangible assets of firm i at 
the end of period t 
iVCd _  
Dummy variable that equals 1 for VC/PE-backed FCBs  
(i.e. FCBs receiving VC/PE financing during their life) 
iCGd _  
Dummy variable that equals 1 for control group FCBs 
(i.e. FCBs that do not receive VC/PE financing) 
1,__ −tipostVCd
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 from the year that 
follows the one in which the focal firm obtains the 
VC/PE financing up to the end of the observation 
period for a FCBs i 
g
iVCd _  
Dummy variable that equals 1 for VC/PE-backed FCBs  
(i.e. FCBs receiving VC/PE financing during their life) in 
generation g with g equal to G1 for first generation 
FCBs and FG for descendant generation FCBs 
g
iCGd _  
Dummy variable that equals 1 for control group FCBs 
(i.e. FCBs that do not receive VC/PE financing) in 
generation g with g equal to G1 for first generation 
FCBs and FG for descendant generation FCBs 
g
tipostVCd 1,__ −
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 from the year that 
follows the one in which the focal firm obtains the 
VC/PE financing up to the end of the observation 
period for a FCBs i in generation g with g equal to G1 
for first generation FCBs and FG for descendant 
generation FCBs 
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In particular, in order to analyze differences in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity among VC/PE-backed and CG FCBs before the entry of VC/PE, we 
estimate Model 1a by excluding the observations of VC/PE-backed firms 
related to the post-investment period.  
If there are capital market imperfections and the external capital supply 
curve of FCBs is upward-sloping, we expect 5γ  and 6γ  to be positive, 
indicating financial constraints, respectively, for CG and VC/PE-backed FCBs. 
Our first hypothesis anticipates a positive slope for both groups. In addition, 
according to our hypothesis 2, we expect VC/PE-backed firms to be more 
financially constrained than CG FCBs in the pre-investment period  
(i.e. 56 γγ > ). 
In order to test our research hypothesis 3, we modify Model 1a as follows: 
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where the dummy variable 
g
iVCd _  indicates a FCB i in generation g that 
received VC/PE during its life, while 
g
iCGd _  identifies a CG FCBs i in 
generation g, with g equal to G1 for first generation and equal to FG for 
descendant generation FCBs. According to our research hypothesis 3, we 
expect first generation VC/PE-backed FCBs to be more financially constrained 
than CG FCBs in the pre-investment period (i.e. 
1
5
1
6
GG γγ > ). 
In order to ascertain the impact of VC/PE on the investment cash flow 
sensitivity of FCBs we then resort to the following model (Model 2a). 
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where 1,
__
−tipostVCd  switches from 0 to 1 in the year that follows the 
one in which the focal firm obtains the VC/PE and equals 1 up to the end of 
the observation period. For CG firms this variable always takes value 0. 
The coefficient 7γ  captures the increase in the average investment rate of 
a VC/PE-backed family firm in the years following the initial investment. The 
coefficient 8γ  measures the effect of VC/PE on the investment–cash flow 
sensitivity. More specifically, the effect of VC/PE on financial constraints can be 
gauged through a simple linear test on the parameters of the models. Indeed, 
after receiving VC/PE financing, internal cash flow in these firms should no 
longer have any effect on the investment rate (i.e., the coefficient of CFi,t/Ki,t–1 
should not be positive and significant). Following this line of reasoning, we 
performed the following Wald tests of the null hypothesis that a change in 
cash flow does not affect the investment rate: 05 =γ  for firms that did not 
obtain any VC/PE and 086 =+ γγ for firms that obtained VC/PE. In order to 
compare the investment cash flow sensitivity of VC/PE-backed firms and CG 
FCBs in the post-investment period we resort to the following Wald test 
0586 =−+ γγγ . Finally, the effect of VC/PE on the investment level can be 
evaluated in a similar way by performing Wald tests of the following null 
hypothesis 07 =γ .  
Similarly to what we do for Model 1, also for Model 2 we estimate a 
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second model (Model 2b) in order to analyze the alleged differences in the 
impact of VC/PE among generations of FCBs. We thus resort to the following 
model: 
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The linear combinations we resort to test to our research hypotheses are 
similar to those discussed for Model 2a. In particular, according to our 
research hypothesis 4, we are interested in estimating whether VC/PE is able 
to reduce investment cash-flow sensitivity in first generation FCBs.  
All of the variables used in the model are normalized by the beginning-of-
period-t stock of fixed and intangible assets. As firms in our sample are 
relatively young and small, this value is sometimes close to zero, producing 
extremely skewed and leptokurtic distributions of the variables. The presence 
of these outliers could severely bias our results. To avoid this problem, we 
winsorized all variables (e.g., Dixon, 1960) with a 1% cut-off for each tail. In 
other words, for each variable we calculated the values corresponding to the 
1st and 99th percentiles of its distribution and assigned these values to all 
observations falling beyond them. This approach is useful because it reduces 
the impact of outliers and allows the use of a larger number of observations 
than would be possible if outliers were deleted. Furthermore, it has already 
been used in the investment literature (e.g., Baker & Stein, 2003), notably to 
assess investment–cash flow sensitivity (e.g., Cleary, 1999, 2006;  
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Bertoni et al., 2010).16  
We estimate all our models for the total sample of VC/PE-backed and CG 
FCBs. Moreover, as robustness check for Model 1b and Model 2b, we also 
estimate Model 1a and Model 2a separately for first generation and 
descendant generation FCBs. 
The main objective of the econometric analysis is to assess the 
“treatment” effect of VC/PE on investment-cash flow sensitivity and evaluate if 
this effect depends on FCB generations. In order to deal with the potentially 
endogenous nature of the VC/PE variable (i.e., iVCd _ ) we resort to a two-
step system generalized method of moments estimation (GMM-SYS, Arellano 
& Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) with finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005). In addition to lagged levels of the series as instruments 
for first differences equations, the GMM-SYS estimator employs additional 
moment conditions using first differences as instruments for variables in 
levels. We consider covariates in the original Euler equation and all VC/PE 
variables to be endogenous; therefore, instruments start from t-2. In order to 
alleviate finite sample bias and measurement errors problems we limit the 
instrument set with moment conditions in the interval between t-2 and t-3 
(see Bond, 2002).  
Results of the Hansen statistic reported in Section 5 reassure us about 
the validity of the moment conditions used in all the estimations. Moreover, to 
evaluate the relevance of all our econometric models, we implemented the 
                                      
16 Estimates using these different cut-offs (i.e., 2% and 5%) are very close to those described 
in the next sections. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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Arellano and Bond test for first- and second-order serial autocorrelation of 
residuals [AR(1), AR(2)]. If εit is not serially correlated, the difference of 
residuals should be characterized by a negative first-order serial correlation 
and the absence of a second-order serial correlation. Our results confirm this 
(see again Section 5). 
3.4.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In Table 3.3., we report some descriptive statistics about regression 
variables, growth (in terms of total assets and sales), growth opportunities (in 
terms of ratio between intangible assets and fixed assets) and age for VC/PE-
backed and CG FCBs. Panel A refers to all FCBs while Panel B and Panel C refer 
to first generation and descendant generation FCBs, respectively. 
  
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS AND THE IMPACT OF VC FUNDING’S 
 173
TABLE 3.3. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
PANEL A: ALL FCBS 
    
pre VC investment period post VC investment period 
 
CG FCBs VC-backed FCBs VC vs CG VC-backed FCBs VC vs CG 
 
mean median obs mean median obs mean 
 
Mean median obs mean 
 








−
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
Sales
SalesSales  
0.203 0.031 1805 0.116 0.073 529 -0.087  0.044 0.018 975 -0.159  







 −
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
assetsTotal
assetsTotalassetsTotal  
0.071 0.042 1813 0.183 0.099 529 0.112 *** 0.058 0.012 975 -0.013 
 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
I  
0.247 0.124 2184 0.384 0.198 684 0.137 *** 0.226 0.096 992 -0.021  








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
S  
7.863 3.966 2184 5.334 3.516 684 -2.529 *** 3.365 2.161 992 -4.498 *** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
D  
1.010 0.640 2184 1.226 0.967 684 0.217 *** 1.226 0.931 992 0.217 *** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
CF  
0.342 0.239 2184 0.273 0.226 684 -0.069 *** 0.160 0.128 992 -0.182 *** 
tiAge ,  31.156 28.000 2184 20.265 18.000 672 -10.891 *** 26.543 25.000 992 -4.613 *** 








−1,
,
tan
ti
ti
K
giblesIn  
0.205 0.180 2183 0.144 0.180 684 -0.061 *** 0.346 0.298 992 0.142 *** 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data are expressed in thousand € and 
deflated by CPI (reference year: 2005). 
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TABLE 3.3. (CONT.) 
PANEL B: FIRST GENERATION FCBS 
    pre VC/PE investment period post VC/PE investment period 
 CG FCBs VC/PE-backed FCBs VC/PE vs CG VC/PE-backed FCBs VC/PE vs CG 
 Mean median Obs mean median obs mean  mean median obs mean  







 −
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
Sales
SalesSales  
0.385 0.038 826 0.133 0.087 260 -0.252  0.031 0.029 471 -0.353  








−
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
assetsTotal
assetsTotalassetsTotal  
0.078 0.045 829 0.215 0.122 260 0.137 *** 0.060 0.012 471 -0.018  








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
I  
0.262 0.120 1020 0.447 0.225 339 0.186 *** 0.221 0.100 480 -0.041  








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
S  
9.696 4.596 1020 5.625 3.591 339 -4.071 *** 3.354 2.154 480 -6.342 *** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
D  
1.058 0.606 1020 1.238 1.025 339 0.180 ** 1.231 0.948 480 0.173 ** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
CF  
0.376 0.243 1020 0.309 0.224 339 -0.067 * 0.180 0.127 480 -0.196 *** 
tiAge ,  24.701 24.000 1020 15.764 14.000 339 -8.937 *** 22.250 21.500 480 -2.451 *** 








−1,
,
tan
ti
ti
K
giblesIn  
0.214 0.192 1019 0.122 0.179 339 -0.092 *** 0.353 0.290 480 0.139 *** 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data are expressed in 
thousand € and deflated by CPI (reference year: 2005). 
 
 
PANEL C: DESCENDANT GENERATIONS FCBS 
    pre VC/PE investment period post VC/PE investment period 
 CG VC/PE VC/PE vs CG VC/PE VC/PE vs CG 
 mean median obs mean median obs mean  mean median obs mean  







 −
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
Sales
SalesSales  
0.050 0.025 979 0.100 0.065 269 0.050 ** 0.055 0.010 504 0.005  








−
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
assetsTotal
assetsTotalassetsTotal  
0.065 0.038 984 0.153 0.080 269 0.088 *** 0.056 0.010 504 -0.009 
 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
I  
0.234 0.126 1164 0.321 0.176 345 0.087 *** 0.231 0.089 512 -0.004 
 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
S  
6.257 3.566 1164 5.049 3.470 345 -1.208 ** 3.376 2.176 512 -2.880 *** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
D  0.967 0.670 1164 1.215 0.887 345 0.248 *** 1.223 0.905 512 0.255 *** 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
CF  0.312 0.234 1164 0.238 0.228 345 -0.074 *** 0.141 0.128 512 -0.171 *** 
tiAge ,  36.813 33.000 1164 24.847 23.000 333 -11.966 *** 30.568 29.000 512 -6.244 *** 








−1,
,
tan
ti
ti
K
giblesIn  
0.197 0.174 1164 0.166 0.182 345 -0.031 
 
0.340 0.306 512 0.143 *** 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data are expressed in 
thousand € and deflated by CPI (reference year: 2005). 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS AND THE IMPACT OF VC FUNDING’S 
 175
We show summary statistics, such as mean, median and number of 
observations for CG firms and VC/PE-backed in both pre and post investment 
periods. Moreover, for every variable, we perform t-tests on the difference-in-
mean between the group of CG and VC/PE-backed FCBs. 
3.5. RESULTS 
The results on the dependency of investments on cash flows in VC/PE-
backed FCBs prior to the initial VC/PE investment and in similar FCBs that did 
not receive VC/PE are reported in Table 3.4. This table includes analyses on all 
sample firms (first and second columns) and separate estimations for founder 
and descendant generation FCBs (third and fourth columns, respectively). In 
Panel A we show the estimated coefficients whereas in Panel B we apply Wald 
tests to explore significant differences between pairs of coefficients. 
When we ignore the generation in which the family was involved at the 
time of the initial VC/PE investment (i.e. first column), we find highly 
significant positive investment-cash flow sensitivity in both VC/PE and non 
VC/PE-backed FCBs, with the respective coefficients being 1.1203 and 0.3641. 
In the second column the estimations include all sample firms but separating 
first and descendant generation FCBs. In this case the coefficients are greater 
than one in FCBs that were later subject to a VC/PE investment, with the 
significance level being 1% in first generation FCBs and 5% in firms in 
following generations. Regarding CG firms, the coefficients are 0.2154 in the 
first generation and 0.4544 in descendant generations, with the respective 
significance levels being 10% and 5%. This view is completed with separate 
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estimations for first (third column) and descendant generation (fourth column) 
FCBs. The results on the first generation are similar to those of previous 
columns. Nevertheless, regarding descendant generations the coefficient 
measuring the dependency of cash flows on investments is not significant in 
CG firms. Therefore, regarding our first hypothesis, we find firm evidence on 
the sensitivity of investments to cash flows in FCBs that were later subject to a 
VC/PE investment and in first generation CG FCBs, but only partial evidence 
for descendant generation CG firms. 
Even though in Panel A the coefficients reported for VC/PE-backed firms 
are higher than those of CG firms, we need to confirm that they are 
significantly different by applying a Wald test. The results are shown in Panel 
B. In the first column we find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
significantly higher in FCBs that received VC/PE later than in CG FCBs when we 
do not separate FCBs by generation, thus confirming our hypothesis 2. When 
similar tests are run distinguishing between founder and descendant 
generation FCBs we find firm evidence that in the former the sensitivity was 
significantly higher in firms that were later subject to a VC/PE investment. 
Therefore, we also find support for our hypothesis 3. 
Regarding the different sensitivity in VC/PE and CG FCBs in second or 
subsequent generations, we provide only exploratory evidence because there 
could be FCBs approaching VC/PE institutions for different reasons (e.g. 
finance growth or as an exit way for some/all family shareholders). When the 
estimation is run on all FCBs (i.e. Model 1b, in the second column) the 
difference is not significant whereas it is significant when the estimation is 
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carried out separately for descendant generation FCBs. We argue that the 
heterogeneity in this group would require a larger sample to be able to 
separate growing firms seeking financing from consolidated firms in which 
some or all shareholders are seeking liquidity. 
The results of the impact of VC/PE involvement on the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity are shown in Table 3.5. There are also four columns replicating 
the structure of Table 3.4. Panel A shows the coefficient that measures the 
cash flow sensitivity interacting with dummies that represent VC/PE 
involvement, generation and, also, observations related to the post-
investment period. In the first column we report the results of the whole 
sample of VC/PE and CG FCBs. We observe that the sensitivity of investments 
to cash flows in VC/PE-backed FCBs is 0.9328 for the whole observation period 
(i.e. pre and post investment period), significant at the 1% level, whereas it is 
negative, but insignificant, when only the post-investment period is 
considered. If we look at Panel B the Wald test in the first row provides 
evidence that there is still a significant sensitivity in VC/PE-backed FCBs, albeit 
with a lower coefficient. In addition, Wald tests in the second and third rows 
show that the sensitivity in VC/PE-backed FCBs was significantly higher than in 
CG firms and this difference fades away after the VC/PE entry. Therefore, 
when all FCBs are considered, despite the lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, the dependency is not fully eliminated in VC/PE-backed FCBs but 
those firms are no longer more financially constrained than other non VC/PE-
backed FCBs. This provides only partial confirmation to our fourth hypothesis. 
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Regarding the impact on first generation FCBs, we find the results in 
columns 2 and 3. In Panel A the coefficient measuring sensitivity for the whole 
observation period is also around one and the interaction with the dummy 
including only the post-investment period shows negative coefficients. In this 
case, this reduction is significant at the 10% level only when the model is 
estimated only for first generation FCBs. Panel B shows similar results to those 
found for the whole sample (i.e. the coefficient is still positive and significant 
but no longer different from that found in other FCBs). Hence, even though 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is not fully eliminated VC/PE-backed FCBs, we 
find a significant reduction (albeit with low significance) that is in accordance 
with our fifth hypothesis.  
Finally, we provide exploratory evidence on descendant generation family 
firms. When the whole period is considered neither VC/PE-backed nor CG FCBs 
show a significant sensitivity. This also happens when only the post-
investment period is considered for the former. In addition, Wald tests do not 
show significant differences between the two groups neither before nor after 
the VC/PE investment.  
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TABLE 3.4. 
FCB'S INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN THE PRE-
INVESTMENT PERIOD 
 
PANEL A. REGRESSION RESULTS OF VC/PE-BACKED VS. CG FCBS 
 
Variable Coeff. Model 1a Model 1b 
Model 1a  
First generation 
FCBs 
Model 1° 
Descendant 
generations FCBs 








−
−
2,
1,
ti
ti
K
I  
1γ  0.1471  0.1323  0.3016 ** -0.0993  
  
(0.092) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.089) 
 
2
2,
1,








−
−
ti
ti
K
I  
2γ  -0.056  -0.0479  -0.1166 ** 0.0467  
  
(0.036)  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.04)  








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
S  
3γ  -0.0033  -0.0019  -0.0093 * 0.0091  
  
(0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
2
1,
,








−ti
ti
K
D  
4γ  0.0092 * 0.0085  0.0105 ** -0.0003  
  
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007)  








−1,
,
_
ti
ti
i K
CF
CGd  5γ  
0.3641 ***       
(0.129) 
       








−1,
,1
_
ti
tiG
i K
CF
CGd  15
Gγ    
0.2154 * 0.3994 ***   
  (0.129)  (0.106)    








−1,
,
_
ti
tiFG
i K
CF
CGd  FG5γ    
0.4544 ** 
  
0.2008 
 
  (0.181)    (0.137)  








−1,
,
_
ti
ti
i K
CF
VCd  6γ  
1.1203 ***       
(0.196)        








−1,
,1
_
ti
tiG
i K
CF
VCd  16
Gγ    
1.0582 *** 1.0359 ***   
  
(0.206) 
 
(0.179) 
   








−1,
,
_
ti
tiFG
i K
CF
VCd  FG6γ    
1.2149 **   0.8816 *** 
  (0.483)    (0.303)  
Cons. α  0.1883 * 0.2133 ** 0.1098  0.3297 *** 
  
 
(0.091)   (0.091)   (0.084)   (0.123)   
N.obs 
 
2868  2868  1359  1509  
N. firms 
 
469  469  241  228  
Hansen 
 
192.227 [193]  191.809 [191]  185.448 [187]  187.370 [187]  
AR1 
 
-5.5243 *** -5.4712 *** -3.8229 *** -4.3817 *** 
AR2 
 
0.987   0.9023   0.8902   0.3686   
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TABLE 3.4. (CONT.) 
 
PANEL B. WALD TESTS: VC/PE-BACKED VS. CG FCBS 
 Variable  Coeff. Model 1a Model 1b 
Model 1a 
First generation 
FCBs 
Model 1a  
Descendant generations 
FCBs 
CF(VC/PE-backed)-CF(CG) 
Before VC/PE entry 
56 γγ −  0.7561 *** 
0.2262 
1
5
1
6
GG γγ −
 
  
0.8428 *** 0.6365 *** 
  
  
0.2205 
 
0.183 
   
FGFG
56 γγ −
 
  
0.7605 
   
0.6808 ** 
    0.5412       0.2888   
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction on equations 1a and 1b, 
using different assumptions about the structural break as presented in Section 4. The dependent variable is 
firm i’s investment ratio at time t. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, 
respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis 
of, respectively, no first or second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM estimator. Investments, cash flows, and 
debt are all normalized by beginning of period level of fixed assets and winsorized at the 1% level. Pooled 
rows refer to coefficients which are assumed to remain constant. Columns (1) and (2) report estimations of 
the pre-investment period on all VC/PE-backed FCBs. Column (3) reports estimations of the pre-investment 
period in first generation VC/PE-backed FCBs (i.e. G1) and column (4) reports estimations of the pre-
investment period in descendant generation VC/PE-backed FCBs (i.e. FG). A detailed description of 
independent variables is available in Table 3.2. 
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TABLE 3.5. 
IMPACT OF VC/PE ON FCB'S INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
AND INVESTMENT RATE 
 
PANEL A. REGRESSION RESULTS OF VC/PE-BACKED AND CG FCBS 
Variable Coeff. Model 2a Model 2b 
Model 2a 
First 
generation 
FCBs 
Model 2a 
Descendant 
generations FCBs 








−
−
2,
1,
ti
ti
K
I  
1γ  0.1297 * 0.1359 * 0.2355 ** -0.0114  
  
(0.073)  (0.072)  (0.101)  (0.076)  
2
2,
1,








−
−
ti
ti
K
I  
2γ  -0.0361  -0.0364  -0.0711 * 0.0069  
  
(0.028) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.031) 
 








−1,
,
ti
ti
K
S  
3γ  -0.0047  -0.0038  -0.0116 ** 0.0068  
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
2
1,
,








−ti
ti
K
D  
4γ  0.0124 ** 0.013 ** 0.019 *** 0.0034  
  
(0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  








−1,
,
_
ti
ti
i K
CF
CGd
 
5γ  
0.2821 **       
(0.116)        








−1,
,1
_
ti
tiG
i K
CF
CGd
 1
5
Gγ    0.2371 * 0.381 ***   
  (0.129)  (0.101)    








−1,
,
_
ti
tiFG
i K
CF
CGd  FG5γ    
0.3544 **   0.1466  
  (0.163)    (0.131)  








−1,
,
_
ti
ti
i K
CF
VCd  6γ  
0.9328 ***       
(0.172)        








−1,
,1
_
ti
tiG
i K
CF
VCd  16
Gγ    
0.8765 *** 1.0669 *** 
  
  (0.176)  (0.154)    








−1,
,
_
ti
tiFG
i K
CF
VCd  FG6γ    
0.9023 **   0.4912  
  (0.428)    (0.304)  








−1,
,
__
ti
ti
i K
CF
postVCd
 
8γ  
-0.3302        
(0.249)        








−1,
,1
__
ti
tiG
i K
CF
postVCd
 1
8
Gγ    -0.2534  -0.4659 **   
  (0.26)  (0.211)    








−1,
,
__
ti
tiFG
i K
CF
postVCd
 FG
8γ    
-0.5044    -0.1146  
  (0.502)    (0.375)  
 
  
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS AND THE IMPACT OF VC FUNDING’S 
 182
TABLE 3.5. (CONT.) 
PANEL A.  
Variable Coeff. Model 2a Model 2b 
Model 2a 
First 
generation 
FCBs 
Model 2a 
Descendant 
generations FCBs 
ipostVCd __  7γ  
0.0429        
(0.045)        
1
__
G
ipostVCd  
1
7
Gγ    -0.1074  -0.0363    
  (0.088)  (0.059)    
FG
ipostVCd __  
FG
7γ    
0.0326    -0.0154  
  (0.065)    (0.053)  
Cons. α  0.187 *** 0.1821 *** 0.1426 * 0.2508 *** 
  
(0.058)  (0.057)  (0.076)  (0.078)  
N.obs   3860   3860   1839   2021   
N. firms 
 
469 
 
469 
 
241 
 
228 
 
Hansen 
 
214.080 
[228]  
243.789 
[255]  
194.554 [219] 
 
172.373 [222] 
 
AR1 
 
-7.8321 *** -7.8306 *** -5.3237 *** -5.8141 *** 
AR2   1.0736   1.1193   0.5917   0.8983   
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TABLE 3.5. (CONT.) 
PANEL B. WALD TESTS: VC/PE-BACKED VS. CG FCBS 
 Variable Coeff. Model 2a Model 2b 
Model 2a 
First 
generation 
FCBs 
Model 2° 
Descenda
nt 
generatio
ns FCBs 
 
CF for VC/PE-backed 
firms after the entry of 
VC/PE 
86 γγ +  0.5937 *** 
(0.1972) 
 
1
8
1
6
GG γγ +    
0.6231 *** 0.601 *** 
  
  (0.2084)  (0.1486)    
FGFG
88 γγ +  
  0.3979    0.3446  
    (0.3281)       (0.3083)   
          
                 
CF(VC/PE-backed 
firms)-CF(CG firms) 
Before VC/PE entry 
56 γγ −  0.6418 *** 
(0.187) 
 
1
5
1
6
GG γγ −    0.6394 *** 0.6859 ***   
  (0.1693)  (0.1486)    
FGFG
56 γγ −    
0.5479    0.3765  
    (0.4407)       (0.2009)   
CF(VC/PE-backed 
firms)-CF(CG firms) 
After VC/PE entry 
586 γγγ −+  
0.3116 
       
(0.2276)        
1
5
1
8
1
6
GGG γγγ −+    
0.386  0.220    
  
(0.2259) 
 
(0.1597) 
   
FGFGFG
586 γγγ −+  
  
0.0435 
   
0.23 
 
    (0.4094)       (0.2455)   
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction on equations 2a and 2b, 
using different assumptions about the structural break as presented in Section 4. The dependent variable is 
firm i’s investment ratio at time t. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, 
respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis 
of, respectively, no first or second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM estimator. Investments, cash flows, and 
debt are all normalized by beginning of period level of fixed assets and winsorized at the 1% level. Pooled 
rows refer to coefficients which are assumed to remain constant. Columns (1) and (2) report estimations of 
the pre and post-investment periods on all VC/PE-backed FCBs. Column (3) reports estimations of the pre 
and post-investment periods in first generation VC/PE-backed FCBs (i.e G1) and column (4) reports 
estimations of the pre and post-investment periods in descendant generation VC/PE-backed FCBs (i.e FG). A 
detailed description of independent variables is available in Table 3.2. 
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3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The family business literature remarks that the preservation of SEW in 
FCBs leads to a limited use of external financing sources and strategic choices 
not always deriving from an economic point of reference. Nevertheless, when 
poor performance could lead to severe financial hardship for the family’s 
standard of living, family shareholders are forced to reconsider SEW as the 
main reference point (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Based on the investment sensitivity to internally generated resources as 
a reference of financial constraints in unlisted FCBs that could lead to this 
financial hardship, we argue that highly constrained FCBs will be more inclined 
to accept the entry of external shareholders such as VC/PE institutions. In 
addition, we aim to check to what extent VC/PE involvement does affect the 
existing dependency of investments on internally generated cash flows. The 
scope of analysis is a sample of unlisted Spanish VC/PE-backed FCBs that were 
subject to a VC/PE investment between 1995 and 2006. We analyze the 
investment sensitivity to cash flows before and after the initial VC/PE 
investment. 
We find evidence on the significant sensitivity of investments to cash 
flows in all FCBs that were later subject to a VC/PE investment before the 
initial VC/PE investment. This dependency is also significant in first generation 
CG FCBs, but not in descendant generation CG FCBs. In addition, financial 
constraints are significantly higher in first generation VC/PE-backed FCBs than 
in similar CG firms. Despite their natural reluctance to accept external 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN FCBS AND THE IMPACT OF VC FUNDING’S 
 185
shareholders we argue that those FCBs accept the entry of a VC/PE firm to 
carry out investments that are necessary for survival, except for a group of 
FCBs that are willing to access external sources to grow faster (Poutziouris, 
2000). In descendant generation VC/PE-backed firms the results are not 
conclusive because it is more likely that some of them may approach VC/PE 
firms to find an exit for some/all shareholders rather than to finance growth.  
Regarding the effect of VC/PE involvement on financial constraints we 
find that, despite the lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, the dependency 
is not fully eliminated in VC/PE-backed FCBs, but those firms are no longer 
more financially constrained than other non VC/PE-backed FCBs. This finding 
holds for the whole sample and for the subsample of first generation FCBs. We 
argue that the sensitivity is not eliminated because the presence of VC/PE 
investors will positively affect a growth-seeking attitude in the firm and 
investments will increase more than what family shareholders initially planned. 
As first contribution of our paper, we provide evidence on the dilemma 
between the preservation of the SEW or the achievement of financial goals in 
FCBs. Secondly, we provide evidence on the role VC/PE investors play in 
alleviating financial constraints in first generation FCBs, thus contributing to 
taking advantage of their growth opportunities. We also contribute to 
overcoming the limited attention of VC/PE activity in family business literature. 
The main constraint of our work is related to the limited sample of 
VC/PE-backed FCBs, which does not allow us to explore research questions 
related to financial constraints due to the heterogeneity found in FCBs (i.e. 
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generations, size, motivations, industries and so on) and in VC/PE approaches 
(i.e. startup, expansion, replacement capital, buyouts). For future research, it 
would be interesting to analyze financial constraints controlling for generation 
and type of funding. More specifically, what was the stake acquired by the 
VC/PE firm? Majority or minority? Was there a capital increase in the investee 
firm and/or did some shareholders sold their stake? 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Venture capital / Private Equity 17 (hereinafter, VC/PE) represents an 
alternative source to finance investment opportunities for a wide variety of 
firms. The total amount committed in Europe rose from 3.4 billion Euros in 
1988 to 43 billion Euros in 2010, with 5000 companies involved in 2010 
(EVCA, 1988–2010). Even in a country such as Spain, from the decade of the 
1990s when investments amounting to a few hundred million Euros were 
made in about one hundred firms per year (Balboa & Martı´, 2004), the yearly 
amount committed is around 4 billion Euros since 2005, with around 800 
investments per year and an existing portfolio at the end of 2010 amounting 
to 19 billion Euros invested in 3261 portfolio firms (Barthel & Alferez, 2011).  
The huge increase in the amounts invested also shows a change in the 
role played by VC/PE firms in the investee companies in Spain, following a 
pattern found in most European countries. In the U.S., VC was originally 
related to minority investments in innovative companies at the founding or 
early development stage (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). The minority share of 
VCs tried to avoid distorting the innovative drive of the entrepreneur, which 
could be justified from a resource base (Florin, 2005) or an agency theory 
(Sapienza & Gupta, 1994) perspective. Nevertheless, the poor performance of 
those investments in most European countries (e.g. see returns on early stage 
investments in performance reports focused on different European countries, 
such as NVP, 1998; Guillaume, 1998; BVCA, 1998, 2009; EVCA, 2005) has led 
                                      
17 Under the term Venture capital/private equity we include investments at all stages, 
encompassing investments at the early, expansion and late stages. 
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to an increasing share of minority and majority stakeholdings in cash-
generating companies mostly belonging to low technology industries (e.g. see 
EVCA Yearbooks, 1988–2010). In particular, 70% of the total amount invested 
and 15% of the number of investments in Europe were leveraged majority 
acquisitions (EVCA, 2010).  
In addition to the funding provided, managerial support and other 
value-adding activities seem to explain the superior performance of VC/PE-
backed firms (Sapienza, 1992; Barry, 1994). In this respect, many papers 
have already addressed the issue of the positive impact that VC/PE investors 
have on their investee firms (Alemany & Martı´, 2005; Baum & Silverman, 
2004; Belke, Fehn, & Foster, 2006; Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Hellmann & 
Puri, 2002; Manigart & Van Hyfte, 1999).  
VC/PE investors also invest in family-controlled businesses (FCBs, 
henceforth), which are the prevailing form of enterprise throughout the world 
(King & Santor, 2008; Mandl, 2008). The importance of FCBs in the literature 
has increased substantially in the last decade. Among the topics of interest, 
FCB growth and succession are recognized as the main challenges for FCBs. In 
this context, we argue that VC/PE may facilitate firm changes in management, 
organization, governance and ownership to support the FCB’s survival and 
future performance. But little attention has been paid in the literature to the 
effect of VC/PE involvement in FCBs. It is accepted that, on average, VC/PE 
backing exerts a positive effect on investee firms. Nevertheless, the existence 
of different growth patterns in family and non-family investee firms has not 
been explored yet.  
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We aim to investigate to what extent the specific characteristics of FCBs 
cause higher or lower growth when compared to other investee firms without 
family-related control. Based on their determination to protect their 
socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), we assume that FCBs are more reluctant to change 
their culture and managerial style, which is something to be expected as part 
of the value-adding services provided by VC/PEs. Nevertheless, the willingness 
to accept new strategic and entrepreneurial goals may be affected by the 
minority or majority share held by the incoming external investor. Along these 
lines, we anticipate that VC/PE investors are less able to provide managerial 
support when they hold a minority stake because the existing family 
management might be reluctant to accept changes in their own management 
culture. As a result, we hypothesize that they could perform worse than non-
family investees. 
Conversely, in FCBs where VC/PE investors acquire a majority stake, 
they can impose their own management style and force deep organizational 
changes. Therefore, the evolution of FCBs that are subject to a majority 
acquisition should not be statistically different from that of other non-FCBs 
with VC/PE backing.  
The scope of the paper comprises Spanish firms that were subject to a 
VC/PE investment between 1995 and 2004, with our accounting data ranging 
from 1991 to 2007, whenever possible. By concentrating on data from only 
one country, we guarantee that all sample firms operate under similar 
constraints deriving from the institutional and legal environment (De Clerk, 
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Sapienza, & Zaheer, 2008).  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. Most studies on FCBs are 
based on qualitative data, thus limiting the ability to measure the impact of 
sound organizational changes. In this work we base our analyses on objective 
quantitative data to test our hypotheses. We also contribute to the limited 
existing evidence on the effect of VC/PE involvement in FCBs (Debicki, 
Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009), especially regarding key strategic 
decisions such as growth and succession.  
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In the following section 
we describe the role played by VC/PEs in investee firms. We also present our 
hypotheses regarding the differential effect of VC/PE investments according to 
the equity share they hold in investee family-controlled businesses. The third 
section concentrates on the description of the data and the models applied. 
The fourth section reports the results obtained, and the fifth is devoted to the 
conclusions and discussion of the main findings. 
4.2. FAMILY FIRMS, VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY (VC/PE) AND ITS 
IMPACT ON FIRM GROWTH 
4.2.1 VC/PE IMPACT ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 
VC/PEs offer value-adding services to the investee firms (Jain, 2001), 
which are not provided by other financial intermediaries such as banks or 
savings banks. Screening and monitoring (Baum & Silverman, 2004; 
Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011), in addition to managerial support and 
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expert advice, explain the positive impact VC/PEs have on investee firm 
performance (Balboa, Martí, & Zieling, 2011; Croce et al., in press; Davila et 
al., 2003; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Zahra, 1995). Proactive 
initiatives to create direct connections with key external stakeholders are also 
main VC/PE value-adding inputs (Large & Muegge, 2008). Kaserer, Achleitner, 
von Einem, & Schiereck (2007) summarize three areas for value creation in 
investee firms, namely operating/strategic value drivers, corporate 
governance and financial issues. The corporate governance issues include the 
reduction in agency costs, the mentoring activities undertaken to enlarge the 
network of business contacts, and the enhanced monitoring when VC/PE firms 
hold a majority position.  
The results of most empirical studies show that VC/PE-backed companies 
outperform non-VC/PE-backed ones. To cite a few, Davila et al. (2003) 
highlight employment growth in U.S. VC/PE-backed firms. Manigart and Van 
Hyfte (1999) find higher growth in total assets and cash flow for Belgian 
VC/PE-backed companies when compared to non-venture-backed ones. Engel 
(2002) also finds higher employment growth rates in German VC/PE-funded 
firms. Bertoni et al. (2011) find similar results in Italian high-tech firms. 
Alemany and Martí (2005) find evidence of higher revenue, asset and 
employment growth in Spanish VC/PE-backed firms.  
Originally, U.S. VC/PE investors focused on innovative companies that did 
not have access to traditional sources of funds to finance the startup and early 
expansion processes (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Asymmetric information 
problems are acute in those firms, thus limiting their ability to fund growth by 
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accessing external financing sources. VC/PEs are considered as specialized, 
informed investors able to address the serious information asymmetry 
problems found in those ventures (Chan, 1983). They exhibit outstanding 
screening abilities as well (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002; Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984). After the investment, VC/PEs develop close relationships with 
entrepreneurs/managers and establish tight reporting and control systems in 
the investee firms (Scholtens, 1999).  
Despite the high risk involved, VC/PEs originally tended to hold minority 
stakes in those innovative early stage companies (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992) 
to avoid distorting the entrepreneurial drive of the managers. Minority 
shareholdings could be justified from two different angles. From a resource 
base perspective, Florin (2005) notes the importance of the relationship 
between founder characteristics and performance and recalls the general 
agreement about the idea that the founding team provides most of the 
experience and technological and organizational skills that drive a company’s 
performance (e.g. see Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; Dollinger, 1995; Dyke, Fischer, 
& Reuber, 1992; Siegel, Siegel, & MacMillan, 1993). From an agency theory 
perspective, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) point out that a significant reduction 
in ownership may reduce managerial incentive to work toward long-term 
profits.  
Based on the information gathered in the screening process (Hisrich & 
Jancovicz, 1990; Rock, 1987) and the shareholders’ agreement signed at the 
time of the initial investment round (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994), VC/PEs 
initially trusted the capability of the investee firm managers. In addition, close 
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monitoring and frequent interaction between VC/PE and investee managers 
are usual when VC/PE investors hold minority stakes (Sapienza & Gupta, 
1994), especially when firm managers have limited managerial experience 
(Rock, 1987). Therefore, VC/PE investors tended to be confident about the 
managerial team’s flexibility to accept their strategic and managerial guidance. 
In case this assumption proved to be wrong, VC/PEs usually staged their 
commitments to preserve the right to abandon the project (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 1994; Sahlman, 1990).  
Since the late eighties, however, the investment strategy of VC/PE 
institutions across Europe has been remarkably different from the original 
pattern followed by U.S. investors. As reported in the European Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Yearbooks (EVCA, 1988–2010), the 
bulk of investments is concentrated in consolidated, large companies, mostly 
belonging to cash-generating low technology industries. The amounts 
committed to early stage innovative firms rarely exceed 10% of the total 
amount invested. Since the leading managerial role in consolidated firms may 
be played by either internal or external experienced managers, it is more likely 
that VC/PE investors prefer to hold controlling positions in those firms. 
Furthermore, the cash-generating capacity of target companies also allows for 
the use of debt in the acquisition of majority stakes to leverage returns 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009), leading to a new investment category known as 
leveraged buyout.  
The reason behind this change in the original concept of VC/PE is the 
significant difference in returns found between U.S. and European VC/PE 
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institutions investing in early stage innovative firms (Hege, Palomino, & 
Schwienbacher, 2004). The poor returns obtained from those investments in 
Europe is also confirmed in different performance surveys published by, or on 
behalf of, different national VC/PE associations (e.g. NVP, 1998; Guillaume, 
1998; BVCA, 1998, 2009; EVCA, 2005). Wright and Chopraa (2010) affirm 
that buyout funds, which are only invested in leveraged buyouts, outperform 
any other funds related to the traditional VC/PE category. Furthermore, the 
pooled average return on early stage European funds created since 1980 was 
negative at the end of 2007. 
As a result, nowadays the focus of VC/PE investments in Europe includes 
a limited share of minority shareholdings in innovative companies at the 
startup and early development stage and a large share of both minority and 
majority shareholdings in larger companies belonging to low technology 
industries, with the largest amount being allocated to buyout-type deals. In 
this latter group, the enhanced financial performance will be based on both 
financial leverage and a strategic entrepreneurial perspective leading to 
growth (Meuleman, Amess, Wright, & Scholes, 2009). The radical changes to 
be made in the firm’s asset base and capital structure, however, can be 
carried out only when the VC/PE investor holds a majority position. In this 
way, the latter can apply its management culture without a potential conflict 
with other shareholders. 
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4.2.2. ROLES VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY CAN PLAY IN FAMILY FIRMS 
Family-controlled businesses are the prevailing form of enterprise 
throughout the world. These make significant contributions to 
entrepreneurship and socioeconomic development in most countries. Families 
are the most frequent ultimate owner in non-widely held quoted corporations 
in Western Europe (44.3%), East Asia (37.9%), the U.S. (19.8%) and Canada 
(31.2%), with 56.4%, 63.2%, 28.1% and 44.6% being the share of non-
widely held quoted companies in each geographic area, respectively (King & 
Santor, 2008). Regarding unquoted companies across Europe, about 70–80% 
of enterprises are FCBs (Mandl, 2008). 
There is mixed evidence in the literature about the family influence on 
growth and performance in FCBs. On the one hand, family ownership may 
negatively influence firm performance because of tunneling decisions against 
minority shareholders (Johnson, 2000), such as transferring assets or profits 
to other self-owned firms, excessive family compensation, advantageous 
transfer prices or loans and loan guarantees. Family ownership and control 
may reduce the probability of a takeover, entrench poor managers and favor 
nepotism or the use of perquisites and private benefits (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; King & Santor, 2008; Lease, McConnell, Mikkelson, & Wayne, 1984; 
Stulz, 1988). These behaviors reduce firm performance (Gersick, Davis, 
Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). 
Regarding growth, FCBs tend to be more risk averse than their non-family 
counterparts (Athanassiou, Crittenden, Kelly, & Marquez, 2002; Daily & 
Dollinger, 1991, 1992; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 2000) because their 
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owners have most of their wealth tied to one asset (Morck & Yeung, 2003). In 
addition, according to behavioural theory, FCBs are likely to consider their 
socioemotional wealth as a key asset to protect and will therefore tend to 
accept strategies that imply below-target performance18 to prevent its loss 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  
On the other hand, family involvement may reduce agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and favor long-
term strategies (James, 1999). The interest of family owners in maintaining 
firm control over generations, as well as reputation, altruism and longer 
relationships that usually characterize family owners, may also reduce agency 
conflicts with creditors and suppliers. Furthermore, FCBs develop a strong 
culture and specific values, such as group, internal, centralized and long-term 
orientation (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004), which become an important 
strategic resource. According to the latter, FCBs are expected to outperform 
non-family ones.  
VC/PE is an alternative source of financing that also includes value adding 
services. Nevertheless, FCBs often do not consider it because it implies 
accepting an external shareholder on the board. In addition, family 
shareholders feel uncomfortable with the control and reporting implications of 
a VC/PE relationship (Harvey & Evans, 1995), as well as with the high returns 
                                      
18 Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) distinguish between venturing risks (i.e. those related to promising 
projects with uncertain returns) and performance hazard risks (i.e. greater probability of failure 
and below-target performance) in family firms. They affirm that: ‘While family firms may avoid 
venturing risks, they may be willing to incur the risk of greater performance hazard in order to 
preserve their socioemotional wealth’ (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, p. 107). 
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that VC/PE investors aim to obtain in a short period of time. Another 
explanation of the reluctance of FCBs to approach VC/PE investors is related to 
valuation. Owners in FCBs tend to add an ‘emotional value’ (Zellweger & 
Astrachan, 2008) on top of the enterprise value that a financial analyst would 
estimate, thus limiting the chances of reaching an agreement with the VC/PE 
investor. 
In this context, we aim to analyze the impact of VC/PE involvement in 
FCBs when compared to that found in non-FCBs. Our first concern is to identify 
the roles to be played by VC/PE firms in FCBs, among which financing growth 
and solving shareholder conflicts and succession should be highlighted. Firm 
growth is a key strategic decision in all firms in general, and in FCBs in 
particular. Growth is an essential strategy when families enlarge over 
generations (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Poza, 1988; Ward, 1997). FCBs, 
however, are reluctant to carry out the necessary investments to take 
advantage of growth opportunities when external sources of funds are 
required. Family owners are usually averse to incorporating new shareholders 
(Ward, 1997) and also tend to avoid raising funds from financial institutions 
(Sonnenfeld & Spence, 1989). In addition to financing issues, FCB growth is 
also influenced by the inherent characteristics of the CEO, such as age and 
tenure, and by the degree of family influence in the firm, which is related to 
the number of generations involved in the business (Kellermanns, Eddleston, 
Barnett, & Pearson, 2008).  
A second role to be played is related to succession. Ownership and 
management succession is one of the biggest challenges for FCBs. Succession 
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is something which many of them do not accomplish very well (Lansberg, 
1999; Rubenson & Gupta, 1997). VC/PE may also be useful for generational 
transitions, with management buyouts (MBOs) and buyins (MBIs) being 
alternative solutions to the private FCB ownership succession issue (Howorth, 
Westhead, & Wright, 2004; Robbie & Wright, 1995). Intergenerational 
transfers are not only an ownership issue, but also a financing one. Reducing 
the ownership structure complexity, which can cause inefficiencies in the long 
run, requires funding to allow the exit of some, or all, original shareholders. 
VC/PE firms can play that role, buying either minority or control stakes.  
Therefore, VC/PE involvement facilitates changes in the firm’s 
organization, management, governance and ownership to support the 
continuity and prosperity of the company. Even minority VC/PE investments 
may lead to control changes within the family ownership when a family 
member, or a family branch, decides to sell its stake in the firm. This action 
usually triggers the introduction of structural changes in the organization and 
management of the firm, which are said to be imposed by VC/PE managers. 
Upton and Petty (2000) observe that VC/PEs are interested in participating in 
US transition financing, usually in the form of debt or preferred stock 
combined with sweeteners (warrants or conversion rights). They find that the 
successor qualification, along with the firm’s strategic plans, is the key point in 
the VC/PE screening process of transition investments.  
VC/PE involvement in FCBs may, however, be affected by the special 
characteristics of those firms. When we analyze the different effect that VC/PE 
may have on FCBs and non-FCBs, we wonder if VC/PE amplifies a FCB’s 
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strengths or weaknesses. In addition to funding, the performance of investee 
firms heavily depends on monitoring and mentoring activities performed by 
the VC/PE investor (Sahlman, 1990). FCBs approaching VC/PE investors only 
for funding purposes could endanger the close relationship that is required 
between family and incoming nonfamily shareholders to enhance value 
creation.  
In some cases, however, the entry of the VC/PE firm could solve the 
rigidities of the FCB’s management culture, which could arise in FCBs affected 
by long tenure. Founders of FCBs who wish to build a long lasting legacy may 
become more conservative in their decisions because of the high risk of 
undertaking new entrepreneurial ventures, as well as the risk of destruction of 
family wealth (Sharma, Christman, & Chua, 1997; Zahra et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, FCBs usually have a well-established organizational culture, 
which is an important strategic resource (Barney, 1986; Zahra et al., 2004). 
The entry of an active external shareholder with its own management culture 
could create a conflict. Zahra et al. (2004) argue that firm culture cannot be 
developed or changed quickly.  
The role to be played by VC/PEs is dependent on the needs of the FCB. 
When a FCB contacts a VC/PE institution to fund growth, the funding itself 
may outweigh the value-adding reasons for approaching this type of investor. 
FCBs tend to be overly confident of their own management culture at this 
stage, but lack the funds required to carry out growth investments. Therefore, 
family owners would be reluctant to give away a majority stake in the 
company through a capital increase to raise new funds, since they would want 
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to retain full control of the growth process. But FCBs also approach VC/PEs to 
allow the exit of some family shareholders, usually selling minority stakes to 
external investors. Therefore, the remaining family shareholders would be 
inclined to continue with the traditional management culture of the firm.  
Even if they hold a minority share in a FCB, VC/PEs will act as in any 
other investee firm, e.g. including their monitoring and value-adding activities 
as part of the actions taken to help increase its value. Therefore, two 
situations may arise. On the one hand, a conflict between the two 
management cultures could lead to a reduced flow of information between firm 
and VC/PE managers, thus limiting the ability of the latter to identify and 
provide solutions to problems found in day-to-day operations. On the other 
hand, VC/PE managers may decide to accept a leading role of the existing 
management culture, thus forgoing their value-adding abilities.  
Therefore, the inability of VC/PE managers to implement their 
management culture in the investee firm, or the conflicts created with the 
existing management culture, may affect growth and performance. Since FCBs 
are known to have well-established management cultures which are not easy 
to change (Zahra et al., 2004), we anticipate that the management of the FCB 
will be more reluctant to accept changes when the VC/PE firm holds a minority 
stake. We also anticipate a lower VC/PE involvement in value-adding activities, 
which could undermine performance and growth in FCBs when compared to 
the non-family ones. Our first hypothesis follows from this discussion:  
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Hypothesis 4.1:  Minority VC/PE investments in FCBs lead to slower company 
growth than in non-family VC/PE-backed firms. 
VC/PE institutions in Europe have evolved toward investment strategies 
that include the acquisition of majority stakes in mature firms. We have 
already discussed the positive and negative effects of family ownership on 
business performance, with reputation being one of the noteworthy positive 
effects. The acquisition of majority stakes in FCBs will probably involve a 
radical transfer of control rights from the family to the VC/PE investor. This 
process may generate transition costs that could cancel out the positive 
influence of family reputation. Furthermore, VC/PE firms acquiring majority 
stakes in FCBs seem to experience great difficulties in replacing talented 
managers (Buttignon et al., 2005). In fact, majority acquisitions in FCBs lead 
to a profound change in the organizational structure, with human capital being 
the most sensitive area. Personnel management and control by the founders 
(or family members), scarce delegation and the specific business knowledge 
and entrepreneurial competence of the founders can complicate the transition 
to a majority VC/PE ownership and the development of the new organization. 
Many FCBs are highly dependent on the tacit knowledge of key individuals, 
especially family members, thus making the transfer of this knowledge a 
lengthy process (Howorth et al., 2004; Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001).  
On the other hand, VC/PE investors can balance the high risk aversion 
attitudes found in FCBs (Athanassiou et al., 2002; Daily & Dollinger, 1991, 
VC / PE AND THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FAMILY AND ECONOMIC GOALS IN FAMILY FIRMS 
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF VC/PE ON FAMLIY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 
212 
1992; Morck et al., 2000). In addition, a controlling share of the VC/PE 
investor facilitates a unified and determined management of the business that 
enables the implementation of a new management strategy. In this sense, a 
conflict between the previous management culture of the family and the VC/PE 
investor’s management style is not expected to happen, and so the latter is 
able to add value as in any other investee firm. As a consequence, we expect 
no important differences between the growth of family and non-family 
investee firms when the VC/PE firm holds a majority stake. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis would be as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.2:  FCBs and non-FCBs selling a majority stake to a VC/PE 
investor do not show different growth patterns in the post-
investment period 
4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
This paper focuses on the VC/PE activity carried out in Spanish firms over 
a long period of time. We build the largest database of Spanish VC/PE firms 
ever created, for which we find and homogenize accounting and ownership 
data. The sources of identification of VC/PE firms are the Spanish Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association and http://www.webcapitalriesgo.com. 
Since accounting data on Spanish firms have only been available since 1991 
and we aim to analyze the period before and after the investments, we focus 
our research on investments made since 1995. Since we also aim to analyze 
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the post-investment period, we include investments carried out up to 2004. 
1572 VC/PE investments were recorded in Spain between 1995 and 2004, 
including all stages but excluding financial and real estate sectors, as well as 
investments made abroad by Spanish VC/PE firms (Martí, Salas & Barthel, 
2010). We were able to fully identify 1313 of those firms in the Official Trade 
Registers. The 259 missing firms include firms that were acquired by others 
before the third year, firms that disappeared before the third year and firms 
that never reported or changed their names. We only found full accounting 
data on 1138 firms, of which 494, 509 and 135 were early, expansion and late 
stage investments, respectively. The sources of accounting information are the 
AMADEUS Database, which records information on 1,202,363 Spanish firms, 
and the Official Trade Registers.  
Early stage firms are defined as newly formed firms that raise money to 
complete the final development of the product or service to be distributed 
(seed), or that already have a product or service and are raising money to 
launch the manufacturing and distribution of the product (start-up). Expansion 
stage investments are defined as investments in existing firms with at least 
one profitable line of business. It is common to distinguish between 
development capital and replacement capital. In both cases, the VC/PE 
investor holds a minority position, at least initially. In the former, the company 
issues new shares to finance growth, whereas in the latter the VC/PE investor 
acquires a minority stake of existing shares to allow the exit of a group of 
shareholders. Late stage investments represent the acquisition of majority 
stakes in mature, consolidated firms, including leveraged buyouts, 
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management buyouts, management buyins and firms in distress. Since we aim 
to analyze the effect of the family management culture on the impact of VC/PE 
involvement, we exclude early stage investments. We assume that these 
newly established firms, even if they are family-owned, do not have a well-
established management tradition that would explain the differences found in 
growth when compared to those of non-family-related companies.  
The final step in the sampling process was to investigate the family or 
non-family nature of the remaining 644 firms at the expansion and late 
stages, involving both VC/PE minority and majority stakes. Our sources were 
the AMADEUS database, the firms’ websites, the official corporate news 
releases (BORME) and press clippings. FCBs are defined as companies whose 
ultimate largest shareholder is a family or individuals closely linked to a family 
group. This definition is in accordance with the official definition given by GEEF 
(European Group of Owner Managed and Family Enterprises) and FBN (Family 
Business Network) in 2008 and also adopted by the IEF (Family Business 
Institute in Spain). Based on the firm ownership information, we classify 199 
firms as FCBs, and of these 159 involve a minority stake of the VC/PE firm and 
40 a majority stake. The percentage of FCBs in the full sample is 30%. This 
share is below the weight that FCBs have in the Spanish economy. 
Nevertheless, this lower presence is in accordance with the bias of FCBs 
against VC/PE involvement, given the reluctance of FCB shareholders to allow 
the entry of external investors.  
In Table 4.1., Panel A shows a balanced distribution of FCBs and non-
FCBs by VC/PE holding stake. The proportion of firms in which a VC/PE 
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investor holds a minority stake is around 80% in both groups. Panel B reports 
how FCBs and non-FCBs are distributed with regard to the year of the initial 
VC/PE investment. Panel C shows the distribution of FCBs and non-FCBs 
across industries, with FCBs being more focused on manufacturing than the 
non-family ones. Table 4.2. describes the size of the firms in the sample from 
three different perspectives, namely sales, employees and assets, and 
analyzes FCBs and non-FCBs separately. We sort all firms on the basis of the 
EU references for micro, small, medium and large sized firms. Regarding firms 
in which the VC/PEs hold a minority stake, a larger proportion of FCBs belong 
to the micro category. The differences are not so important in small and 
medium sized firms.  
As regards the number of valid observations, we were able to collect data 
up to the third year after the initial investment for 641 firms and up to the 
fifth year for 412 firms in our sample. 
TABLE 4.1. 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
PANEL A: BREAKDOWN BY VC/PE HOLDING STAKE 
VC/PE HOLDING STAKE 
FCBS NON-FCBS ALL FIRMS 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Minority 159 79.9 350 78.7 509 79.0 
Majority  40 20.1 95 21.3 135 21.0 
Total 199 100.0 445 100.0 644 100.0 
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TABLE 4.1 (CONT.) 
PANEL B: BREAKDOWN BY YEAR OF INITIAL VC/PE INVESTMENT 
YEAR 
FCBS NON-FCBS ALL FIRMS 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
1995 5 2.5 31 7.0 36 5.6 
1996 8 4.0 33 7.4 41 6.4 
1997 13 6.5 49 11.0 62 9.6 
1998 34 17.1 44 9.9 78 12.1 
1999 31 15.6 48 10.8 79 12.3 
2000 24 12.1 65 14.6 89 13.8 
2001 24 12.1 37 8.3 61 9.5 
2002 14 7.0 29 6.5 43 6.7 
2003 36 18.1 57 12.8 93 14.4 
2004 10 5.0 52 11.7 62 9.6 
Total 199 100.0 445 100.0 644 100.0 
 
PANEL C: BREAKDOWN BY INDUSTRY 
Industry 
FCBs Non-FCBs All firms 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Technology, Media & Telecom 16 8.0 73 16.4 89 13.8 
Manufacturing  114 57.3 187 42.0 301 46.7 
Primary and Energy  1 0.5 14 3.1 15 2.3 
Services  68 34.2 171 38.4 239 37.1 
Total 199 100.0 445 100.0 644 100.0 
This table divides the whole sample of Spanish VC/PE investments conducted between 1995 and 2004, 
excluding early stage investments, from three different perspectives, namely the minority vs. majority 
stakeholding of the VC/PE firm, the year of the initial investment and the industry, and, simultaneously, by 
the family or non-family nature of the firm. The raw data to build the tables were collected from ASCRI, 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com and the AMADEUS database. 
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TABLE 4.2. 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: SIZE OF FIRMS 
 
PANEL A:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MINORITY STAKE 
SIZE REFERENCE 
FCBS NON-FCBS ALL FIRMS 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Sales (Euro Million)       
 Under 2 31 19.5 111 31.7 142 27.9 
 Between 2 and 10 62 39.0 113 32.3 175 34.4 
 Between 10 and 50 45 28.3 90 25.7 135 26.5 
 Over 50 21 13.2 36 10.3 57 11.2 
Total 159 100.0 350 100.0 509 100.0 
Employees (Number)       
 Under 10 23 14.5 82 23.4 105 20.6 
 Between 10 and 50 53 33.3 119 34.0 172 33.8 
 Between 50 and 250 61 38.4 110 31.4 171 33.6 
 Over 250 22 13.8 39 11.1 61 12.0 
Total 159 100.0 350 100.0 509 100.0 
Assets (Euro Million)       
 Under 2 18 11.3 75 21.4 93 18.3 
 Between 2 and 10 63 39.6 136 38.9 199 39.1 
 Between 10 and 43 50 31.4 97 27.7 147 28.9 
 Over 43 28 17.6 42 12.0 70 13.8 
Total 159 100.0 350 100.0 509 100.0 
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TABLE 4.2 (CONT.) 
PANEL B:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MAJORITY STAKE 
SIZE REFERENCE 
FCBS NON-FCBS ALL FIRMS 
Nº firms % Nº firms % Nº firms % 
Sales (Euro Million)       
 Under 2 6 15.0 19 20.0 25 18.5 
 Between 2 and 10 9 22.5 21 22.1 30 22.2 
 Between 10 and 50 16 40.0 32 33.7 48 35.6 
 Over 50 9 22.5 23 24.2 32 23.7 
Total 40 100.0 95 100.0 135 100.0 
Employees (Number)       
 Under 10 5 12.5 16 16.8 21 15.6 
 Between 10 and 50 6 15.0 15 15.8 21 15.6 
 Between 50 and 250 14 35.0 40 42.1 54 40.0 
 Over 250 15 37.5 24 25.3 39 28.9 
Total 40 100.0 95 100.0 135 100.0 
Assets (Euro Million)       
 Under 2 4 10.0 13 13.7 17 12.6 
 Between 2 and 10 15 37.5 27 28.4 42 31.1 
 Between 10 and 43 7 17.5 29 30.5 36 26.7 
 Over 43 14 35.0 26 27.4 40 29.6 
Total 40 100.0 95 100.0 135 100.0 
This table divides the whole sample into micro, small, medium and large firm categories from three 
different perspectives, namely sales, employees and total assets, and, simultaneously, by the family or 
non-family nature of the firm. All values are taken in the year of the initial VC/PE investment. The raw data 
to build the tables were collected from ASCRI, www.webcapitalriesgo.com and the AMADEUS database. 
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4.3.2. MODELS AND METHODOLOGY 
We aim to test whether firm growth follows different patterns in family 
vs. non-family VC/PE-backed firms. We measure the impact of VC/PE 
investments on investee firm growth, with sales, gross margin519 and 
employment being the references to be analyzed. Therefore, the dependent 
variable is defined as the absolute growth per year (i.e. difference between 
the value at the end and at the beginning of the year) in sales, gross margin 
or employees, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.  
Regarding the independent variables, we define a dummy variable, 
namely Family, which takes on value 1 if the investee firm was a FCB before 
the initial VC/PE investment, or 0 otherwise. We also include the growth in 
total assets (i.e. difference between the value at the end and at the beginning 
of the year), scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, because the 
funding provided by VC/PE firms may increase the asset base to support 
growth, as suggested by Alemany and Martí (2005). In addition to equity or 
quasi-equity funding, which increases the firm’s solvency, VC/PE investors 
provide contacts with investment bankers (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Hsu, 
2004; Tykvová, 2007). These contacts and the increase in equity due to the 
money injection by the VC/PE firm make it easier for investee firms to access 
bank loans in their development process (Bertoni et al., in press). In the same 
vein, VC/PE firms usually stage their commitments to investee firms over time 
                                      
19 Defined as the difference between sales and materials and other direct inputs used to 
manufacture the product or provide the service. 
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and syndicate follow-on investments to limit their risk exposure (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001; Sahlman, 1990; Wright & Robbie, 1998). Investee firms are 
thus able to obtain additional funding to support the growth process over time. 
Therefore, growth in variables such as sales, gross margin and employment 
should be related to the increase in assets that results from both VC/PE 
funding and an easier access to other external sources of funds. 
In addition to funding, the value-adding services provided by VC/PEs, 
such as coaching and mentoring (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Sahlman, 1990; 
Wright & Robbie, 1998), also explain the better performance of investee firms. 
This added value can differ somewhat across investors, with the results 
depending on the VC/PE firm’s reputation. As Balboa and Martí (2007) argue, 
reputation could be a proxy for the ability to raise more funds over time. 
Therefore, those VC/PE firms with more funds under management are 
expected to provide higher value to their investee firms, thus exhibiting larger 
growth profiles. Similarly, there is a substantial number of public-sector-
backed VC/PE firms in Europe (Manigart & Beuselinck, 2001) whose managers 
might not have the same incentives and/or experience as their private sector 
counterparts. Consequently, we include VC/PE size and private vs. public-
sector nature as proxies of VC/PE reputation.  
Our model is represented as follows: 
Growth in sales, gross margin, employmentit = F(Familyi, Asset growthit, Investor sizei, 
Private sector VC/PEi, LogEmployeesit, Regioni, Industry and Time dummies) 
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Family and Asset growth are described in previous paragraphs. Investor 
size is a dummy that takes on value 1 if the VC/PE firm had over €150 million 
under management.20 Private sector VC/PE is a dummy that takes on value 1 
if the VC/PE firm is private sector-backed, or 0 otherwise. We also include 
control variables related to the investee firm’s size, location and industry, and 
time dummies. We measure firm size with the natural logarithm of the number 
of employees at the end of the year (LogEmployees). The variable Region is a 
dummy that takes on value 1 if the investee firm is located in a region with a 
per capita average income below 75% of the EU average (i.e. EU Objective 1), 
or 0 otherwise (i.e. developed regions). The activity sector classification 
(Industry) is based on NACE rev2 codes. We aggregate the four-digit NACE 
rev2 category into four categories, namely Primary, Low and Medium 
Technology Manufacturing, Low and Medium Technology Services and High 
Technology, and define industry dummies accordingly.  
Regarding the estimation process, our data refer to time series 
observations on a number of unlisted firms, with some independent variables 
being time invariant. Accordingly, random effects panel data regressions are 
performed to estimate the models, because fixed effects estimation would  
  
                                      
20 Firms managing more than s150 million are classified as large in the Spanish Private Equity 
Report (Barthel & Alférez, 2011). 
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eliminate those variables from the analysis. Even though the individual 
effects found in panel datasets could be treated as fixed or random variables, 
Arellano and Bover (1990) affirm that we can always treat the individual 
effects as random variables without loss of generality.21 
4.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4.3. reports the observed growth in sales, gross margin and 
employees over a five-year period after the investment. Regardless of the 
variable considered, the average growth found in FCBs is significantly lower 
than that found in non-FCBs when the VC/PE firm holds a minority stake 
(Panel A). The greater differences are found in revenue growth. Conversely, 
FCBs display lower standard deviations in all variables. Panel B shows that 
growth rates found in FCBs when the VC/PE firm holds a majority stake are 
not significantly different from those of non-FCBs.  
  
                                      
21 An alternative approach that would address potential endogeneity concerns would include the 
dependent variable lagged one period as explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the estimation 
process of this model, based on the GMM methodology, would require at least five consecutive 
observations to define instruments properly, plus one more to compute growth. 
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TABLE 4.3. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF GROWTH 
 (Normalized by total assets, in investee firms over a five year period after the 
VC/PE initial investment) 
 
PANEL A:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MINORITY STAKE 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN 
STD. 
DEVIATION 
MIN. MAX. 
Increase 
employees / 
Total assets 
      
All firms 2,497 514   0.0022** 0.0071 -0.0126 0.0724 
FCBs  785 160   0.0012** 0.0043 -0.0126 0.0297 
Non-FCBs  1,712 354   0.0026**    0.0080 -0.0062 0.0724 
Difference     0.0014***    
Increase gross 
margin / total 
assets 
      
All firms 2,497 514   0.1073** 0.2644 -0.6310 2.2157 
FCBs  785 160   0.0570** 0.1791 -0.6310 1.0623 
Non-FCBs 1,712 354   0.1303** 0.2909 -0.3554 2.2157 
Difference     0.0733***    
Increase gross 
revenues / 
total assets 
      
All firms 2,497 514   0.1810 0.4262 -1.0634 3.3700 
FCBs 785 160   0.1024 0.3209 -1.0634 1.9835 
Non-FCBs 1,712 354   0.2170 0.4596 -0.6108 3.3700 
Difference     0.1145***    
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TABLE 4.3. (CONT.) 
PANEL B:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MAJORITY STAKE 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN STD. 
DEVIATION 
MIN. MAX. 
Increase 
employees / 
Total assets 
      
All firms 676 136      0.0011 0.0036 -0.0049 0.0326 
FCBs  210 40      0.0008 0.0025 -0.0049 0.0135 
Non-FCBs 466 96      0.0013 0.0040 -0.0020 0.0326 
Difference        0.0005    
Increase 
gross margin 
/ total assets 
      
All firms 678 136      0.0770 0.1840 -0.1212 1.5441 
FCBs  212 40      0.0677 0.1264 -0.0597 0.4967 
Non-FCBs 466 96      0.0812 0.2036 -0.1212 1.5441 
Difference        0.0135    
Increase 
gross 
revenues / 
total assets 
      
All firms 678 136      0.1294 0.2897 -0.4715 1.6227 
FCBs  212 40      0.1224 0.2209 -0.1949 0.8673 
Non-FCBs 466 96      0.1326 0.3148 -0.4715 1.6227 
Difference        0.0102    
This table reports descriptive statistics on winsorized (1% each tail) values of the variables. Growth is 
estimated as the difference between the variable at the end of the year and the same variable at the 
beginning of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. We test the null hypothesis that 
means are equal between VC/PE-backed FCBs and VC/PE-backed non-FCBs. ***, ** and * indicate, 
respectively, significance levels  <1%, <5% and <10%. Six firms (five non-family) for which accounting 
data about the year of the initial VC/PE investment were unavailable are included in the descriptive 
statistics. 
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Regarding the independent variables, in Table 4.4. (Panel A) the size of 
firms when the VC/PEs take a minority stake is significantly different in FCBs 
and non-FCBs, with the former having a larger number of employees on 
average. Conversely, no significant differences are found in asset growth 
between both groups of firms. As for the firms in which the VC/PE firm holds 
majority stakes and whose statistics are shown in Panel B, no significant 
differences are found in size and asset growth between the two groups. 
 
TABLE 4.4. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EMPLOYEES AND ASSET GROWTH 
 
PANEL A:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MINORITY STAKE 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN STD. 
DEVIATION 
MIN. MAX. 
LogEmployees       
All firms 2,518 510 4.0739*** 1.4912 0 7.9714 
FCBs  801 159 4.1779*** 1.2867 0.4969 7.2704 
Non-FCBs 1,717 351 4.0254*** 1.5705 0 7.9714 
Difference   -0.1525***    
Asset growth       
All firms 2,502 514 0.2914*** 0.6038 -0.724 5.2388 
FCBs  785 160 0.2397*** 0.4907 -0.724 3.8929 
Non-FCBs 1,717 354 0.3150*** 0.6461 -0.724 5.2388 
Difference   0.0753***    
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TABLE 4.4. (CONT.) 
PANEL B:  
FIRMS IN WHICH THE VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDS A MAJORITY STAKE 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN 
STD. 
DEVIATION 
MIN. MAX. 
LogEmployees       
All firms 136 691 4.7144 1.6981 0 7.9714 
FCBs  40 213 4.7381 1.6974 0 7.9714 
Non-FCBs 96 478 4.7039 1.7064 0 7.9714 
Difference   -0.0342    
Assets growth       
All firms 136 678 0.2005 0.4787 -0.7240 3.9109 
FCBs  40 212 0.2542 0.6278 -0.1083 3.9109 
Non-FCBs 96 466 0.1760 0.4028 -0.7240 2.8050 
Difference   -0.0782    
This table reports descriptive statistics on Winsorized (1% each tail) values of the variables. LogEmployees 
is the natural logarithm of the employees at the end of the period. Asset Growth is estimated as the 
difference between the total assets at the end of the year and the same variable at the beginning of the 
year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. We test the null hypothesis that means are equal 
between VC/PE-backed FCBs and VC/PE-backed non-FCBs. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance 
levels  <1%, <5% and <10%. 
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4.4. RESULTS 
Table 4.5. reports the regression results of the different models that 
measure growth in investee firms when the VC/PEs hold a minority stake up to 
the fifth year after the initial investment, which is the average holding period 
of Spanish VC/PE investors in their portfolio firms (Barthel & Alférez, 2011). All 
non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% level in order to avoid the 
distortion of extreme growth rates found in some investee companies in which 
a large increase in volume relative to low initial values was found, or in failed 
firms in which the sales, gross margin or headcount were reduced to zero. 
Dependent variables measure growth in sales, gross margin and employees.  
As expected, asset growth explains the observed growth in all 
dependent variables, namely sales, gross margin and employees. Asset growth 
in the first year is explained by the VC/PE investment, which implies an influx 
of money coming from an external investor to take advantage of growth 
opportunities.  
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TABLE 4.5. 
REGRESSION RESULTS: VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDING MINORITY 
STAKES, UP TO FIVE YEARS AFTER THE INITIAL INVESTMENT 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
SALES GROWTH 
GROSS MARGIN 
GROWTH 
EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH 
FCBi -0.0871*** -0.0530*** -0.0010** 
 0.0227 0.0141 0.0004 
Asset growthit 0.4028*** 0.2259*** 0.0046 
 0.0268 0.0132 0.0005 
Private sector VC/PEi 0.0166 0.0178 0.0005 
 0.0246 0.0161 0.0005 
Investor sizei -0.0060 -0.0179 0.0000 
 0.0285 0.0195 0.0007 
LogEmployeesit 0.0461*** 0.0231*** 0.0015*** 
 0.0097 0.0069 0.0002 
Regioni -0.0138 -0.0236* 0.0001 
 0.0239 0.0142 0.0006 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.1800** 0.1643*** -0.0013 
 0.0796 0.0524 0.0017 
# of observations 2,435 2,435 2,435 
# of firms 506 506 506 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
This table reports Random Effects GLS regressions. The dependent variables are growth in Sales, Gross 
Margin and Employees between t and t-1, scaled by total assets at time t-1. The independent variables are: 
(1) FCB: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the VC/PE-backed firm was a FCB, or zero otherwise. (2) 
Asset growth: Growth in total assets between t and t-1, scaled by total assets at time t-1. (3) Investor size: 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lead investor had over €150 million under management, or zero 
otherwise. (4) Private sector VC/PE: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lead investor was a private 
sector related VC/PE firm, or zero otherwise. (5) LogEmployees: Natural logarithm of the number of 
employees at time t. (6) Region: Dummy that takes value 1 if the investee firm is located in a region with 
an average per capita income under 75% of the EU average. Robust standard errors are reported in small 
case. Non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% threshold.  
   *  Indicates significance levels <10%. 
   **  Indicate significance levels <5%. 
   ***  Indicate significance levels <1%. 
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The dummy variable indicating whether the investee firm was a FCB 
exhibits a negative coefficient, as anticipated, revealing that VC/PE-backed 
firms owned by family groups do not grow as fast as VC/PE-backed non-FCBs 
do. In accordance with Hypothesis 1, these results are found in all 
threemodels after controlling for firm size, location, VC/PE investor size, and 
the private or public-sector nature of the VC/PE firm involved. Regarding firm 
size, the natural logarithm of the number of employees shows a positive and 
significant coefficient. We also control for the average personal income level of 
the region where the investee firm is located. In addition, the size of the 
VC/PE investor is also considered. We aim to control whether the value added 
by VC/PE firms is different in large and small institutions. As regards VC/PE 
goals, we also control for the private or public sector backing of the VC/PE 
investor. Excluding firm size, the remaining control variables are not 
significant, except location in one of the models, which is marginally 
significant.  
Since our regressions are based on an unbalanced panel in which we 
only have five-year post-investment data on 325 firms out of the 506 firms in 
which the investor holds a minority stake, we develop several robustness 
checks. First, we estimate the model in a shorter time window, taking into 
account only three years after the initial VC/PE investment. The coefficients on 
asset growth are again highly significant, as well as slightly greater than those 
shown in Table 4.5. Similarly, the coefficient related to the distinction between 
FCBs and non-FCBs is again negative and significant. We also carried out 
similar regressions with a four-year time window and the results are similar.  
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As further checks for robustness, we perform the same regressions on 
all three models and all time windows from three to five years but changing 
the winsorizing threshold to 2 and 5%. The results are the same in all cases. 
Additionally, we decide to scale sales and gross margin by the number of 
employees at the beginning of the period, with the results also being the 
same. In order to control for simultaneity concerns, we also repeat the same 
regressions lagging asset growth and the natural logarithm of employees one 
period.22 The results are the same for sales and gross margin, whereas no 
significant effects are found on employment growth. Finally, we replace the 
natural logarithm of employees with the natural logarithm of assets as control 
variable and repeat the previous regressions of sales and gross margin. The 
results remain unchanged.  
As a final robustness check, we also estimate an alternative model in 
which the endogenous variable is defined as the difference on the variable at 
the end and the beginning of the year, divided by the value of the same 
variable at the beginning of the year. Since this definition leads to high 
extreme values (e.g. firms starting with very small amounts showing large 
growth in quantities, or failed firms showing sharp decreases), the regressions 
were carried out on data winsorized at the 5% threshold. The results also 
confirm the significantly different growth rates found in family and non-family 
VC/PE-backed companies. All these regressions are available upon request. To 
sum up, we may conclude that FCBs where the VC/PEs hold a minority stake 
                                      
22 Even though the purpose of those two variables is to control for the effect on growth of the 
additional funds received at the time of the initial VC round. 
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do not grow as much as other non-family VC/PE-backed businesses, thus 
verifying our first hypothesis.  
 
TABLE 4.6. 
REGRESSION RESULTS: VC/PE INVESTOR HOLDING MAJORITY 
STAKES, UP TO FIVE YEARS AFTER THE INITIAL INVESTMENT 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
SALES GROWTHIT 
GROSS MARGIN 
GROWTHIT 
EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTHIT 
FCBi 0.0019  0.0007  -0.0005 
 0.0343  0.0230  0.0004 
Asset growthit 0.3613 *** 0.1930 *** 0.0051 *** 
 0.0703   0.0570  0.0005 
Private sector VC/PEi -0.0696  -0.0289  -0.0004 
 0.0431  0.0230  0.0005  
Investor sizei 0.0560  0.0317  0.0005 
 0.0430  0.0288  0.0008 
LogEmployeesit -0.0050  -0.0076  -0.0000 
 0.0130  0.0126  0.0003 
Regioni -0.0291   -0.0297  -0.0001 
 0.0451  0.0193  0.0004 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Sector dummies YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.2963 ** 0.2719267 ** 0.0007 
 0.1255   0.1307299  0.0016 
# of observations 668 668 667 
# of firms 135 135 135 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
This table reports Random Effects GLS regressions. The dependent variables are growth in Sales, Gross 
Margin and Employees between t and t-1, scaled by total assets at time t-1. The independent variables are: 
(1) FCB: dummy variable that takes value 1 if the VC/PE-backed firm was a FCB, or zero otherwise. (2) 
Asset growth: Growth in total assets between t and t-1, scaled by total assets at time t-1. (3) Investor size: 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lead investor had over €150 million under management, or zero 
otherwise. (4) Private sector VC/PE: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the lead investor was a private 
sector related VC/PE firm, or zero otherwise. (5) LogEmployees: Natural logarithm of the number of 
employees at time t. (6) Region: Dummy that takes value 1 if the investee firm is located in a region with 
an average per capita income under 75% of the EU average. Robust standard errors are reported in small 
case. Non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 1% threshold.  
   *  Indicates significance levels <10%. 
   **  Indicate significance levels <5%. 
   ***  Indicate significance levels <1%. 
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Regarding the regressions run on the subsample of firms in which the 
VC/PE investor holds a majority stake, the results for the five-year time 
window are reported in Table 4.6. Interestingly, the coefficient measuring 
asset growth exhibits a positive, significant value in all models, regardless of 
the dependent variable analyzed, thus supporting the strategic 
entrepreneurship perspective introduced by Meuleman et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, we do not find a significant coefficient at standard levels for the 
coefficient related to VC/PE-backed FCBs, in agreement with our Hypothesis 2. 
This finding supports the assumption that growth patterns shown by the latter 
are not significantly different from those found in non-FCBs. None of the firm 
and VC/PE control variables are significant.  
Since we have only five post-investment observations for 87 VC/PE-
backed firms in which the VC/PE investor holds a majority stake, out of the 
135 firms in this subsample, we ran the same regressions only until the third 
year after the initial investment. The results show that the FCB dummy 
remains statistically insignificant. These results are also robust to changes in 
the winsorizing threshold or the consideration of a four-year time window. 
Similarly, the FCB dummy remains statistically insignificant when the growth 
in sales, gross margin and employees is scaled by the number of employees at 
the beginning of the period, or when asset growth and the natural logarithm of 
employees are lagged one period. Finally, the results also hold when the 
endogenous variable is defined as the relative growth of the original variable, 
thus confirming our Hypothesis 2.  
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4.5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
VC/PEs are considered as value-adding investors who contribute to the 
development of entrepreneurial businesses. Empirical studies usually show 
that VC/PE-backed firms outperform non-VC/PE-backed ones. Nevertheless, 
we intend to analyze to what extent the impact could differ when the investee 
is a FCB. There is a gap in the literature about VC/PE involvement in FCBs, 
which may be due to the reluctance of FCBs to accept VC/PE investors. But 
these specialized investors could play an important role in two critical issues, 
namely succession and growth. In this respect, we are interested in exploring 
different growth patterns in family vs. non-family VC/PE-backed firms when 
VC/PE investors hold either a majority or a minority position.  
We hypothesize slower growth in FCBs when compared to non-family 
ones if the VC/PE firm holds a minority stake, and non-significant differences 
when the VC/PE firm becomes a controlling stakeholder in the investee firm. 
We expect that minority VC/PE stakes in FCBs hinder strategic decisions, 
because two very different management cultures overlap. In this vein, the risk 
aversion attitude predicted by agency theory in FCBs may create barriers for 
growth-oriented strategies that VC/PEs aim to develop. Nevertheless, we 
expect no differences with non-FCBs when the VC/PE firm takes a controlling 
position, since the acquirer’s management tradition will replace the existing 
family’s management culture. In this way, conflicts between both 
management traditions are less likely to occur, albeit the investee firm may 
lose part, or all, of the value related to the family reputation. 
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We test the hypotheses proposed on a unique sample of Spanish VC/PE 
investments made between 1995 and 2004. In accordance with the 
hypotheses proposed, our results show significant differences in the growth 
patterns found in family and non-family investee firms, with the latter showing 
statistically higher growth rates in firms where the VC/PEs held minority 
stakes. No differences were found between FCBs and non-FCBs’ growth when 
the VC/PE investor acquired a controlling stake in the investee firm.  
To sum up, VC/PE is an alternative way to fund FCB growth and to solve 
succession and other conflicts among heirs, even though the impact is lower 
than that found in other non-family investee firms when the VC/PE firm holds 
minority stakes.  
The contributions of this work include the initial evidence provided about 
VC/PE involvement in FCBs, which has received little attention in the 
literature. In addition, most of the literature about FCBs is based on qualitative 
data. We base our analyses on a large dataset comprising both VC/PE-related 
and accounting data on Spanish VC/PE-backed firms, thus allowing us to test 
our hypotheses on a large sample based on quantitative data. Furthermore, 
this is the first paper that analyzes the impact of VC/PE investors in FCBs vs. 
non-FCBs from a quantitative perspective and also the first that studies the 
VC/PE involvement in Spanish FCBs. Similarities between firms in civil law 
countries lead us to think that these results and conclusions will be similar at 
least for FCBs in Continental Europe.  
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Our work provides evidence on the differential role played by VC/PE 
managers when they hold a minority rather than a majority stake in the 
investee firm. We find statistically higher growth rates in non-FCBs where the 
VC/PE investors held minority stakes, which could be explained by the inability 
of VC/PE managers to change the management culture when the majority 
shareholders belong to a family group. Therefore, VC/PE investors should 
carefully address the potential conflicts that may arise due to the risk adverse 
attitudes found in FCBs. When VC/PE majority stakes are considered, however, 
VC/PE managers are able to implement their management culture and, 
therefore, the results would not be different from those expected in other 
investee firms.  
The implications of our research are important for both VC/PE managers 
and shareholders of FCBs. On the one hand, VC/PE managers should properly 
address the potential conflicts with the existing management team in family 
VC/PE-backed firms to avoid underperformance. On the other hand, FCB 
managers should allow VC/PE managers to provide value-adding services that 
could enhance growth and value at the time of the VC/PE exit. Furthermore, 
by accessing VC/PE institutions, FCBs may also reduce their natural risk 
aversion attitudes toward growth, as well as the lack of resources that could 
limit their ability to take advantage of growth opportunities. The presence of a 
VC/PE firm could also help to anticipate a planned change in the firm’s 
ownership structure, thus reducing the problems found in FCBs in second or 
later generations. Buyouts also become a solution to those problems, albeit 
with a more radical approach.  
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Regarding the limitations of our paper, the size and number of 
observations of the sample did not allow us to check the endogeneity concerns 
that could arise in investee firms to provide further robustness to our findings. 
As a second limitation, we were unable to consider relevant variables about 
the national vs. international focus or the product diversification strategy of 
the investee firms. Finally, our work does not consider qualitative variables 
about the management of the FCBs involved.  
For further research, it would be important to analyze the determinants 
of the lower growth patterns of FCBs when the VC/PE firm holds a minority 
stake. In addition, it should be interesting to analyze whether these findings 
could also be present in other developed countries. 
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The agenda of Family-controlled Businesses (FCBs) is dominated by 
socioemotional considerations and the fear of losing control of the firm leads 
to a reluctance towards external financing. Transparency for third parties is 
not practiced nor welcomed. This limits financing to internally generated 
resources. But FCBs do face two main challenges, namely growth and 
succession. 
The financing of growth investments is somewhat limited by information 
asymmetries and agency costs when it cannot be obtained from internal 
resources. VC/PE institutions are specialized investors that seem to be an 
adequate partner for funding growth in FCBs, reducing their financial 
constraints. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that they introduce different 
value-adding activities to FCBs, such as networking and contacts with banks, 
suppliers and clients. Nevertheless, existing evidence maintains that FCBs are 
underrepresented in the portfolios of VC/PE investors.  
Although research about growth in FCBs is rich, most studies are based 
on qualitative data. In some way they are insufficient to provide evidence on 
the motives of FCBs to approaching external sources of funds. Only few papers 
include the financing decision with VC/PE-investors and mainly focus on later 
stage investments. In addition, there is a lack of attention on the effect of 
VC/PE involvement in FCBs. This study includes contributions that help in 
filling these gaps.  
This study aims to highlight the motives for family principals to set 
different preferences between socioemotional “family” issues and financial 
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considerations. Depending on economic conditions different settings of these 
preferences are expected. Recent literature provides evidence that reluctance 
to receive external financing is highest in the first generation. Only in the case 
of poor performance financial considerations become more salient. In the first 
two empirical works of this thesis we assume that only first generation FCBs 
with low performance are more likely to approach VC/PE investors.  
Secondly, we expect a positive effect of VC/PE involvement in FCBs, as in 
any other firm. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the impact of investors’ 
involvement in FCBs could change depending on the minority or majority 
shareholding of VC/PE firms. A minority stake might not allow them to carry 
through necessary changes to lead the firm to new growth paths, whereas a 
majority stake enables them to do so with the necessary power to decide and 
select adequate growth strategies.  
The central hypotheses are tested in three different empirical exercises 
and are focused on unlisted Spanish FCBs in first and later generations. The 
data for the VC/PE investments were obtained by the Spanish Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Association (ASCRI) and www.webcapitalriesgo.com. The 
accounting and ownership information was taken from the AMADEUS Database 
and the official Trade Registers. Additionally, a sample of non-VC/PE financed 
FCBs was taken from the AMADEUS Database.  
The empirical results confirm the central research hypotheses undertaken 
in this work. In the first study, total factor productivity is analyzed before the 
entry of the VC/PE firm for a large representative sample of Spanish FCBs and 
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non-FCBs that received VC funding between 1995 and 2005. The generation in 
which the FCBs received VC/PE financing is taken into consideration. The 
empirical results show lower total factor productivity growth in first-generation 
FCBs that later receive VC/PE. On the contrary, this is not found for later-
generation FCBs. These findings confirm the higher reluctance of first 
generation FCBs to accessing external sources of funds, due to the desire to 
protect their socioemotional wealth. In this way, utility preferences are 
changed with poor performance and family goals do not prevail over financial 
goals. 
Nevertheless, more research is required on this issue because VC/PE 
institutions show superior screening abilities and would not invest in poor 
performing firms. We then looked at the measure we used (productivity) and 
we argue that poor productivity growth could be caused by an imbalance 
between inputs and outputs (i.e. an increase in inputs to fuel growth did not 
lead to a similar increase in outputs). In this way, low productivity growth 
could be indicating that those FCBs accessing VC/PE could be financially 
constrained, as already proved in non-FCBs. This issue is addressed in the 
second empirical contribution, where financial constraints are tested as a 
motive for FCBs to approach VC/PE financing. The results of the previous 
study are confirmed in this second work. To include firms’ unobserved 
investment opportunities estimations are based on the Euler equation, 
according to the model of Bond and Meghir. Significant dependency of 
investments to cash flows is found to be higher in FCBs that later receive 
VC/PE financing. In addition, first generation FCBs that receive VC/PE later 
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seem to be more financially constrained than their first generation non-VC/PE-
backed counterparts. Nevertheless, no significant differences are found in later 
generation FCBs. Thus, the hypotheses about financial constraints as a motive 
for FCBs to approach VC/PE are confirmed, despite the reluctance of first 
generation FCBs to lose control.  
In addition, the first two empirical works also show that VC/PE 
involvement exerts a positive effect on first generation FCBs. Productivity 
growth is significantly increased by VC/PE firms in first-generation FCBs, 
whereas no significant changes are found in later-generation FCBs. Similarly, 
in the second work we find that VC/PE financing alleviates financial constraints 
in first generation FCBs, whereas it does not happen in descendant 
generations.  
The third study considers the behavioral results of the first two exercises 
but focuses on the impact of VC/PE on investee firm’s performance. Contrary 
to the first two studies, the third study is based on the investors’ perspective. 
As targeted, key circumstances are analyzed to identify distinctive drivers of 
investors’ influence. Based on the previous results and recent findings in 
literature a key role was assumed for the size of investors’ share in the 
investee firm. We argue that majority or minority shareholdings controlled by 
VC/PE institutions would lead to a strong or weak influence, respectively, of 
VC/PE managers over FCB managers. More precisely, depending on their share 
in the FCB, the VC/PE investor could impose or not their management culture 
over the family’s management culture. Early stage investments were excluded 
from the analyses because family management culture is not believed to be 
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strongly developed yet. We measure growth in sales, gross margin and 
employment in the empirical model. As expected, we find that VC/PE-backed 
FCBs grow less than non-FCBs also backed by VC/PE investors when the latter 
hold minority shareholdings. Conversely, no significant differences are found in 
the case of VC/PE firms holding majority shareholdings. 
This work contributes to the previous literature in several ways. Firstly, it 
develops a young stream of literature including behavioral and corporate 
finance issues in FCBs. The prevalence of socioemotional wealth preservation 
over financial goals is highlighted in FCBs. But this prevalence changes when 
firm survival is at risk. We provide insights on the motives family principals 
have to approaching external investors. As first reason we highlight low 
productivity, which could be explained by an imbalance between inputs and 
outputs. This is a starting point to the challenging development of the 
investigation of thresholds for families and their principals to change from 
family to financial goals in their utility functions. It also gives new insights on 
FCBs’ research across generations.  
Secondly, from the investor’s perspective, we provide evidence that only 
with a majority stake the investor is able to implement the necessary changes 
required in the management culture to enhance firm value. A strong family 
agenda impedes the impact of value-adding capacities of VC/PE investors 
when the latter act as a minority shareholder. Hence, it sheds light on the 
difficulties VC/PE investors may face when investing in FCBs. 
Future research should investigate further the reason why FCBs approach 
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or not VC/PE institutions, with a generational perspective, completing the 
initial evidence found in our empirical works. Similarly, as the number of 
minority investments increases in recent periods the role of contracting should 
be taken into consideration for further studies. The role VC/PE institutions can 
play depends on the strength of their influence. If contracts are developed in 
this context this might enhance probability of success of minority investments. 
As main limitations, we should mention that the scope of this study is 
limited to only one country. Even though this approach reduces heterogeneity 
across sample firms and the impact of environmental issues, sample size is 
not large enough to provide more evidence on the research questions 
analyzed. 
